

To be returned to the
ACADEMIC REGISTRAR,
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON,
SENATE HOUSE, W.C.1
with the Examiners' Report

ABU HAKIMA (A.M.)

Ph.D.

1960.

(History.)



ProQuest Number: 10731473

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10731473

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

1.
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

S. O. A. S.

THE 'UTBĪ STATES IN EASTERN
ARABIA IN THE SECOND HALF
OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

by

Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakima

Thesis submitted for the degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

June 1960

C O N T E N T S

	<u>page</u>
Acknowledgement	4
Abstract	5
Transliteration	7
Abbreviations	8
<u>Survey of the Sources</u>	10
A. Arabic Sources	12
B. Local Tradition	33
C. India Office Records	38
1. Manuscript documents	38
2. Printed documents and works	40
D. The European travellers' accounts	41
1. East India Company's Servants	41
2. Travellers other than those officials	42
3. Early 19th century travellers	44
E. Late European compilations	47
Chapter 1 <u>Introductory: The State of Affairs in</u> <u>the Persian Gulf in the First Half of</u> <u>the Eighteenth Century</u>	50
A. The European trading companies in the Persian Gulf.	55
B. Affairs of Persia and Ottoman Mesopotamia (1700-1750)	65
1. The Affairs of Persia	65
2. The Affairs of Ottoman Mesopotamia	72

	<u>Page</u>
C. Eastern and Central Arabia	76
Chapter II <u>The Rise of Kuwait (1700-1762)</u>	85
Chapter III <u>The Growth of Kuwait - The Establishment of Zubara. 1766 - The Beginnings of the 'Utbī Naval Power (1762-1775)</u>	116
Chapter IV <u>State of Affairs in the 'Utbī States 1775-1790</u>	162
Chapter V <u>The Wahhābīs in Eastern Arabia</u>	216
A. The Wahhābiyya and the Wahhābī relations with the Banī Khalid.	219
B. Development in the 'Utbī States (1790-1800)	249
C. 'Utbī-Wahhābī relations, 1792-1800	265
Chapter VI <u>The 'Utbī States and the Trade of the Persian Gulf and Eastern Arabia 1750-1800</u>	294
Conclusions	323
Appendix	331
Bibliography	349
Maps	362
1. Niebuhr's Map of the Persian Gulf, 1765	9
2. Kuwait Bay	363
3. The Great Desert Route	364
4. Location of Arab Tribes around the Persian Gulf	365
5. Bahrain and its vicinity	366

M.B.

Please note that in the pagination pages 233, 278-287 inclusive have been omitted in error.

2.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I should like to express in this place my gratitude to Professor Bernard Lewis, under whose inspiring guidance this work has been carried out. To Dr. M. E. Yapp, of the S.O.A.S., I am indebted for valuable suggestions.

I should like to put on record the great assistance I received from the staffs of the libraries of the British Museum, the India Office and the School of Oriental and African Studies. Mr. J. D. Pearson, the Librarian of the S.O.A.S. was extremely helpful in obtaining microfilm copies of theses from abroad. I have also to express my thanks to the Kuwaitī friends for their valuable information on their local tradition. To Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Khalid Āl-Khalīfa, the cousin of the ruler of Bahrain, I am indebted for similar information on the local tradition of the Āl-Khalīfa.

To the British Council I owe a debt of two years scholarship without which it would have been difficult to accomplish this work.

June, 1960.

ABSTRACT

This study deals with the 'Utbi States in Eastern Arabia in the second half of the eighteenth century. The rise of the 'Utub, the ancestors of the present influential families and the rulers of Kuwait and Bahrain, has so far been neglected.

Chapter One of the present work describes the position in Eastern Arabia and the Persian Gulf in the first half of the 18th century and how certain factors paved the way for the rise of the first 'Utbi settlement of Kuwait.

Chapter Two treats of the origin of the 'Utub and reflects an attempt to answer various questions relating to the growth of Kuwait and the rise of the Āl-Ṣabāḥ as the first 'Utbi rulers in that town, in 1752.

In 1766, the Āl-Khalīfa, the cousins of Āl-Ṣabāḥ, accompanied by other 'Utbi families, migrated to the south and established Zubāra in Qatar. The rapid growth of the 'Utbi trade that followed its establishment and other aspects of the 'Utbi history are discussed in Chapter Three.

The commercial success of Kuwait and Zubāra provoked the jealousy of other Arab tribes in the area and especially those on the Persian littoral of the Gulf. As a result of military operations between the 'Utub and the latter Bahrain Islands were conquered in 1782 and by now the 'Utub had become the strongest Arab maritime power on the Persian

Gulf. This rise in the 'Utbi power until 1790 is treated in Chapter Four.

By the 1780's the Wahhābīs had conquered most parts of Central Arabia and started their wars against the Banī Khālid, rulers of al-Ḥasā and the barrier of the coastal 'Utbi States. Wahhābism, Wahhābī-Khālidī struggle, and Wahhābī relations with the 'Utūb are treated in Chapter Five.

Chapter Six deals with the commercial aspect of the 'Utbi history and it shows how they succeeded in almost monopolising the trade of Eastern Arabia.


'Utbi relations with the European and other forces in the area are treated in various chapters of the thesis.

ABBREVIATIONS

B.S.	Bombay Selections.
B.M.	British Museum.
E.I./I	Encyclopaedia of Islam, first edition.
F.R.P.P.G.	Factory Records, Persia and the Persian Gulf.
J.I.H.	Journal of Indian ⁱⁱ history.
Sec. Com.	Secret Committee.

SINUS PERSICUS
*marium partem
 ad observationem propriam
 A. MDCCCLXV institutas
 delineatus*
 C. Viebuhr.

Scala
 Milliarum Germanicorum 15 in uno Gradu
 Leue: 100000 20 in uno Gradu.



SURVEY OF THE SOURCES

SURVEY OF THE SOURCES

Materials for writing the history of the 'Utbī States in Eastern Arabia in the second half of the eighteenth century were traced in both Arabic and European sources. The 'Utūb, whose rise is for the first time being historically treated, have so far remained without any serious study. Very little was said about their history during that period, principally because those who dealt with it were either Arabs who did not consult European sources or Europeans who did not consult the relevant Arabic sources. In the present work those sources were combined and an attempt was made to let them join in presenting that history.

Some of these sources were used by writers who dealt with Arabia and the Persian Gulf in as much as they needed them for their narratives, but it can be claimed that they have never been used in writing the history of the 'Utūb, which is being written for the first time and with some detail. In fact, many of the Arabic manuscripts, as far as I know, have never been used before.

Therefore it has become necessary in the opening of this work to reevaluate the most important sources in point of the light they throw on the history of the 'Utūb in particular, and Eastern Arabia in general.

It has seemed best to divide our sources of information into the following groups:

- A. Arabic sources.
- B. Local traditions.
- C. India Office Records.
- D. European travellers.
- E. Late European Compilations.

A. Arabic Sources.

Most of the Arabic contemporary or semi-contemporary sources are still in manuscript. The very few that were published appeared either in abridged forms or they are as rare as the manuscripts. It is necessary to state that those sources did not deal specifically with Eastern Arabia or the 'Utūb, but events relating to them are given there.

The Arab writers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries whose works throw light on Eastern Arabia come mostly from Najd and 'Irāq. Those who wrote in Najd were chronicling the Wahhābī Islamic revolution. The writers in 'Irāq, on the other hand, were influenced by the Ottoman rule of the country.

Ḥusayn b. Ghannām is the first Wahhābī chronicler. His work Rawdat al-Afkār wal-Afhām¹ is made up of two volumes. In the first

¹For the title in full see the bibliography. This book exists as a manuscript and printed. Two manuscript copies are in the British Museum, Nos. Add. 23, 344-5 and 19,700, 19,300. El-Bātrik in his Turkish

(cont.)

volume the author explains the situation in Najd and neighbouring countries and how people at that time, i.e. the eighteenth century, "were not Muslims at all". The author gives Chapter II to the geneology of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb and how he achieved success and the effect he had on his contemporary shaikhs. The remaining three chapters are given to the Wahhābī creed as seen from various dispatches of Shaikh Muḥammad to a number of people, Wahhābīs and otherwise.

This volume is of extreme importance in explaining the Wahhābī doctrine because Ibn Ghannām was one of the disciples of Shaikh Muḥammad, and he presents in this volume most of the Wahhābī creed as given by its founder. The Wahhābī creed and the teachings of Shaikh Muḥammad were of great consequence in Eastern Arabia and other parts of the peninsula.

(cont.)

and Egyptian Rule in Arabia (1810-1841) (thesis, London University 1947) used a manuscript copy owned by "Fawzān al-Sābiq, late Su'ūdī Minister to Egypt" (see p. xv of his thesis). Rawḍat al-Afkār was published in lithograph print at Bombay, 1919. The work of Ibn Ghannām and other British Museum manuscripts were either bought from their owners or given to the Museum. Most of those manuscripts were bought by the British representatives in the Persian Gulf, many of whom were acquainted with the Oriental languages.

The second volume entitled Kitāb al-Ghazwāt al-Bayāniyya etc.¹ is the earliest chronicle of Wahhābīsm. The author made it clear from the beginning of this part that he intended to chronicle the spread of the new doctrine of which he was a follower. He starts with the year 1159/1746, when Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb was obliged to leave al-'Uyayna town in Najd and seek refuge at al-'Dir'iyya, the stronghold of Āl-Su'ūd, an incident which coloured the history of the following fifty years because he was driven out by Sulaymān b. Muḥammad Āl-Ḥamīd of the Banī Khālīd.² The Wahhābīs had to wage war against the Banī Khālīd, the protectors of the 'Utūb and other smaller tribes in Eastern Arabia,³ until their humiliation in 1795. As Wahhābīsm colours the history of the era under consideration, Ibn Ghannām becomes invaluable for the tracing of Wahhābī expansion towards the east of Najd. His importance comes, as well, from the fact

¹See bibliography for the full title.

²For the Banī Khālīd tribe, their territories and rule in Eastern Arabia, see Chapter II, pp. 76-82. For their struggle with the Wahhābīs, see Chapter V, pp. 224-249.

³By protectors, I am referring to the Arab custom of himāya or dakhīl. The 'Utūb settled at Kuwait, their first settlement in Eastern Arabia, by the permission of the Shaikh of the Banī Khālīd and they stayed under his protection till his authority was weakened and this gave them the opportunity to practise a state of independence in the 1750's.

that he was both contemporary to the events he describes, and he knew the people and places he writes about.

In his chronicling of events, he portrays the spirit of a true Wahhābī. Therefore, he is not sparing in describing the opponents as "infidels, treacherous enemies of God", etc. Yet his chronicle is invaluable for not only being the first chronicle of Wahhābism but also because he gives almost in all events the results of skirmishes or battles whether they turned in favour of the Wahhābīs or not. In fact, his description of those encounters is more detailed and informative than the second Wahhābī chronicler, Ibn Bishr. Modern writers hold his work in great esteem.¹ Kitāb al-Ghazwāt ends abruptly by the events of 1212/1797², though Ibn Ghannām lived thirteen years after

¹Philby, Sa'ūdi Arabia, London, 1955, p. 5.

²Ibn Ghannām's work was used extensively by Rentz when compiling his thesis on Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb and the Beginnings of the First Unitarian Empire in Arabia. B. Winder, in A History of the Sa'ūdi State from 1233/1818 - 1308/1891, uses the Ibn Ghannām not infrequently. They both used the Bombay printed copy. Al-Rayḥānī, in his Ta'īkh Najd al-Ḥadīth Wa Muḥaqāṭuh, uses the Bombay copy.

that date.¹

‘Uthmān b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Bishr (d. 1288/1871), in his work ‘Unwān al-Majd fī Ta’rīkh Najd, chronicles the Wahhābī movement from its earliest phase, like Ibn Ghannām, till 1263/1851. His work exists as a manuscript in the British Museum (Or 7718) with the date 1270/1853 at its end. This means that it is one of the earliest copies existing.² Ibn Bishr intended to compile the history of Najd under the Wahhābī-Su‘ūdī rule (I, pp. 1-4). His History is a year by year account of the current affairs of the Su‘ūdī rulers. Their triumphs as well as their defeats are recorded. Those rulers are always highly esteemed by him and their success is mentioned in detail while their defeats or withdrawals are not. He quoted other historians (pp. 4-5), but he does not mention the History of Ibn Ghannām, though he quoted his poetry more than once (I, p. 95).³ Yet my

¹Ibn Bishr in ‘Unwān al-Majd, Vol. I, p. 149, gives the death of Ibn Ghannām in the events of 1225/1810.

²There may be other manuscripts of the same work in the possession of Su‘ūdīs. The work was published in Baghdād in 1328/1911 in one volume, and in Makka in two volumes. The references are here made to the Makka edition. Rentz and Winder use the Makka edition, while Batrik uses the Baghdād edition.

³Ibn Ghannām composed long poems to commemorate the Wahhābī victories over their opponents. On pp. 98-99, Vol. II, he expresses his rejoicing on the reduction of al-Riyāḍ, and on pp. 214-17, Vol. II, he expresses the relief the Wahhābīs felt on the death of Thawaynī.

close examination of both texts revealed that Ibn Bishr modelled his work on Ibn Ghannām's Ghazwāt. The events are the same and the wording is similar, but the main difference lies in the fact that Ibn Bishr's does not digress when chronicling events to religious questions, like Ibn Ghannām's.¹ As for the area under consideration, the struggle with the Banī Khālīd, rulers of al-Ḥasā, is fairly well described. The writer, in what he calls "earlier event or antecedent", Sābiqa, in his History gives much about the Banī Khālīd's rule. In fact, they are the only dated events from which a chronology for the Banī Khālīd rulers was drawn.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, when piracy became a pressing danger to the area, Ibn Bishr becomes invaluable as an authority on the subject, where he, as usual, expresses the Wahhābī attitude towards piracy, the Qawāsīm pirates being adherents of Wahhābism (I, p. 146).

As a Wahhābī authority and contemporary too, he is invaluable for recording events of the Wahhābī occupation of Bahrain and the ever-existing Wahhābī threat to 'Umān and Masqaṭ, where the Āl-Bū-Sa'īdīs, the rulers, had to face both Wahhābism and piracy in the Persian Gulf (I, 142-146).

¹See for example the events of the years 1167/1753 and 1210/1795.

The importance of both Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr in the history of the 'Utbi States lies in the fact that they record the Wahhābī-Khālidi relations. The Banī Khālidi were for sometime the protectors of the 'Utūb and their barrier against the Wahhābīs. They also record the Wahhābī raids on the 'Utbi States in the 1790's and the 'Utbi counter attacks.¹ They gain importance also from the fact that they were Wahhābī believers and that they were contemporary to the events recorded by them.

But if Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr were contemporaries who represent the Wahhābī interests, there were other contemporaries who held just the opposite point of view. These were 'Irāqī historians who represent the Ottoman outlook.

In this group of Histories falls the work of Yāsīn² b. Khayr Allāh al-Khaṭīb al-'Umari, Al-Durr al-Maknūn fī Ma'āthir al-'Ādiya min al-Qurūn. Al-'Umari was born in 1158/1745 in al-Muṣil. So he was quite old when the Wahhābīs started raiding 'Irāq at the beginning of the 19th century. He compiled more than one historical

¹See Chapter V below, pp. 265-294.

²Yāsīn belongs to a distinguished 'Ulamā' family. His father, grandfather and his son were 'Ulamā' and authors. See their works in Brockelmann, Supp. II, 781-782.

work.¹ Al-Durr al-Maknūn starts with the first year of the Hijra and ends at 1226/1811. The long era covered by the work made the chronicling of events very brief. Though the material concerning the area under consideration is not abundant, when compared to that of Ibn Ghannām or Ibn Bishr, yet it is of special importance because it reflects the Ottoman outlook on the Wahhābīs.² And, at the same time, it expresses the feeling of the Shī'as on every "event of Wahhābī barbarism", as he often calls it, displayed during their sudden and frequent raids. The Wahhābīs are called "treacherous and damned fellows" and Su'ūd, their leader, was no more than a "villain" (f. 387). Unfortunately he does not give any detailed account of the Ottoman reaction to those attacks.

¹ His work Gharā'ib al-Athar was published in al-Muṣil by Maḥmūd Ṣiddīq al-Jalīlī in 1369/1940. See 'Abbās al-Azzawī Ta'rikh al-'Irāq bayn Ihtilālayn, Baghdād, 1954, Vol. 6, p. 208. There are two manuscript copies of Al-Durr al-Maknūn in the British Museum. Add. 23, 312-3. For other works by the same author see Brockelmann, Supp. II, pp. 781-782. These manuscripts are kept in Berlin, Cairo, Paris and al-Muṣil. Another manuscript copy is in Paris, 4949, Brockelmann, Supp. I^I, 781.

² The same Ottoman outlook is represented in the contemporary Syrian work, Kitāb al-Miṣbāḥ al-Sārī wa Nuzhat al-Qārī, by Ibrāhīm Khilīl al-Dayrānī, Bayrūt, 1272 A.H/1855.

Yet this can be traced in the work of 'Uthmān b. Sanad al-Baṣrī¹ Maṭālī' al-Su'ūd Biṭṭayyib Akhbār al-Wālī Dawūd² which was compiled on the demand of Dawūd Pasha, the Wālī of Baghdād, in 1241/1825.³ The work does not actually give the history of Dawūd Pasha alone, for it portrays the history of Ottoman 'Irāq and its relations with the neighbouring countries from 1188/1774, the birth of Dawūd pasha, to 1242/1826, the death of the author.⁴ The reigns of preceding Pashas of Baghdād are described and important events are recorded. Thus this contemporary work becomes invaluable for the siege and occupation of Baṣra by the Persians (1775-1779), the information it gives on the Muntafiq and other Arab tribes of 'Irāq and their relations with Eastern Arabia, the expeditions of Thuwaynī of the Muntafiq against the Wahhābīs in 1786 and 1797 and the expedition of 'Alī

¹ Shaikh 'Uthmān b. Sanad is a Najdī of the 'Anaza tribe. He was born in Najd in 1180/1766 and later migrated to Baṣra. He died at Baghdād in 1242/1826. He was Malikī Sunnī. See the article "Al-Shaikh 'Uthmān b. Sanad al-Baṣrī" in Lughat al-'Arāb, III, 1913, pp. 180-186, by Kāzīm al-Dujaylī.

² On the Berlin MS. the title of the work is given as Ta'rīkh Baghdād al-Musammā Maṭālī' al-Su'ūd fī Akhbār Dawūd. The title I give in the text is taken from the author, f. 14.

³ See Maṭālī', f. 13.

⁴ Brockelmann, Supp. II, 791, gives his death in 1250/1834, after Amīn Hasan al-Hulwānī's Mukhtaṣar Maṭālī'.

Pasha, the Kaya of Baghdād, against them in 1798/9. The work reveals the author's anti-Wahhābī feelings in more than one place. An example of this can be seen in his long poem commemorating Thuwaynī, the chief of the Muntafiq, who was assassinated by the Wahhābīs in 1797 (ff. 79-80).¹ This work is also important for it is the earliest source to give the letters exchanged between 'Alī Pasha and Su'ūd on the first's withdrawal from al-Ḥasā in 1799.² Events in this work are arranged chronologically and it contains the biographies of many contemporary literary figures and chiefs of Arab tribes. The book was written in compliance with the desire of Dāwūd Pasha and the author left Baṣra for Baghdād for that purpose in 1241/1825 (f. 13).

¹He is praising Thuwaynī for contradicting Ibn Ghannām's poem which praises the assassinator, the Wahhābī slave Tu'ayyis.

²The work was abridged by Amīn b. Ḥasan al-Ḥulwānī and printed in Bombay in 1304/1886 under the title Mukhtaṣar Ta'rīkh al-Shaikh 'Uthmān b. Sanad al-Baṣrī al-Musammā Maṭālī' al-Su'ūd Biṭayyib Akhbār al-Wālī Dawūd. The copy I am using in my work is the Berlin manuscript which is in itself incomplete because it ends with the events of 1231/1315. Al-Dujaylī, in Lughat al-Ārab, III, p. 184, mentions to other manuscript copies in the Murjāniyya Library and in the Library of the Carmelite Fathers in Baghdād. Al-'Azzawī, in his customary way of quoting in verbatim other works in writing his chronological history of 'Irāq, refers to another copy owned by him, see Ta'rīkh al-'Irāq, Vol. 6, p: 63.

Of special importance to the historian of Eastern Arabia in the eighteenth century is Ibn Sanad's Sabā'ik al-'Asjad fī Akhbār Aḥmad Najl Rizq al-As'ad, which is a monograph dealing with the biography of Aḥmad b. Rizq, a rich 'Utbī merchant who, according to Ibn Sanad's Sabā'ik, established Zubāra together with Khalīfa b. Muḥammad, the founder of the Āl-Khalīfa ruling family of Bahrain. This work was published in Bombay in 1315/1897.¹ In this work Ibn Sanad gives very short biographies of forty two men who had connections with Ibn Rizq. They represent a cross section of the men of Baṣra and the 'Utbī towns. A brief note is made of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāḥ, the second ruler of Kuwait, and Khalīfa b. Muḥammad, the first 'Utbī ruler of Zubāra. The style of writing is full of saj', (rhyming) and the author's poetry.

Still this is the earliest place where mention is made of the 'Utūb as the founders of Zubāra.² It is the only Arabic source to give us information, though without statistics, on the 'Utbī trade and the attitude of Khalīfa b. Muḥammad towards relieving the merchants from paying any duties (p.20).³ Ibn Sanad, when speaking of the 'Ulamā' and mer-

¹A manuscript copy of the same is kept in the British Museum, No. Or 7565.

²Sabā'ik, p. 19.

³He might be comparing the position of the merchants at Zubāra with those of the neighbouring ports of al-Qaṭīf and al-'Uqair where the duties were collected on imports.

chants, seems to have known most of them very well. He, himself, was a student of Ibn Fayrūz, one of those whose biographies he gives. Although Ibn Sanad does not give the reason for writing this book, it can be gathered from the biographies of Ibn Rizq's five sons at the end of it that Ibn Sanad wrote it on the eldest son's demand. This son, Muḥammad by name, was a rich 'Utbī merchant who migrated with his father from Zubāra to Baṣra after the surrender of Zubāra to the Wahhābīs in 1798. The book was written after the death of Aḥmad b. Rizq.¹ Aḥmad b. Rizq continued to be a prominent figure in 'Irāq after his emigration from Zubāra.² This work is known to people interested in history in Kuwait and Baḥrain. It is referred to in al-Qinā'ī and al-Raḥīd³ when they tried to fix an approximate date for the rise of Āl-Ṣabāḥ and Āl-Khalīfa. Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Khalīd

¹He died in 1224/1809. See Sabā'ik, p. 103.

²Coranez in his Histoire des Wahabis, (Paris 1810), pp. 57-59 and p. 190, note no. 23, speaks of the wealth of Aḥmad b. Rizq and how in 1804 he intervened between the Mutasallam of Baṣra and the Sultān of Masqaṭ in a financial dispute.

³Two Kuwaitī historians, see below pp. 91-93.

Āl-Khalīfa, reflecting the tendency among the Āl-Khalīfa, does not agree to the point which Ibn Sanad makes when he states that the father of Ahmad b. Rizq was, together with Khalīfa b. Muḥammad, the founders of Zubāra. Shaikh 'Abd Allāh told me that Ibn Sanad was the Imām of the Āl-Khalīfa mosque at Zubāra during the reign of Ahmad b. Khalīfa. Although I could not trace any information about 'Uthmān b. Sanad's life, yet his wide knowledge of the important people in al-Ḥasā and the 'Utbī States is clear from the forty two biographies in Saba'ik al-'Asjad and of the comments he makes in his exact chronology in Maṭāli' al-Su'ūd. These two works of Ibn Sanad, however, gain importance from the fact that they are written by a person who was contemporary to the events about which he writes and well acquainted with the 'Utūb themselves.

Much valuable information on Eastern Arabia in the period under our consideration was traced in the work of another historian whose identity has remained unknown in the catalogue of manuscripts in the British Museum since 1860, when his manuscript found its way to the Museum.¹ This is Lam' al-Shihāb fī Sīrat Muḥammad b. 'Add al-Wahhāb.²

¹My efforts to discover the identity of the author have not, so far, proved successful. I contacted to that end some people interested in history in Kuwait, Bahraïn and Su'ūdī Arabia, but none of them could give any information, because the book is not known to them. The British Museum manuscript may, therefore, be the only known copy.

²Bound with the same manuscript is another manuscript of Kitāb al-Tawhīd by Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb.

As no proper introduction and use of this book has so far been made, it becomes necessary to give a brief analysis of its contents.

Lam' al-Shihāb deals with the history of the Wahhābīs from the start of their movement until the year 1233/1317.¹ It is divided into five chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter I deals with the rise of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb and gives his biography.

Chapter II explains how Muḥammad b. Su'ūd accepted the new doctrine.

Chapter III deals with the geneology of Muḥammad b. Su'ūd.

The fourth chapter gives a detailed account of the rule of the Wahhābīs beginning with Muḥammad b. Su'ūd and ending by 'Abd Allāh b. Su'ūd, and the spread of their influence in 'Umān, Qaṭar, 'Irāq, Syria, etc.

In Chapter five the author explains how the Wahhābīs won parts of the Ḥijāz, Yaman, Tihāma, and gives some account of the Arab tribes living there.

The conclusion illustrates some of the teachings of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb and how other Muslims refuted them.

¹It is interesting to note that this manuscript was written, according to what is given by its copyist Ḥasan b. Jamāl b. Aḥmad al-Rubkī, in the same year of its compilation by its unknown author, in 1233/1317. See f. 280.

In all this the writer does not appear to be a mere chronicler of events like Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr. He gives the historical facts, and discusses causes and results almost throughout his work. He tries to find out the truth about what he writes by contacting shaikhs from Zubair and Kuwait (ff. 20-21). He is not prejudiced against the Wahhābīs. On the other hand, he himself was not a Wahhābī, and yet he respects the teachings of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. When the Wahhābīs commit a crime he never looks for an excuse but condemns it.¹

He is the only Arab historian to give a fairly detailed account of the Banī Khālīd and mentions their good characteristics (ff. 222-226). In Lam' alone one can find a satisfactory geneological account of the Banī Khālīd in spite of the fact that even this account lacks the dates.² His analysis of their fall is also remarkable. According to him, the Banī Khālīd could have resisted the Wahhābī attacks, had it not been for the fact that their chiefs began their internal struggle for the Shaikhship influenced by the Wahhābī instigation and conspiracies (ff. 79-81).

¹An example of this according to Lam' is the attitude of the Wahhābīs towards 'Alī b. Aḥmad, a Khālīdī chief, who was killed in cold blood after he had been offered safe conduct by Su'ūd (ff. 86-87).

²The Banī Khālīd shaikhs can be traced in Ibn Bishr's 'Unwān al-Majd', Vol. I, but here they are disorderly, thrown into the various pages. Ibn Bishr is useful in dating the various rules of those shaikhs.

On tackling the expeditions sent to al-Ḥasā, whether Wahhābī or Ottoman, he tries to be quite accurate in estimating the distances between towns, by giving different estimations and selecting the most appropriate one.

Nor does he forget to give statistics in his History; the income of the Wahhābī states in 1232/1816, from the different parts of Arabia, was estimated at 2,210,000 riyāls (ff. 236-237); the population of the state numbered about two millions and three hundred thousands (ff. 237-238).

As for the Wahhābī attitude towards piracy, he states the fact that Shaikh 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, an important Wahhābī religious figure, used to hold it as supreme religious duty (ff. 247-248). He points out that the Wahhābīs used the Qawāsīm as their tools in many piratical instances (ff. 96-109). His account of 'Alī Pasha's expedition against the Wahhābīs in al-Ḥasā in 1213/1798 is unrivalled by any other Arab account¹ for he offers reasons for the failure of the expedition not to be found anywhere else (ff. 173-187). Nor did he forget to tell us that he had been an eyewitness of the expedition somewhere near Baṣra.

¹Ibn Sanad in his Maṭāli' gives an account of this expedition, but his account is not so detailed as Lam''s and it lacks the reasoning on the failure of the expedition given by Lam'. Ibn Bishr records the expedition from the Wahhābī point of view, but there again the reasoning is lacking. According to Ibn Bishr the Wahhābīs were victorious because they were stronger and better fighters.

His honesty as a historian made him revise his account of some incidents later in the year 1233/1817, a year after he had finished writing his work. As for the topography of al-Ḥasā, he gives a description which is far better than other contemporary accounts (ff. 215-221).

But the work has a defect so much as the author relates many events without giving the dates, and these had to be calculated by reference to other works. However, it is a rich source of information and it can boast of a moderate and unbiased attitude towards recording the history of the struggling forces in the area, a fact which is lacking in most other contemporary Arab works.¹

Another work which compares with Lam' al-Shihāb in its moderation is 'Unwān al-Majd fī Bāyn Ahwāl Baghdād wa Baṣra wa Najd² by Ibrāhīm b. Faṣīḥ al-Ḥaydarī al-Baghdādī. Ibn Faṣīḥ, before writing his History, travelled, as he stated in his introduction, to Syria, Egypt and Turkey in order to become acquainted with the countries he may speak about in his work. His grandfather As'ad al-Ḥaydarī was

¹From the date 1233/1817 given at the end of the book by the copyist, this copy of the British Museum may go as the earliest if other copies should come into existence.

²British Museum MS. Or 7567.

the Hanafī Muftī of Baghdād. So Ibn Faṣīḥ is a Sunnī Moslem.

His work was written at Baṣra in 1286/1869 when he was working as a government official. In his introduction to his work he shows how he divided it into three chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter deals with the history of Baghdād, the second with Baṣra and the third with Najd.

The chapter on Baṣra interests us in this place and this interest arises from the fact that the author shows ~~there~~ the connection it had with other towns on the Arabian coast of the Gulf. Thus he gives the names of some mercantile families, members of each of which live in three or more of those towns (ff. 91-92).¹

Still the chapter on Najd should not pass without the following comments. Ibn Faṣīḥ here gives the texts of some letters addressed by Wahhābī rulers to their subjects. These letters, as well as extracts from his main work, were quoted by a late 'Irāqī historian, Maḥmūd Shukrī al-Ālūsī in his Ta'rīkh Najd. Sometimes Ibn Faṣīḥ criticises the Wahhābīs (f.113). Al-Ālūsī, copying his work in verbatim and without acknowledgement, in his Ta'rīkh Najd, aroused the anger of Shaikh Sulaymān b. Saḥmān al-Najdī, who thought that al-Ālūsī

¹An example of that is al-Qinā'āt or Āl-Badr family, whose members were in Kuwait, Baṣra and Bahrain.

contradicted himself because he started by praising the Wahhābīs at the very beginning of his work. The fact is that towards the end of Ta'rīkh Najd, al-Ālūsī was actually quoting Ibn Faṣīḥ literally.

Whatever Shaiḫ Sulaymān or other Wahhābī writers might think of what Ibn Faṣīḥ stated, the latter was trying all the time to keep his impartiality, and his work remains an authentic account of Najd and the Arabian littoral of the Gulf during the early years of the 19th century.¹

Another short, but invaluable, manuscript which throws light on the area and era under consideration is Shaiḫ Muḥammad al-Bassām's Kitāb al-Durar al-Mafākhir fī Akhbār al-'Arab al-Awakhir. (British Museum Add. 7358). This work has been compiled by the author at the request of Mr. Rich, the political Resident at Baghdād.²

Al-Bassām was a soldier in the Wahhābī army which fought against Ṭūsūn Pasha, the son of Muḥammad 'Alī Pasha, the Wālī of Egypt (f.14). The main value of this work rests in the fact that it gives a detailed

¹The work of Ibn Faṣīḥ is still in manuscript kept in the British Museum.

Or. 7567. Other copies, Berl. Olt. 1806 and 2985; See Brockelmann, Supp. II, 791.

²Mr. C. J. Rich, born 1787, died at Shirāz 1821. He was the Resident of the East India Company at Baghdād from 1806-1821. His collection of MSS, medals and antiquities is placed in the British Museum. (His MSS. are in the India Office Library).

study of the Arab tribes inhabiting Arabia, 'Irāq and Syria towards the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. The author gives the number of fighters in every tribe.¹ His account of the Qawāsīm, whose territories came to be known as Trucial 'Umān, (ff. 38-39) tallies with what other contemporaries have written. His chapter on al-Hasā (ff. 39-40) is important for the geographical study and implications of names of towns and places at a time when there were no adequate maps for that area.²

'Umān's relations with the 'Utūb and Eastern Arabia under the Āl-Bū-Sa'īd dynasty³ is given in the works of a native from 'Umān, Ḥamīd b. Muḥammad b. Razīq, whose work Al-Fath al-Mubīn al-Mubārḥin Sīrat al-Sāda al-Būsa'īdiyyīn became known to the Western scholars through

¹These numbers are given on various pages. The cavalry as well as infantry is calculated. The total amounts to 1,079,488.

²Al-Bassām wrote his work in 1813, as Mr. Rich puts it on the last page of the work.

³This is the dynasty that succeeded Āl-Ya'ariba dynasty in the Imāmate of 'Umān, in 1154/1741. The first Bū'sa'īdī Imām was Aḥmad b. Sa'īd (1154/1741 - 1188/1775).

Badger's translation in 1871.¹ Two other manuscript works, of Ibn Raziq, were consulted and the data relating to 'Umān's relations with the Gulf are the same as those given in Al-Fath al-Mubīn.

These two works have remained unused by the writers on the Persian Gulf, Eastern Arabia and 'Umān; it is necessary to report here that the one kept in the University Library at Cambridge (Add. 2893) called Al-Sīra al-Jaliyya al-Musammāt Sa'd al-Su'ūd al-Bū-Sa'īdiyya, is the short summary on which Al-Fath al-Mubīn was based. This book has at its end the date 1271/1854 while al-Fath al-Mubīn is dated 1273/1856. To Al-Fath is added also the history of Al-Bū-Sa'īd starting from Ahmad b. Sa'īd and forming 100 folios, the first part being 156 folios. Al-Sīra al-Jaliyya is in thirty folios.

¹The title given to the work by Badger is History of the Imāms and Seyyids of 'Omān; it is an accurate title because the work deals with the history of 'Umān under the Ibādī (Khārījī) rule (for Ibādiyya see Ibid, pp. 385-398) beginning with Julanda b. Mas'ūd 135/751 as the first Imām and ending by Thuwaynī b. Sa'īd (1273/1856). It is worthy to notice in this place that the Christian name of the author is not Salīl, as Badger gives it, but Ḥamīd b. Muḥammad. The word Salīl used by the author (f. 155) means the son of (see Ibn Durayd, Kitāb al-Istāqāq, Cairo, 1958, pp. 359-60). Nevertheless, the author gives his Christian name and his family name in full in more than one place (for example, see f. 124).

The other work is Sahīfat al-Qaḥṭāniyya.¹

The importance of those works lies in the fact that they convey the 'Umānī point of view in the affairs relating to the Gulf and Eastern Arabia. They also are written at a time not far from the events under consideration.

There are other Arabic sources that deal with the history of Eastern Arabia and reference to those will be made where they are used in our text. But before considering the local traditions, it is necessary to state here that the works surveyed above were, except in the case of Ibn Ghannām's, Ibn Bishr's and Al-Fath's translation, not used before, as far as I know, by any author in dealing with the history of the 'Utūb, whether in Kuwait or in Bahrain. Even the three that were used were not used in that context.

B. Local Tradition.

Because the rise of the 'Utūb is treated in this work for the first time and because it does not go back more than 250 years, it became necessary, if possible, to make use of the local tradition kept

¹This work was presented to Rhodes House, Oxford University, by the Sultān of Zanzibār in November 1929. At the end of this work the author, Ibn Raziq, puts his signature and tells that the script is written in his handwriting. The date of writing is also given. It is 1269/1852.

by the inhabitants of both the Shaikhdoms of Kuwait and Bahrain. To investigate these traditions a number of questions in letters and in conversations was put to those people whom I thought able to help. In addition to this, use was made of whatever books were written on the history of the 'Utūb.

As regards my enquiries in Kuwait, these were the result of five years stay in that country (1953-58) during which period I was able to learn much about the present families, many of whom were there from the very beginning. Unfortunately, members of those very few families who have any documents of any kind would not allow any access to them.

Fortunately local tradition in Kuwait was put down in two books in 1926 and 1954. The authors are two Shaikhs or 'Ulamā' who did their best to write down the history of Kuwait from a traditional point of view.

The first of these two is 'Abd al-Azīz al-Rashīd and his work is Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait.¹ In volume one of his History al-Rashīd portrays the social life of the people of Kuwait in the early years of the twentieth century. As social life in Kuwait did not undergo any important changes until after the exploitation of oil in 1946, the pictures the

¹This book was published in Baghḍād in two volumes in 1926.

work draws are almost the same as those of Kuwaitīs in the eighteenth century. An example of this will be seen in his description of pearl fishery among the Kuwaitīs. Here the same portrait can be seen in any eighteenth century work of the European travellers.

In volume two, which deals with the history of Kuwait, the author gives all that the local tradition could say about the rise of Kuwait and the Āl-Ṣabāḥ as its rulers.¹ The publishing of that history in 1926 had its effects on the Arab intelligentsia. Father Anastrase Marie al-Karmalī was disappointed when the first volume made its appearance and had no detailed political study of the Shaikhs and the Shaikhdom. The second volume, however, he said, satisfied more adequately his thirst for historical information. He ended his comments by asking the author to write the history of the other Arab ports on the Gulf.² Existing copies of this book are very rare because its circulation was prohibited by the Shaikh of Kuwait for the author gave some facts relating to the murder of Shaikhs Muḥammad and

¹For his hypothesis on the rise of Kuwait and the Āl-Ṣabāḥ see Chapter II below.

²See his article in Lughat al-‘Arab, IV, 1914, p. 89. See also other comments made by Yūsuf As‘ad Dāghir in Al-Adīb literary magazine VII, July 1958, pp. 19-20.

Jarrāh Āl-Ṣabāh by their half brother Shaikh Mubārak in 1896.

The other Kuwaitī historian Shaikh 'Īsā b. Yūsuf al-Qinā'ī gives his own version of the establishment of Kuwait and the rise of the Āl-Ṣabāh as its rulers.¹ His work Ṣafahāt min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, which appeared in 1954, is a short History of Kuwait beginning with the rule of Ṣabāh I and ending with Mubārak Āl-Ṣabāh, who died in 1915.

The author is considered, by Kuwaitīs, the leading living authority on the history of Kuwait. He is an old man of about 90 years of age. His family is held in esteem by the people and the Shaikhs of Kuwait.² In spite of the fact that he planned his work for the benefit of the government schools in Kuwait, it is a condensed history of Kuwait, with very valuable information on its rise, families, social life and trade.

Like its predecessor it was stopped from circulation on the same grounds.³ However, these two works gain importance from the fact that

¹In the copy in my possession of al-Rashīd's work, Shaikh 'Īsā wrote in the margin his notes on that History. I am not sure of the date when he made those marginal notes.

²For some details about his family see below, pp. 97-98.

³The works of al-Rashīd and al-Qinā'ī were used in various books written after 1950 on Kuwait. These latter books are of no historical value for our present work but contain certain information on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which may be useful to future generations.

they are written by Kuwaitis who know their local tradition well. Some of the relevant facts they give were examined where appropriate in the thesis.

In Bahrain, where the Āl-Khalīfa family is ruling, the local tradition was kept in Shaikh Muḥammad al-Nabḥānī's Ta'rīkh al-Baḥrain, which is part one of his Al-Tuḥfa al-Nabḥāniyya fī Ta'rīkh al-Jazīra al-'Arabiyya. Al-Nabḥānī, after staying some time with the ruler of Bahrain, collected his information and wrote his Ta'rīkh which tells the history of Bahrain from the earliest times to the present time.

What concerns us in this place is the local tradition dealing with the history of Bahrain under the Āl-Khalīfa.

What he tells about the Āl-Khalīfa tallies with what Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Khālīd Āl-Khalīfa told me in August 1959 in London in several meetings held between us. Shaikh 'Abd Allāh, who is a judge in Manāma courts by profession, was kind enough to show me his manuscript history of Bahrain which he is planning to have published. Shaikh 'Abd Allāh's points of view were discussed wherever they occurred in our narrative.

Shaikh 'Abd Allāh's witness to the events is important to us because he represents the Āl-Khalīfa point of view on certain events in the history of the 'Utūb. An example of the conflict between the Āl-Ṣabāḥ and the Āl-Khalīfa points of view was discussed when we dealt with the emigration of the latter from Kuwait in about 1766 and their settlement at Zubāra.

The local 'Utbi tradition was accepted when there was no other source of information on points discussed. The fact that the 'Utub do not have written records of their history makes it difficult for us to fix even the date for the rise of their first Shaikh to power in Kuwait.

C. India Office Records.

However, some of these dates can be checked by the records of the English East India Company kept in the Commonwealth Relations Office, London. Here use was made of manuscript as well as printed records.

1. Manuscript documents: Of the manuscript sources, the Factory Records relating to Persia and the Persian Gulf in the second half of the eighteenth century were consulted. These comprise the volumes dealing with the period from 1703 to 1801.¹

The East India Company in this period had Factories at Bandar 'Abbās (Gombroon), Abū Shahr and Baṣra. The Company's agents used to include in their reports and letters to their superiors at London and Bombay accounts of the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf area. Even

¹These volumes have no index and are unpublished. Reference to them is indicated in this work by giving the date of letters and their numbers. The use of numbers makes it easier to locate the dispatch referred to.

before the temporary establishment of the Baṣra Factory at Kuwait in 1793, these reports supply us with information on Eastern Arabia. It is fair to say that the information on Eastern Arabia, here, is very small when compared with that on Persia and 'Irāq. This may be attributed to the small amount of commerce the Company had had with Eastern and Central Arabia. That commerce, which I describe in Chapter VI of this work, was in the hands of Masqaṭī and 'Utbī merchants.

However, because of the relations of the Arab tribes of southern 'Irāq and the Persian littoral of the Gulf with those of Eastern and Central Arabia, we can trace some information in the Company's records relating to the 'Uṭb and Eastern Arabia.¹ One striking feature of those records is the lack of information on Bahrain. This may be attributed in its turn to the lack of the Company's commercial interests in the area.

However, my hypothesis of the rise of Kuwait to power after the 1770's rests to a considerable extent on the sporadic but very valuable information which those records contain. Perhaps Kuwait's geographical position near Abū Shahr and Baṣra, the Company's centres of commercial

¹In spite of the fact that the Wahhābīs started building their power in the 1740's, they are mentioned for the first time only in the dispatches of 1787 and the only report on the Wahhābīs which I could trace in these records is by Harford Jones Brydges and dated 1st December 1793.

activity in the second half of the 18th century, drew the attention of the Company's agents.

2. Printed documents and works: A clearer picture of the state of affairs in Eastern Arabia from the British point of view is revealed in two works.

The first is Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government - No. XXIV - New Series. In this compilation we can trace "historical and other information" connected with the Arabs of the Persian Gulf. This information comes from reports drawn up by various officers of the Bombay Government in the first half of the 19th century. The importance of these reports to our work comes from the fact that the reporters were officers who were officially asked to report to their government. They wrote at first hand having visited the area. It is true that there are some mistakes in dating earlier events in Arabia, but, on the whole, their work is very valuable for showing the British point of view in the affairs of the Gulf in the 18th and early 19th centuries,¹ for the lists of dated events they offer and the great deal of information on the Arab tribes.

Another compilation on the Persian Gulf is the Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connexions

¹Reference to these reports and the names of the compilers are given when use is made of them.

with the Persian Gulf, 1600-1800. In this work Saldanha selects various letters relating to the history of the Persian Gulf from 1600 to 1800. His selections of the eighteenth century come mostly from the Factory Records of Basra and Abū Shahr. At the end of this work are appended two extremely important reports on the trade of the Gulf. The first was compiled by the Agent and Factor at Basra in 1789 and the second by John Malcolm in 1800. These two reports are contemporary witnesses to the degree of growth that the 'Utbi States had reached towards the end of the century.

D. The European travellers' accounts.

European travellers, in whose works original information on Eastern Arabia was traced, can be classified into three divisions.

1. East India Company's servants.
2. Travellers other than those officials.
3. Early 19th century travellers.

1. East India Company's servants.

Of this group of travellers very little need be said in this place for their works are described in Chapter VI. However, the narratives of their journeys up and down the Gulf and across the great Syrian desert are the main source of information on those famous trade routes in the period and era under consideration.

2. Other travellers.

To this group of travellers belong C. Niebuhr and A. Parsons.

Niebuhr (1733-1815) who became the best European authority on 18th century Arabia, needs but little introduction.

He was the mathematician of the scientific expedition sent out by the King of Denmark to Arabia and the adjacent countries in 1760. Out of five persons, of whom the expedition was originally composed, Niebuhr was the only survivor.¹ On his way back from Bombay to Europe he chose the route via the Persian Gulf. During the period from December 1764 to June 1765 he stayed in the Persian Gulf area. During this time he recorded details of the Arabian tribes inhabiting both coasts of the Gulf and southern 'Irāq.² This is very important to our study because there have always been relations between the Arabs of both shores, and from other works apart from those of Niebuhr very little can be gathered. Thus invaluable information on the Banī Khālīd, Banī Ka'b, the Muntafiq, the Arabs of Bandar Rīq and of Abū Shahr, is given in his works, Description de l'Arabie, and Voyage en Arabie.

¹For the life of Niebuhr and the origin of the expedition, see G. N. Niebuhr, The Life of Carsten Niebuhr, English translation by Prof. Robinson, Edinburgh, 1838, pp. 11-14.

²Niebuhr's works first appeared in German in 1772. A French translation appeared a few years later in 1774 and 1778 and 1780.

In Niebuhr's Description the earliest information concerning Kuwait can be traced (p. 296). It is true that Niebuhr did not visit the town but his method of collecting information on the places which he was unable to visit supplies useful material. In the case of Kuwait he is the first writer to give the two names by which the town was known, Kuwait and Qurain.¹

Niebuhr's chart of the Persian Gulf was the best drawn before the end of the century. It is of great historical value because he locates on it the various territories of the Arab tribes.² Niebuhr failed to collect material of any historical value on the Wahhābīs, but here an excuse can be found in the fact that the Wahhābīs were in their early state and not very much was known about them in Abū Shahr or Basra, the places he visited, during his travels in the Gulf.

However, Niebuhr was and will continue to be invaluable for all historians who write on Arabia in the eighteenth century.³

Another traveller whose information on the state of affairs under

¹See below, pp. 90-91.

²Zubāra is not placed on the map merely because it came into existence a year after the compilation of the map in 1765.

³Almost all those who wrote on Arabia after the publication of Niebuhr's works until the present century depended on Niebuhr's investigations.

discussion is invaluable is Abraham Parsons.¹ Parsons travelled from Aleppo to Baṣra by the desert route in 1774 and he was at Baṣra in 1775 when the Persians besieged the town. In his treatment of that event and its consequences, he gains importance from two facts; he was an eyewitness to and a participator in the events he describes. In that affair the English Factory took the side of the Ottomans against the Persians and Parsons, being on the spot, played his role in the war. The siege of Baṣra had far reaching results on the rising 'Utūb and their conspicuous turn in the war as portrayed by Parsons's narrative of the events has been examined in Chapter 4 of the thesis.

3. Early 19th century travellers.

Of the early 19th century travellers Dr. Seetzen, Bruckhardt, Buckingham, Stocqueler and Wellsted give, though limited, valuable information relating to the 'Utbi States. These, and other travellers, are quoted in various places of the present work and the nature of the information they offer is stated there.

Before concluding this survey of the sources, it is necessary to point out the importance of Sir Harford Jones Brydges' account in

¹"In 1767 Parsons was appointed, by the Turkey Company, Consul and Factor Marine at Scanderron, in Asiatic Turkey, a situation which, after a residence of six years, he was obliged, from the unhealthiness of the country to resign, when he commenced a voyage of Commercial speculation." See the Preface to his Travels, p. iii.

The Wahauby. In this work Brydges speaks of events to which he was a witness and in which he himself participated. He also speaks of events which he did not see but here his power of selectivity and rejection as a historian is great. He is almost always conscious of judging the material he represents. Whenever he feels that there was a better authority on any particular subject he does not hesitate to quote him.

Harford Jones joined the Basra Factory in 1784 and stayed in this area until 1794. During this period he stayed at Kuwait for a short time in 1790 for "a change of air" after falling ill in Basra. In 1793 he came to Kuwait with the Basra Factory on its temporary establishment there. In 1798 he was appointed as a representative of the British Government to the Court of the Pasha of Baghdad.

With this career as a background, a work by Brydges on this particular area must be of particular importance.

His Wahauby, therefore, reflects its author's experience. He knows the area and its inhabitants. When treating wahhābīsm as a creed, he, believing that Burckhardt was the best authority on the subject, refers the reader to Burckhardt's Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys and Brydges quotes him instead of giving his own account.¹

¹See Brydges, The Wahauby, pp.110-114.

As a matter of fact it is not his History of the Wahhābīs that interests us as much as his Notes appended to it. For in them he gives most valuable information on the rule of Shaikh 'Abd allāh Āl-Ṣabāḥ, the second 'Utbī ruler of Kuwait. His account and criticisms of the expedition of 'Alī Pasha, the Kaya of Baghdād, against the Wahhābīs in 1798 are equalled only by those of Lam' al-Shihāb.

Yet there is only one riddle which remained unanswered by Brydges in the delicate affair of the Wahhābī attacks on Kuwait which took place during the Factory's residence there. Brydges makes the Shaikh and the people of Kuwait the heroes of the Wahhābī repulsion and clearly states that neither the Factory's sepoys nor the Company's cruiser at the port, played any share in that affair. On the other hand John Lewis Reinaud, an official of the Factory, told Dr. Seetzen in Aleppo in 1805 that the Factory's role in repelling the attackers was decisive, that the Factory's relations with the Wahhābīs suffered and that he was sent by the Factory to al-Dir'iyya, the Wahhābī capital, to restore the relations.¹ Did Brydges keep in his mind when he was giving his account the Company's policy of keeping neutral in any struggle among the Arabs of the Gulf and not interfering as long as the Company's mail and flag

¹For a rather detailed account of this affair, see below, pp. 289-291.

remained unmolested?¹

Nevertheless, it is only in Brydges' work that we find an explanation of how the Basra Factory came to know of the arrival of the French emissary, Captain Borel de Bourg, at Kuwait in 1778.

The Factory Records relate only the story of his capture.²

E. Late European Compilations

It remains for us to treat two works of value on the history of the Gulf in this survey. The first is Sir Arnold Wilson's The Persian Gulf, first published in London, 1928, which is a general study of the region since its ancient times, and J. G. Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, which was published by the Government of India (Calcutta, 1915) and which until recently was not available for public use.

The Gazetteer, which has been used in our compilation, is a remarkable work of compilation³ and the author based it primarily upon selections from the records of the Indian Governments. For the material on 18th century Arabia he depends mostly on Bombay Selections No. XXIV, Western travellers, formerly alluded to, and Brydges' Wahauby.

¹For this policy of neutrality see Mr. Francis Warden's "Extracts from Brief Notes Relative to the Rise and Progress of the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf" in Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 57, and p. 433.

²See below, p.

³This work is in two volumes of two parts each.

Its main defect in the information on Arabia lies in the fact that Lorimer did not consult any Arabic source. This led him to say in some places that information on certain periods was lacking. In the case of al-Ḥasā, he says "Nothing is known of al-Ḥasā before 1795". Had he consulted Ibn Ghannām, Ibn Bishr, Lam' al-Shihāb or other Arabic works, he must have known much about al-Ḥasā.

However, the Gazetteer will remain an exceedingly important source of information on the Persian Gulf, especially during the 19th century.

We may now turn to show how these different Arabic and European sources were used.

It has been seen that, besides Ibn Ghannām, Ibn Bishr, Ibn Rāziq and Ibn Sanad's Maṭālī', which are chronicles, other Arabic sources give most of their accounts without dates. With the European sources the case is different. The Factory Records give not only the year but the day and month. The European literary sources usually give the dates. So whenever possible the dates were fixed by the help of the European sources. It should be stated here that the Arab chroniclers were exact and their dates, when given and when checked by the Factory records, proved to be correct.¹

¹ An example of this is Thuwaynī's expeditions of 1786 and 1797 against the Wahhābīs and 'Alī Pasha's expedition of 1798/9. They are all given the right dates in the Arabic chronicles.

As for the material for the history of the 'Utūb, the Company's Records helped in building up the picture of the 'Utbī sea power and trade, while the description of the internal relations between the Arabs of Eastern Arabia was based on the information contained in the Arabic sources.¹

The local tradition supplied the material for the rise of the 'Utūb in Kuwait, their origin, emigration and their final settlement at the place by the permission of the Shaikh of the Banī Khālid.

¹An example of that is the continuous struggle between the Banī Khālid and the Wahhābīs throughout the whole period and the Wahhābī attack on Zubāra.

Chapter I

Introductory

THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PERSIAN GULF IN
THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Chapter I

Introductory

THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PERSIAN GULF IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The study of the rise of the 'Utbī States and their development in Eastern Arabia¹ throughout the second half of the eighteenth century dictates a preliminary study of the state of affairs in the

¹Historical research on Eastern Arabia in the eighteenth century is very scanty. The prominent event in that century was the emergence of the Wahhābī movement, which reached the zenith of its strength in the last decade of the eighteenth and the first decade of the nineteenth centuries. The two major sources of information on the Wahhābī movement, namely, Rawdat al-Afkār wal-Afhām limurtādi Hāl al-Imām wa Ta'dād Ghazwāt dhawī al-Islām, two vols. (Bombay, 1919) by Ḥusain b. Ghannam, and 'Uthmān b. 'Abd Allāh b. Bishr . . . 'Unwān al-Majd fī Ta'rīkh Najd, two vols. (Makka, 1349/1930), do not give much information on Eastern Arabia in the first half of the eighteenth century, mainly because the authors, being Wahhābī believers and chroniclers, were interested in the period of the spread

(cont.)

countries surrounding the Persian Gulf in the first half of the same century. This is mainly because the migration of the 'Utūb and their settlement at Kuwait took place around the opening years

(cont.)

of Wahhābīsm. Ibn Bishr clearly stated that the period previous to that was not of equal importance to the years following the beginning of Wahhābī propagation (see Ibn Bishr, Vol. I, pp. 5 and 6.).

Recent research work on Wahhābīsm, when referring to Eastern Arabia, mostly derives from these two chroniclers. Reference may here be made to 'Abdel Ḥamid M. El-Batrik's Turkish and Egyptian Rule in Arabia, 1810-1841, Ph. D., 1947, Modern Islamic History, London University, and G.S. Rentz's Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (1703/4-1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia, Dissertation submitted for the degree of Ph. D. in History, California University, 1948 (microfilm copy), and Ṣalāḥ al-'Aqqād's Le Premier Etat Sa'udite (1744-1818), Essai sur son histoire politique et religieuse, These pour le Doctorat d'Etat, Université de Paris, Faculté des Lettres (1956). See also Ch. V below on Wahhābī relations with Eastern Arabia.

of the eighteenth century.¹

To this one may add that the histories of the Persian Gulf littoral states were interrelated. This interrelation might be attributed to more than one factor. In the first place come the Arab tribes, who were very influential during the eighteenth century. They dwelt on all the shores of the Gulf, and were ruled by Shaikhs who hardly acknowledged any superior authority in any of the governments around the Gulf. The same aspect of interrelation can be as well exemplified by the European companies, who had factories in and commercial relations with all the country surrounding the Gulf. However, the three outstanding indigenous spheres of

¹See "Chronological Table of Events connected with the Government of Muskat, from the 1730-1843; etc.", in Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXIV, New Series, (Bombay, 1856), pp. 140-141. See also "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs (Bahrain) from the year 1716 to the year 1817; Prepared by Mr. Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay; etc.", in Ibid., pp. 362-363.

For the local tradition respecting the rise of Kuwait, see above.

of dominion of the Persian Gulf, all through the eighteenth century, were the Persians in the north-east, the Ottomans in Mesopotamia, and the Arabs in the west and south, wherever circumstances made it possible for the 'Utūb to build their independent state at first in Kuwait about 1716, and then to establish Zubāra in Qatar in 1766, and to conquer the Bahrain Islands in 1782.¹

It is worthwhile noting too that the 'Utūb built their states in the above-mentioned places on the coast of Eastern Arabia when three factors were working on their side. The first was the conveying of trade to and through the Persian Gulf by the European trading companies, and the second was the lack of any one strong power in the Gulf and Arabia that could interfere with the progress of establishing these 'Utbī settlements. The third was the situation of Kuwait in the Banī Khālīd territory. The Banī Khālīd's rule was most favourable to trade and at the same time they were the protectors of the thriving town.² In the present chapter an attempt is

¹See Chapter III for the establishment of Zubāra, and Chapter IV for the conquest of Bahrain.

²It is still related by the Āl-Ṣabāḥ that their ancestors used to pay homage to the Shaikh of Banī Khālīd whenever he came to Kuwait in summer. I was told of this by Shaikh Ṣabāḥ al-Sālim Āl-Ṣabāḥ. The kind of the tribute paid by the Āl-Ṣabāḥ varied according to the property of the ruler. Still, there is no evidence of the kind or amount of that tribute.

made to see how these three factors were working in a way that made it possible for the 'Utūb to build their states in Eastern Arabia.

A. The European trading companies in the Persian Gulf.

The English East India Company

The English East India Company's relations with the Persian Gulf and its trade can be seen from two aspects. The first is from that of competition with the other European nations trading with the Gulf; the second is from that of the East India Company's relations with the local powers working within the Gulf. As to the first aspect, it is known that the English were not the first European nation to form relations with the Persian Gulf.

The European nations who had trade activities in the Gulf were the Portuguese, the Dutch, the English, and the French.

The Portuguese

Among the four, the Portuguese were the first to establish their power and influence in that area. Yet by the beginning of the seventeenth century they were losing their positions, for Bahrain was lost to them in 1602 and Hurmuz in 1622. Their last fortresses in Masqat capitulated to the Arabs of 'Uman in about 1651.¹ This political

¹F.C. Danvers, Report on the India Office Records Relating to Persia and the Persian Gulf (London), p. 12. See also Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Vol. I, 1, p. 836.

and military decline was followed by a similar decline in trade. Yet this did not mean that Portuguese ships and merchandise stopped frequenting the Gulf for trading purposes, for until 1721 their Factory at Kung was visited by merchant ships belonging to "Indians, both Hindus and Muhammadans".¹

Two European nations worked in harmony to drive the Portuguese out. These were the English and the Dutch, represented by their East India Companies as early as the first half of the seventeenth century.² The English and the Dutch fought a joint battle against the Portuguese in the Gulf till the latter were dislodged.³

The French

The French entered the competition after the formation of their French East India Company in 1664.⁴ But early in the eighteenth century their factory at Bandar 'Abbās was closed down. It was not till the year 1755 that they re-established their Residency at Basra. However, during the first half of the eighteenth century French ships used

¹See J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf (Bombay, 1915), Vol. I, part i, p. 68.

²A. Wilson, The Persian Gulf (London, 1954), p. 160.

³Ibid., p. 161.

⁴Ibid., p. 166

to call at Baṣra and other parts of the Gulf.¹

The Dutch

But the two major European trading nations in the Gulf in the first half of the eighteenth century were always the Dutch and the English. Both of them had Factories at more than one town and port in the countries bordering on the Persian Gulf.²

The relations between the Dutch and the English seem to have been cordial during the first half of the eighteenth century. The Factory Records of the English Company speak of packets and letters being conveyed from their factory at Gombroon to Baṣra in Dutch ships.³ This friendship soon gave way to hostilities early in the second half of the eighteenth century, when the English occupied the first place among European nations trading with the Gulf.

¹Mr. Houssaye, Agent of the Baṣra Factory, to C. of D., Baṣra, 29th July, 1726, in F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 14. Dispatch No. 1571.

²Both had Factories at Bandar 'Abbās and Baṣra.

³Gombroon Factory to the C. of D. dated Gombroon, 7th May 1737. See also E. Ives, A Voyage from England to India in the year 1754, also A Journey from Persia to England by an Unusual Route in 1758 and 1759 (London, 1773), p. 206.

The English: their proceedings in the Gulf.

A brief discussion of the British interests in the Gulf in the first half of the eighteenth century helps to illustrate how their relations with the 'Utbī States started and developed. These interests are reflected in the dispatches of the agents in the English Factories, in Gombroon, Iṣfahān, Baṣra, and other places in Persia and Ottoman Mesopotamia. From these dispatches one can feel that there were two main purposes for the establishment of those Factories. The first was to establish centres for distributing English goods and other goods¹ that were carried by English ships to and from the countries bordering the Persian Gulf. The second was to use these Factories

¹For two lists of goods carried to the Factories of the Persian Gulf see F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 14, letter from Gombroon to the C. of D., dated 25th March 1727. The following articles are listed: From Bombay: pepper, sugar, rice, betel nut, cotton piece goods. From India: Bengal and Mangahore rice, sugar, ginger, turmeric, pepper and piece goods. From Gombroon ships carried fruit and rose water. European woollens and Persian silks head the list of trading commodities.

and especially the Basra Factory, as a centre for the English Company's dispatches, whether they were going to the East or to the West.¹ The English Company could depend only on two speedy and safe ways of conveying the dispatches in the eighteenth century. The first was by sea from India to the Red Sea, and from thence to Europe. The second was what was called the overland or the desert route through Basra and Aleppo, which proved to be more practical and to some extent safer. The degree of safety by the overland route was greater because the only danger was from the Arab tribes, whose friendship was easily bought by regular presents of money and goods.² The overland route not

¹Though the purposes for establishing these Factories can be traced in most of the dispatches of the first half of the eighteenth century, yet a very clear reference to that was made in a letter from Mr. Latouche on his handing over the responsibilities of the Basra Factory to his successor, Mr. Manesty. See a letter from Latouche to Manesty, Basra, 6. xi. 1784, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18. dispatch No. 1299

²For this desert threat to the mail and packets of the East India Company, mentioned in many dispatches from Basra in the first half of the eighteenth century, cf. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 14, Nos. 2330, dated Gombroon, 2nd March 1724, 571, Basra, 29th July, 1726, and Vol. 15, No. 670, Basra, 19th May 1741.

only proved valuable for the Company's trade in the Gulf of Persia, but also for speedy contact between Bombay, Surat and other places in India and the Court of Directors in London. The importance of the overland route can be clearly seen in the second half of the eighteenth century, before and after the Seven Years War (1756-1763).¹

Trade before politics

However, it was the duty of the representatives of the trading companies to try always to keep to the main object behind their establishments in the area, which was trade. Yet one could not expect those representatives to remain isolated from what happened in the countries where they functioned. In other words, politics followed the trade, till at least the end of the eighteenth century, when the French tried to establish themselves politically in Egypt. As a matter of fact, the English East India Company, "in less than half a century after its incorporation by the Royal Charter of 31st December 1600, assumed a political aspect".²

Consular power for the Agents

The year 1708 witnessed the union of the new and old English companies, and thence the new name, "The United Company of the merchants

¹For the desert route, see Chapter VI, pp. 299-310 and pp. 310-312 for the advantages the Persian Gulf had over the Red Sea.

²See Wilson, op.cit., p. 169.

of England trading to the East Indies."¹ Their Residents had from now on consular power and rank.²

Relations with the Ottomans and the Persians

This consular power, given to a Resident who was at the same time investing his personal fortune in trade, made him always think of his own interests as well as the Company's. More than once the Residents fell into quarrels with local governments. The solution of those disputes had to be undertaken by both the Governor at Bombay and H.M. Ambassador in Istanbul.³ If it is remembered that the Factories existed both on Ottoman and Persian territories, one can expect the Governors in both countries to try to use the Company's war vessels in times of crisis against each other. In addition to this, both the Ottomans and the Persians sought the help of the Company in building up their naval

¹The name of the English East India Company will be used throughout the present work.

²Wilson, op.cit., p. 170.

³We can take the example of Mr. Samuel Manesty's dispute with the Mutasallim of Baṣra and the Pāsha of Baghdād in 1792, which led to the removal of the Factory from Baṣra in 1793, and its establishment at Kuwait till 1795. Kuwait was not as good a centre as Baṣra for the Company's trade. *See* Journal of the Asiatic Society, vol. 1, p. 111.

power in the Gulf.¹ And the Company used to shift its activity between the two, and thus, early in the 1720's the English East India Company thought that Baḡra, an Ottoman territory, might prove more prosperous for and more yielding to its commercial interests, and thus Gombroon was deserted mainly because of the anarchy that ruled Persia as a result of the Afghāns' invasion. The transfer of commercial activities from Persian to Ottoman territory was, as expected, taken as a sign of enmity to the Persian Government. However, this transfer of the Company's chief residency back and forth between Persian and Ottoman territories seems to have been dictated mainly by two reasons. The first was to show each Government that the Factory could do its job in the other place, and the second was to avoid the oppression of local governors..

Ottoman and Persian behaviour towards the English

In both situations the intended results were often not as desired. The Mutasallims of Baḡra were not less oppressive than the Shaikhs of Abū Shahr and Gombroon. To please both powers at the same time was almost impossible. However, the Residents did their best, and managed to keep the Company's trade with the countries bordering

¹See below, Nādir's policy in the Gulf, pp. 70-71.

on the Persian Gulf flourishing.¹ But wars and the disturbed internal state of affairs worked against the Company's interests. Mr. Martin French of the Basra Factory wrote to the Court of Directors in London in 1732 from Basra telling them that

"The War with Persia has put so effectual a Stop to Business here that a Bale of Goods has not been sold in many Months. We do not think it advisable to unlade the Ships now here till we see how Things are likely to go."²

Capitulations and Rogoms

The European companies enjoyed favourable terms offered them by the Ottoman capitulations on one hand, and favourable "Rogoms"

¹Early in the year 1726, difficulties arose with the Pasha of Basra, who hindered the progress of the Factory. In a letter from Basra Mr. Housse, "Basra Chief for the Company's affairs in the Gulf of Persia", wrote to the Court of Directors in London saying that the Pasha wanted to levy customs on goods before their sale. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 14, Basra 10th April 1726, and Vol. 15, No. 2384 from Gombroon speaks of the same difficulty. The latter is dated Gombroon 25th March 1727.

²Mr. Martin French to the C. of D., Basra 19.iii. 1732/3, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 15. Another letter dated the 25th June 1732 from Basra, signed by Mr. French, is written to the same effect.

from the Persian Shāhs. In Baṣra and Gombroon the English East India Company collected the consulage from English ships.¹ This yielded a large profit in peace, but during the wars and sometimes because of local intervention the Factories were unable to collect consulage.

In addition to the threats from local governors, the Companies had to beware of sea depredations or what the reports call piracy. The Factories were therefore fortified and garrisoned by sepoys. The ships conveying the trade were armed with guns. There was almost a continuous demand from the Factories for war vessels to be kept close at hand for emergencies.² Thus the Companies kept trade going in the Gulf and this trade brought wealth to many towns in the area. Though

¹The consulage was collected at a rate of 2%. The consulage of the year 1725 at Baṣra amounted to 17195 shāhees. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 14 dispatch No. 559. Accounts of the Factories in the Persian Gulf were given in Indian Rupees or Persian Mamoodies (Mahmūdīs) or Persian Shāhees. Though the value of the Ottoman and Persian currency was inconsistent, some valuation can be drawn from accounts that were given in the Factories' records. Every Indian Rupee was nearly equal to five Mahmūdīs. (F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 15, No. 649, dated Baṣra 22nd February 1736). In one pound sterling there are 80 Shāhees (F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 15, dispatch 2578.)

²See Factory Report from the Council at Gombroon to the Court of Directors, London, dated Gombroon 25th March 1727, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 14. dispatch No. 2334.

Kuwait and Bahrain are hardly mentioned in the reports of the English East India Company in the first half of the eighteenth century, there can hardly be any doubt that the conveyance of trade by European vessels and by Muslim vessels from India and Masqat gave the initiative for the rise of the 'Utbī maritime power in the 1750's,¹ as we shall see in the following chapter.

B. Affairs of Persia and Ottoman Mesopotamia (1700-1750)

Alongside with this trading activity in the Gulf, the second factor referred to previously, namely, the lack of any centralized power in the Gulf, was working also in favour of the rising 'Utbī states. For the only two powers that might have been able to exercise such authority, the Ottomans and the Persians, were in no way in a position to do so.

1. The Affairs of Persia

In Persia the first half of the eighteenth century was a period of constant change and unrest. The country was invaded by the Afghāns, the Ottomans and the Russians.² So it was natural that the Persian

¹Cf. Ives, op.cit., pp. 207, 222-223.

²For the troubled state of Persia see L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah, A Critical Study based mainly upon Contemporary Sources, (London, 1938), pp. 1 - 17.

Gulf remained in the same period far from feeling any impact from Persia. And it was not until after 1726, when Nādir Shāh rose to power in Persia, that the Gulf began to play a role in the policy of that Persian ruler.

Maritime ambitions of Nādir Shāh

As for Nādir Shāh's interests in the Gulf, "it is no mean testimony to his genius, and to the wide range of his ambition, that while for a brief moment he elevated Persia to the rank of the first military power in Asia, he also dreamed of creating naval resources which should ensure her dominion over the shores of both the northern and the southern seas, i.e. over the Caspian and the Persian Gulf."¹ The lack of strong Persian naval power in the Gulf made it impracticable for any ruler of Persia to establish his authority over the rebellious Arab populace of the shores of the Gulf.² Though "Nādir Shāh deserves the credit for being the first Monarch of Persia who realized the value of a fleet", yet he was fighting against "the influence of physical

¹G.N.Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London, 1892), two vols., Vol. II, p. 390.

²See a letter from Mr. Martin French, Agent of the Basra Factory, to the C. of D., dated 20.v. 1732, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 15., dispatch No. 630.

conditions which gave the Persians invincible repugnance to the sea."¹ This repugnance is best exemplified in Nādir's Admiral of the Coast, "a Persian who had never seen a ship".² The Persian fleet was manned by Indians and Portuguese.³ A Persian naval attack on Baṣra took place in 1735, but the "Ottoman Governor" obliged two English ships, belonging to the East India Company, to fight against the Persians, who were driven back.⁴ As to the power of the

¹P. Sykes, A History of Persia (London, 1921, two volumes), Vol. II, p. 271.

²Ibid., and Curzon, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 392, where he, commenting on that selection, quoted Hanway, who says, "But there cannot be a stronger ignorance of the Persians in regard to maritime affairs than that of Myrza Nehtie (i.e. Mirza Mehdi) who was appointed Admiral of the Coast before he had ever seen a ship."

³See Carsten Niebuhr, Descriptions de l'Arabie sur des observations propre et des avis recueillis dans les lieux memes (Amsterdam, 1774) pp. 269-70, and Curzon, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 392.

⁴Cf. a letter from Mr. French to the C. of D. dated 5. vi. 1735, in F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 15. dispatch No. 647.

Persian fleet in the Gulf, it was reported to consist in 1739 of "three Ships, one Brigantine, one three Mast, and one two Mast Grabs beside several Trankeys".¹ As early as 1734 Abū Shahr was selected as a suitable base for the fleet, and shortly afterwards it was re-named Bandar Nādiriyya.²

Persia and Bahrain

What is worth noting in Nādir's naval policy in the Persian Gulf in this context is the Persian occupation of Bahrain in 1736, which was destined to become later, in 1782, an integral part of the 'Utbī dominions. Bahrain during the first half of the eighteenth century seems to have changed hands between the Sultān of Masqaṭ and the Huwala Arabs of the Persian coast of the Gulf.³

The opening of the eighteenth century saw Shaikh Jubāra of the Huwala Arabs ruling in Bahrain completely independent of the Shāh of Persia, because the disturbed state of affairs there left the Arabs of the Gulf free to behave independently of the Shāh.

¹A letter from the Gombroon Agency to the Court of Directors dated 31.iii. 1739, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 15., dispatch No. 2456.

²Lockhart, op.cit., p. 92.

³Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, pp. 284-286.

In about 1713¹ a descent was made on Bahrain by the Arabs of Masqat, then governed by Sulṭān b. Saif II, an Imām of the Ya'ariba dynasty. But the Huwala Arabs, the occupants of Bahrain, obliged the Sulṭān's forces to leave the island, "by the voluntary removal from their houses of the indigenous population, who emigrated to other places in order to escape the 'Umānī oppression".²

The Persian campaign of 1736 seems to have been strongly supported by the Huwala Arabs of the Persian coast and Abū Shahr, for Nādir appointed as governors in Bahrain Shaikh Ghaith and his brother Shaikh Nāṣir al Madhkūr of the Maṭārīsh Arabs. Their authority lasted till 1782, when the 'Utūb captured the Islands.³

One may ask what motives were behind the conquest of Bahrain. The simple answer is that the Islands of Bahrain were coveted for their rich pearl fisheries. In fact they were the richest fisheries in the whole waters of the Gulf, and indeed in the world. They used

¹Muḥammad b. Khalifa al-Nabḥānī, Al-Tuḥfa al-Nabḥāniyya fī Ta'rīkh al-Jazīra al-'Arabiyya, Ta'rīkh al-Bahrain (Cairo, 1342/1923), p. 112.

²Lorimer, op.cit., Vol. I, i, pp. 836-7. Wilson gives the date a year earlier, 1717, The Persian Gulf, p. 172.

³For the conquest of Bahrain by the 'Utūb see a letter from Latouche to C. of D. dated Baṣra 4.xi.1782, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17. See also Nabḥānī, Ta'rīkh al-Bahrain, pp. 114-115.

to yield, yearly, an income of half a million Indian rupees.¹ Bahrain in the first half of the eighteenth century was not in other respects an important emporium for trade, and the trading companies had no Factories there.

Nadir's Fleet - the trading companies

Another thing worth considering is the way in which Nadir formed his fleet. The Dutch and the English East India Companies offered to help either by selling ships to the Persians or by facilitating the construction of those ships in India or elsewhere. This question of the Persian fleet touched the Arabs of the Gulf on both littorals. Those on the Persian littoral were ordered to hand over to the Persians a certain number of ships. The Arabs on the Persian littoral, who were mostly of the Huwala tribe, had always had trading and other relations with their kinsmen of the Arabian littoral. It has been customary among the maritime Arabs of the Gulf to take to their boats and to abandon, together with their families, their ports, when oppressed, and to resort to their kinsmen, waiting for the day of revenge.² Thus it was not later than 1741, during Nadir's lifetime, that the Huwala Arabs succeeded in laying their hands on the Persian fleet, a fact which made "the Persians very pressing for ships". So their demands

¹"Report on the Trade of Arabia, etc." in Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 407.

²See above.

for ships from the English East India Company were listened to and ships were ordered from India.¹

Nādir's Navigators

Though Nādir was quite sure that only the Arabs of the Gulf could be his navigators, yet he transferred some of them to the Caspian in his attempt to create a Persian naval power.² At Abū Shahr he built a dockyard, and, at terrible cost in human suffering, transported timber right across Persia from Māzandarān to Abū Shahr for the use of his shipwrights. The only results of this project were the rude ribs of an unfinished vessel, which were visible at Abū Shahr soon after Nādir's death.³ Yet the use of naval power by Persian Monarchs later in the eighteenth century did not cease. Karīm Khān Zand, when sending his forces under the leadership of Sādiq Khān against Baṣra in 1775, resorted to the Arab Shaikhs of Abū Shahr, who were of the Maṭ-ārīsh tribe, of Bandar Rīq, and of the Banī Ka'b Arabs, who were the most powerful forces in the Gulf.⁴

¹Thomas Dorrill, Baṣra Factory, to C. of D., London, Baṣra, 16.xii.1741, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 15. dispatch No. 671

²Niebuhr, Description, p. 270; and Curzon, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 392.

³Curzon, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 392; and Sykes, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 372.

Niebuhr made a similar remark on those remains as early as 1765, when he was at Abū Shahr (Description de l'Arabie, p. 273).

⁴See Chapter III below, p. 166.

2. The Affairs of Ottoman Mesopotamia

Baghdād

The second power, bordering the Persian Gulf, which might have exercised a strong control over its affairs, was Ottoman Mesopotamia. But here, as in Persia, the Governor's authority¹ was limited to Bagh-
dād, and it did not actually extend south as far as Baṣra. In addition to that handicap, the Wālī of Baghdād, as well as other governors in Mesopotamia, was in a state of almost continuous warfare with the Persians since the Ottoman occupation of Mesopotamia in the fifteen thirties.

Baṣra

In Baṣra,² however, where the Muṭasallim was ruling almost independently of the Pasha in Baghdād, he had to depend on the Arabs for defending the town and transporting its trade. The authority of the Muṭasallim extended beyond the walls of the town to the Arab tribes living around the place.

Arab Tribes

The Muntafiq tribe occupied the area to the west of the town. The Banī Ka'b occupied the area to the east and south-east. While the

¹The Wālī of Baghdād.

²Baṣra capitulated to the Ottomans in 1546. See S. H. Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq (Oxford, 1925), p. 31.

Muntafiq Arabs were almost all through the eighteenth century loyal to the Mutasallim of Baṣra, the Banī Ka'b used to change their allegiance from the Ottomans to the Persians, and sometimes they used to pay homage to both.¹ To these two Arab tribes, the neighbours of Baṣra, may be added the Al-Zafīr tribe, which was almost continually loyal to the Pasha of Baghdād and his Mutasallims in Baṣra.²

The tribes and the Mutasallim

The relations between these Mesopotamian Arab tribes and the Arabs of Eastern Arabia during the first half of the eighteenth century could be described as peaceful, but this peace gave way to strife and struggle in the second half of the century.³ To gain the friend-

¹ Cf. C. Niebuhr, Voyage en Arabie & en d'autres Pays circonvoisins (Amsterdam 1780), Tome II, pp. 187-188. These Arabian tribes are dealt with in Chapter III of the present work.

² Al-Zafīr, or al-Ḍafīr, originally Najdī Tribes, and migrated to 'Irāq, where they lived in the neighbourhood of Baṣra. See 'Abbās al-'Azzawī, 'Ashā'ir al-'Irāq (Baghdād, 1365/1937), Vol. I, pp. 295-304. Al-Muntafiq Tribes came from Najd and settled between Baṣra and Baghdād. See Ibrāhīm ibn Ṣabghat Allāh al-Ḥaydarī, 'Unwān al-Majd fī Bayān Aḥwāl Baghdād wa Baṣra wa Najd, B.M.M. OR 7567, f. 58r. See also Muḥammad al-Bassām, Al-Durar al-Mafākhīr fī Akhbār al-'Arab al-Awākhir, B.M.MS. Add.7358, f. 43.

³ See Chapter IV below, pp. 166 ff.

ship of those Arabs or to have them under the direct rule of the Mutasallim was always an aim of his policy. Once those tribes were free from his control, the trade of Baṣra used to suffer. Baghdād would suffer in turn, because of the great amount of trade that had always been conveyed between Baṣra and Baghdād, both by the water way and the desert caravans.¹

Baṣra's importance to the Ottomans

The Ottomans paid special attention to Baṣra in the sixteenth century as a centre for their attacks against the Portuguese; the same interest continued to exist in the absence of the Portuguese threat in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What mattered then to the Pashas of Baghdād was the trade which flourished after the English East India Company and the Dutch established trading relations there in the early years of the seventeenth century.²

The standard, the amount and the prosperity of trade at Baṣra was controlled by more than one factor. The Mutasallim was the first; his greed, his wisdom, his attitude towards the trading bodies, were

¹The trade by the rivers Tigris and Euphrates was always great. See A. Parsons, Travels in Asia and Africa (London, 1803), p. 154. Also Wilson, op.cit., p. 67-8.

²The East India Company's Factory at Baṣra was established in the year 1643. See Longrigg, op.cit., p. 108, and Wilson, op.cit., p. 163.

75.

of the greatest importance.¹ Secondly, trade needed peace. In fact, this factor is of no less importance than the first. The peace at Baṣra was not just sustained when there was no Persian aggression. Yet the Arab tribes, formerly alluded to, could disturb it and thus affect the state of trade both within Baṣra and the transit trade to Syria, or even the internal trade with Baghdād and other cities of the Pashālik.²

These tribes were, as well as the tribes to the south of Baṣra, occupied in the conveyance of trade by caravans travelling from Central and Eastern Arabia to Mesopotamia and Syria from time immemorial. These desert routes used to pass through Jahra village³ for water, and the newly established 'Utbī town of Kuwait seems to have benefited greatly from this desert route. Jahra and other villages to the south of Baṣra were under the control of the Banī Khālīd tribe.

¹Mr. M. French, the English Agent at Baṣra, wrote, as early as April 10th, 1726, to the Court of Directors at London, saying that the Factory's relations with the Pasha of Baghdād were bad because the latter wanted to receive the customs due to him before the Factory could sell the goods. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 14, dispatch No. 561.

²Cf. a report from the Council at Gombroon to the Court of Directors, London, dated 25th March 1727, in F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 14, dispatch No. 238/.

³Jahra lies between Kuwait and Baṣra.

C. Eastern and Central Arabia

The Banī Khālīd - their territory

The paramount power in Eastern Arabia on the Persian Gulf in the first five decades of the eighteenth century was that of the Banī Khālīd. Their sphere of influence was spreading from Kuwait in the north to Qaṭar in the south. The depth of their influence in Najd will be discussed in the next chapter.¹ And some of their tribes settled in 'Uman al-Ṣīr.²

Banī Khālīd occupy al-Ḥasa from the Ottomans

The history of the Banī Khālīd's rule in al-Ḥasa began earlier than the eighteenth century, but before the second half of the seventeenth century their power was not as strongly established as it was later to be. As early as 1581, they were powerful enough to hinder the authority of the Sharīfs of Makka whenever the latter tried to raid Eastern Arabia and impinge upon them at al-Ḥasa.³ The Banī

¹For details relating to the Banī Khālīd's early power, origin, and sphere of influence, Ibn Bishr's Sawābiq supplies the chronology, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 80, 154, 183, 211, 218. Lam' al-Shihāb gives information but no chronology, op.cit., ff. 223-228, 235.

²Nūr al-Dīn 'AbdALLāh b. Ḥumayd al-Sālimī, Tuhfat al-A'yān Bisīrat Ahl 'Uman, in two volumes, Vol. I, 2nd edition (Cairo 1350/1931); and Vol. II (Cairo 1347/1928), pp. 11, 12.

³Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 24-25.

Khālīd seem to have been traversing Arabia from Qaṭar in the south to Baṣra in the north all through the sixteenth century. Yet they do not seem to have had friendly relations with the Ottomans, who were accompanied by the Muntafiq Arabs when they occupied al-Ḥasā,¹ which was ruled by Āl-Jabrī of the Qays Ārabs. The country continued under Ottoman control till 1080/1670, when it was occupied by Barrāk b. Ghurair Āl-Ḥamīd of the Banī Khālīd.² Barrāk after the conquest established the rule of the Banī Khālīd in al-Ḥasā. The Ottoman Pasha of al-Ḥasā was driven out. Thus ended the first Ottoman rule in al-Ḥasā. Four Ottoman Pashas had already ruled there. They were Fātiḥ Pasha, who was the first Governor, 'Alī Pasha, Muḥammad Pasha, and lastly 'Umīr Pasha, who surrendered to Barrāk.³ Barrāk continued to rule till 1093/1682, when he died and his brother Muḥammad b. Ghurair took over.

¹Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 25.

²Longrigg gives the name of Barrāk in an attack on al-Ḥasā by the Pasha of Baṣra in 1632-34. This Barrāk may be an ancestor of the present Barrāk. Annals of the British Museum, 112, p. 112.

³Respecting the nature of the Ottoman rule in al-Ḥasā, it was only nominal, for "there were no fiefs there", and the Governors in fact were ruling without authority. "Briefly, a baseless and unreal claim to al-Ḥasā was maintained, in the Turkish manner, unsupported by history or present power." Longrigg, op.cit., p. 38.

The extent of their territory

The history of the Banī Khālīd, rulers of al-Ḥasā, is of special importance to the historian of eighteenth century Arabia, because their suzerainty extended to Baṣra in the north, which brought them into continuous contact with the Ottomans of Mesopotamia, and to some parts of Najd in the east, which put them into contact with the petty provinces of Central Arabia. As al-Ḥasā was more fertile than Central Arabia, many people from Najd used to own farms in towns there. This led to complications with Governors of that territory. To illustrate this there is the example of 'Uthmān b. Mu'ammār, the Shāikh of 'Uyayna in the Province of Al-'Ārid. He owned a palm-tree grove in al-Ḥasā which gave him a year's profit of 60,000 golden riāls. When he sheltered Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, Sulaymān b. Muḥammad Āl-Ḥamīd, ruler of the Banī Khālīd, threatened to prevent him from taking his profit if he continued to protect him. The immediate result was the expulsion of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, who sought refuge at al-Dir'iyya with Muḥammad b. Su'ūd.¹ This led to a series of raids and severe fighting, which ended with the occupation of al-Ḥasā in 1795.

¹ Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 32-33, and Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 3-4.

Their ports - Al-Qaṭīf and Al-'Uqair

The Banī Khālīd were not only occupying the fertile oases of al-Ḥasā, but they controlled¹ the trade to Central Arabia from the Gulf. Al-Qaṭīf and al-'Uqair were the harbours of Central Arabia through which sugar, coffee, spices and other goods from India and the Yaman found their way to Central Arabia.² Kuwait was in a position to participate in this trade, but did not gain importance till the second half of the eighteenth century. It is interesting to note that the Banī Khālīd in themselves were divided into settlers and nomads. And as it was customary among the people of the towns to ask the help of the nomads to protect them, the Banī Khālīd could do both jobs, and so there was no need to ask the help of other Bedouins. The tribal centre of the ruler was at al-Ḥasā Oasis. From that place the Banī Khālīd used to raid Central Arabia,³ and to go north to the gates of Baṣra, where they came into conflict with the tribe of al-Zafīr.⁴

¹Fertility is, of course, limited to the oases, or the centres where water could be drawn from the wells. Most of al-Ḥasā territory is itself a desert land.

²"Report on the Trade of Arabia etc.", in Saldanha, Selections from State Papers pp.405-409

These pages contain much information on the part played by these ports in distributing goods to Central Arabia.

³Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 183-4.

⁴Ibid.

Early relations with the 'Utūb

The Banī Khālīd are extremely important to this narrative, because it was in their territory that the 'Utūb built their states. Kuwait, as we shall see later on, gained its early importance as a summer residence of Barrāk, the Shaikh of the Banī Khālīd. To him is attributed the establishment of al-Kūt, or the fortress, after which the town was named.¹ It was not only Kuwait that started and flourished under the Banī Khālīd rule, for Zubāra, in Qaṭar, the second 'Utbī settlement, was under their protection.² The progress of Kuwait, Zubāra and other towns of the eastern littoral of Arabia shows that the Khālīdī rule was peaceful and most favourable to trade.³ Though they were in control of the trade which was carried into Central Arabia, and though they were in control of most of the harbours of Eastern Arabia, they do not seem to have been a seafaring tribe like al-Qawāsīm of

¹Yusuf b. 'Isā al-Qinā'ī, Ṣafahāt min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait (Damascus, 1954), p. 5.

²Al-Khalīfa and other 'Utbī families migrated to Zubāra in 1180/1766. Cf. 'Uthmān ibn Sanād, Sabā'ik al-'Asjad fī Akhbār Ahmad Najl Rizq al-As'ad (Bombay, 1315/1897), pp. 18-19. See also "Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe," etc. in Bombay Selections, p. 363.

³See "Report on the Trade of Arabia etc." in Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 408.

Ras al-Khayma¹ or the 'Utūb of Kuwait or the Arabs of Masqaṭ.² However, the peaceful Khalidī control of Eastern Arabia was a necessity

¹In the English texts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries al-Qawāsim are referred to as "Joasmees", while all the Arabic texts give "Qawāsim", see Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 96-104, and "Historical Sketch of the Joasme Tribe of Arabs; from the Year 1747 to the Year 1819", in Bombay Selections, pp. 300-359.

²"The ascendancy of the Arabs of Muskat in the Gulf of Persia may be dated from the year 1694-5, where they became so powerful as to excite an alarm that they would obtain the command of the Persian Gulf. The navigation of the Gulf became more difficult in the following year, from the increase of their power, of which the Agent at Gombroon predicted that they would prove as great a plague in India as the Algerines were in Europe." - ("Historical Sketch of the Rise and Progress of the Government of Muskat, etc." B.S., xxiv, p. 168).

This supremacy led to the occupation of some places on the Persian coast and to many acts of piracy (see Ibid.). Neither the English nor the Portuguese could oppose the rising power of Masqaṭ. Nor was Persia in the first three decades of the eighteenth century in a position to stop the Masqaṭi depredations. Nādir Shāh directed his fleet and forces against Masqaṭ and succeeded in occupying it and invading other parts of 'Umān, yet the Persians were driven out of 'Umān during his lifetime by Aḥmad b. Sa'īd, who became Imām in about 1744. (Ibid., p. 169, and "Chronological Table of Events connected with the Government of Muskat, etc.", op.cit., p. 122. See also Ḥumayd ibn Muḥammad b. Razīq, Al-Fath al-Mubīn al-Mubārḥin Sīrat al-Sādāt al-Bū-Sa'īdiyyīn,

(cont.)

for giving Kuwait a chance to rise unhindered by other tribes in its early years.

Najd

This peace in Eastern Arabia, which resulted from the consolidation of power in the hands of one Khālidī Shaikh, was lacking in another place which was a neighbour of the newly established 'Utbi town. For in Najd petty chiefs exercised unrestrained power over their towns or tribes. It was not until 1745 that these towns and Amīrs began to feel the overwhelming power of the Su'ūdī family of al-Dir'iyya.¹ Arabia, from time immemorial, used to drive away thousands of its population to the rich outskirts of Syria and Mesopotamia. This was mainly the outcome of droughts, occurring every now and then in some regions of the desert.² Recorded history of modern times

(cont.) M.S., Cambridge University Library, Add. 2892, ff. 153-155; and Al-Sīra al-Jaliyya al-Musammāt Sa'd al-Su'ūd al-Bū-Sa'īdiyya, Cambridge University Library, M.S., Add. 2893, ff. 19-23). However, Masqaṭ's fleet during the first and second halves of the eighteenth century was the greatest local sea power, proving formidable not only to local fleets, but also to foreign ones. So strong did Masqaṭ feel that it tried to impose certain fees on local ships crossing the straits of Hormuz.

¹This year marks the beginning of the Wahhābī activities in Najd.

Cf. Ibn Ghannam, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 4 and Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I., p.15.

²See next chapter, pp. 95-100.

suggests that such expulsions also took place in modern history. As it was customary among the Bedouins to travel with their cattle to the neighbouring fertile oases when attacked by drought, the resort of the people of Najd was al-Ḥasā, with its rich oases. Ibn Bishr in his chronicle points out different years, both in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when the people of Najd found it indispensable to move eastwards towards al-Ḥasā after suffering from severe attacks of drought.¹ The duration of the drought of 1135/1722 was so disastrous for the people of Najd that they did not find enough room for all the emigrants in al-Ḥasā, and so many had to travel to Baṣra and other fertile places in Mesopotamia.² The attitude of the inhabitants of al-Ḥasā, both settlers and Bedouins, towards the immigrants seems to have been friendly. This might be attributed to the fact that Najd and al-Ḥasā were inhabited by 'Adnānī Arabs. The Banī Khālid, the then rulers of al-Ḥasā, belonged to Rabī'a, an 'Adnānī tribe. This attitude, however, seems to have been due to the obligations of Arab hospitality. Yet, as we shall see later on,

¹Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 62, 75, 164, 218, 223.

²Ibid., p. 223. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb might have been among others who travelled to Baṣra in this year; cf. Lam' al-Shihab, ff. 5-9, where the author speaks of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb's journeys.

their blood link with 'Adnāniyya did not prevent the Banī Khālīd from later attacking the rising Su'ūdī Power, which was primarily situated at Dir'īyya in central Najd. The Wahhābis took the defensive for over twenty years (1745-1765), but soon changed to the offensive and carried their wars against the Banī Khālīd till they succeeded in humiliating them finally in 1208/1793 - 1210/1795.¹

Conclusion.

Thus three main factors gave the 'Utūb the chance to establish themselves in Kuwait during the first half of the eighteenth century. The first was the conveyance of trade through the Persian Gulf and the desert route, in which the 'Utūb seem to have participated, and by which they seem to have found a start for their transportation of trade both by camels and by sea. The second was the confused state of affairs and the consequent lack of centralized power in Persia, Ottoman 'Irāq, and Arabia. This confusion, unrest and change in the area made it possible for small communities to live almost free from external interference. The third was the position of Kuwait in the territory of the Banī Khālīd whose reign was most favourable to trade, an additional advantage for the thriving 'Utbī town.

¹See Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 185-192. Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 100-102. Lam' al-Shihāb, op.cit., ff. 85-93.

Chapter II

THE RISE OF KUWAIT

(1700 - 1762)

Chapter II

THE RISE OF KUWAIT

(1700 - 1762)

Rise of Kuwait c. 1700

The emigration of some Arab tribes of the 'Anaza group in the first half of the 18th century from Central Arabia, among whom were the 'Utūb and their settlement at Kuwait¹ marks the rise of the 'Utbi States in Eastern Arabia for several reasons.

In the first place the town was situated in the Banī Khālidī's territory, whose protection the 'Utūb seem to have acquired from the start. Other circumstances helped in the development of the town, such as the trade in the Gulf and the disturbed state of affairs formerly alluded to in Najd, Ottoman 'Irāq and Persia. Yet the geographical position of the town and its natural harbour, formed by the bay, or Jūn, was a factor of no less importance.

¹ Kuwait town is the capital of the present Principality or Shaikhdom. The present borders of the Principality were fixed after the 'Uqair conference of 1921, Hāfiẓ Wahba, Jazīrat Al-'Arab fi'l Qarn al-'Ishrīn, (Cairo, 1935), p. 88. The territory under the authority of the Shaikh in the eighteenth century will be discussed later in this chapter.

These various aspects of the rise of Kuwait,¹ the choice of the Āl-Ṣabāḥ as its Shaikhs and its early administration will form the subject of the present chapter.

Geographical situation

The town, Kuwait, which is about eighty miles south and slightly east of Baṣra, almost 180 miles west by north of Abū Shahr and nearly 280 miles north-west of Baḥrain, faces the north-west and is situated on the southern shore of Kuwait Bay, about one-third of the way from its entrance at Ras-al-Arḍ to its foot at al-Jahra village.¹

The Bay

The bay itself is a large inlet of remarkable form, leading out of the north-west corner of the Persian Gulf, with an extreme length west and east of over twenty miles, and a maximum breadth of about ten miles. In shape it approaches a crescent with the convex side to the north and the horns pointing to the south-west. The bay proper is an indentation in the true Arabian coast line, which is represented northwards by the western shore of Khōr al-Ṣabbiyya and southwards by the coast below Rās al-Arḍ; but its shore is prolonged on the side next the mouth of the Shaṭṭ al-‘Arab by a mud-flat extending twenty miles

¹J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, (Calcutta, 1915), Vol. II, i, p. 1048.

southeast from the mouth of Khōr al-Ṣabbiyya, on which stands the island of Failaka. The entrance of the bay, between this mud-flat and Rās al-Arḍ, is about four miles wide and open to the south-west and south-south-east. In the southern shore of the bay, within, there are three coves: the easternmost, between Rās al-Arḍ and Rās 'Ajūza, is shallow, and vessels are recommended not to enter it; the middle cove, between Ras 'Ajūza and Ras 'Ushairij, contains Kuwait¹ on its eastern side, a dead coral reef covered with mud and sand and known as 'Akāz in the centre, the island of Qurain or Shuwaikh on the southern margin of 'Akāz, and the island of Umm-al-Naml near Rās 'Ushairij and Rās Kāzima, forms the innermost recess of the whole bay, and near the foot of it stands the village of Jahra.

The land surrounding the bay is low except on the north side, where the Zōr hills, parallel to the shore, attain a height of 150 to 400 feet. A flat of soft mud extends for some distance off shore on the northern side of the bay, making communication difficult at low water between sea and land.

¹The town proper is meant.

In most parts of the bay the water is of suitable depth for anchorage, and there is good holding-ground¹.

Supplies and water

Neither Kuwait town nor its environs has ever boasted of any agricultural resources. There are no date plantations, no fields, hardly even a kitchen garden. Forage and vegetables were mostly brought from Jahra village or from abroad.² Drinking water was mostly brought from wells a mile outside the town, and it was, in the words of Sir Harford Jones Brydges, "sweet, bitter and salt at the

¹In a report dated 1845 by one of the Bombay Government officials, Kuwait's harbour was said to be able to harbour the whole British fleet. See "Memoranda on the Resources, Localities, and Relations of the Tribes inhabiting the Arabian Shores of the Persian Gulf" by Lieutenant A. B. Kemball, Assistant Resident at Bushire - Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, p.109.

²Al-Jahra lies near the foot of Kuwait Bay, twenty miles by road west of Kuwait town. It is the chief, and almost the only, seat of agriculture in Kuwait territory, and caravans to Basra and Burayda via Hafar pass through it. The permanent inhabitants are chiefly cultivators of Najdī extraction. Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, (London, 1916), A Handbook of Arabia, Vol. I, pp. 296-297, and

same time".¹ The water of these wells usually becomes sweet immediately after rainfall, but it quickly becomes of a brackish nature after the cessation of the rain.²

Climate

The climate of Kuwait is often cool when the north-west wind, the Shamāl, is blowing; during the summer, the west wind blows cool from the desert all through the night. Kuwait has gained fame as having the mildest summer compared to other towns on the Arabian littoral of the Gulf. The Shaikhs of the Banī Khālid chose it as their summer resort soon after its establishment.³

The name 'Kuwait'

The name Kuwait is the diminutive of the Arabic Kūt or fortress. This may sufficiently indicate the insignificant origin of the town, which became the capital of the present Shaikhdom of Kuwait.⁴ Kuwait

¹Harford Jones Brydges, An Account of the Transactions of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia in the Years 1807-1811, to which is appended a brief History of the Wahabys, Two Vols., (London, 1834), Vol. II, p.12.

²Al-Qinā'ī, Saḥāḥat min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, pp. 7-8.

³Ibid., p.5.

⁴Father Anistās al-Karmalī, commenting on the origin of the denomination of Kuwait, says that "al Kuwait is the diminutive of Kūt. The word

was also named Qurain, which is the diminutive of Qarn, a horn or a hill.¹

Foundation of Kuwait

To fix a certain date for the foundation of Kuwait is almost impossible for lack of evidence. The local tradition, preserved by Kuwaitī historians, however, gives the late seventeenth century as a

(cont.) 'Kūt' in the language of southern 'Irāq and its neighbouring countries in Arabia and parts of Persia is the house that is built in the shape of a fortress or like it so as to be easily defended when attacked. This house is usually surrounded by other houses. The name 'Kūt' is given to such a house when it only lies near water, whether it is river, sea, a lake or even a swamp. Then it was applied to the village built on such a site." He gives the examples Kūt al-Ifranji, Kūt al-Zayn, Kūt al-'Amāra and Kūt Bandar. See the article "Fī Tasmiat Madīnat al-Kuwait", Al-Mashriq, X, (Bayrūt, 1904), pp. 449-458.

¹An island a short distance to the west of Kuwait has the name Qurain.

I was told by Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Khālīd Al-Khalīfa that Qurain or little hill is a common name in Qaṭar and al-Ḥasā. It is worthwhile noting, in Eastern Arabia, that inclination towards diminution occurs not only in the names of places but also in the names of the rulers. The Banī Khālīd give a clear example where the names Dujayn, 'Uray'ir and Sa'dūn were very common.

date. Al-Qina'ī, after stating that Kuwait had been first established by an Amīr of the Banī Khālid,¹ thinks that it was built about the year 1100 A.H./1688 by Amīr Barrāk, ruler of the Banī Khālid.² Al-Rashīd, another Kuwaitī historian, could only say that it was in the late seventeenth century that Kuwait was founded.³ According to al-Nabhanī, quoting the oral tradition, it was established as early as 1019 A.H./1611.⁴ 'Uthmān b. Sanad, writing as early as 1800, could only say that Kuwait gained importance in the early eighteenth century.⁵

The above-mentioned suggestions do all agree to the fact that Kuwait had been established before the opening of the eighteenth century. Al-Qina'ī suggests 1100/1688 and gives as his reason that Barrāk was the founder. This date must be fixed earlier if we remember that Barrāk was dead by 1100/1688. Barrāk ruled from 1080/1669 till his death in 1093/1682.⁶

¹The authority of the Banī Khālid in the seventeenth century extended to the north as far as the neighbourhood of Baṣra, see above, Chapter I, p. 74.

²Safahāt min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, p. 5.

³Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, Vol. I, pp. 10-11.

⁴Al-Nabhanī, Al-Tuhfa al-Nabhaniyya, Al-Kuwait, p. 126.

⁵Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, p. 18. Ibn Sanad was speaking on Kuwait in the context of the arrival there of Rizq al-As'ad, a well known and rich Kuwaitī merchant of the 18th century. His statement runs as follows:

"It (Kuwait) had not been populated before the arrival of his (Ahmad's) great father except for a very short period."

لم تعمر قبل ورود أبيه العظيم اثنان إلى مدينة الكويت في زمان.

⁶Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 65-80.

The coming of the 'Utūb. The wandering stage.

Kuwait, however, might have been a small fishing centre in the seventeenth century, where some Bedouins had settled around that Kūt built by the Amīr of the Banī Khālīd. To that small sea village came the 'Utūb, a collection of Arabian families.

The date of the arrival of the 'Utūb is also controversial, and both their name 'Utūb' and the track they followed are by no means certain.

The denomination 'Utūb

This federation of Arab families was referred to sometimes as Banī 'Utba,¹ and often as 'Utūb,² Uttoobee or Banī 'Attaba.³ All these words derive from the Arabic root 'ataba, meaning to travel from one place to another.⁴ In the second half of the eighteenth century and

¹Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, p. 18.

²Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 95, 101, 107.

³Francis Warden, "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobbe Tribe of Arabs, ... (Bahrein) etc." in Bombay Selections, pp. 362-372.

⁴Jamāl al-Dīn ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-'Arab, (Bayrūt, 1374/1955), Vol. I., p. 579.

the early nineteenth, Arabic sources refer to them as 'Utūb,¹ a denomination which I shall be using all through the present work. Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson² is inclined to think that the name 'Utūb comes from the verb 'ataba too, and he adds that the present Shaikh 'Abd Allāh al-Sālim Āl-Ṣabāḥ, informed him that his forefathers were called by that name after their movement to the north, ''atabū ila al-Shamāl'.³

On the way to Kuwait

Whatever the origin of their name may be, all the authorities writing on Kuwait, early or late, agree that the 'Utūb belong to 'Anaza, an 'Adnanī Arab tribe, inhabiting Najd and North Arabia. The Āl-Ṣabāḥ, as well as other 'Utbī families, claim to be a division of 'Anaza. The tradition, kept by the Āl-Ṣabāḥ and Āl-Khalīfa⁴ states that they belong

¹ Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 95, 101, 107, 176; Ibn Razīq in Al-Sīra al-Jaliyya, f. 186, and Al-Fath al-Mubīn, ff. 193, 197.

² H.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours (London, 1956), pp. 26-27.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See al-Rashīd, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 12 for the origin of the Āl-Ṣabāḥ. The Āl-Khalīfa claim the same descent, I was told of that by Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Khālīd Āl-Khalīfa and that they were the descendants of the same Jumayla division of the 'Anaza.

to Jumayla, a sub-division of Anaza, and that they were originally dwelling at Haddār in al-Aflāj in Najd, whence they migrated to Qaṭar from which place they sailed to Kuwait. Though that tradition does not state clearly when that migration to Qaṭar took place, it might have been a part of the great 'Anaza emigration which took place at about the end of the seventeenth century.¹ That great migration of the 'Anaza in the 18th century resulted in the arrival of the Ruwala in Syria.² They were originally related families that migrated from Central Arabia, either together or separately, and temporarily settled in various places on the eastern coast of Arabia, but finally settled at Kuwait. No certain date can be given for the migration of the 'Utūb

¹Oppenheim could not fix a date for that emigration, yet he states that Jumayla is still there at al-Aflāj. See M. von Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, (Leipzig 1939), Band I, p. 62. He states that the 'Utūb were among them and that they migrated to Kuwait, but he does not give any date for

this migration. See Ibid and Ashkenezi, "The 'Anaza Tribes", in South-Western Journal of Anthropology, New Mexico, 1948, pp. 222-239.

²Anaza is usually divided into two groups, northern and southern. The Ruwala belong to the first. To the southern group belong Al-Su'ūd, Al-Sabāḥ and others. Cf. A. Musil, The Manners and Customs of the Ruwala Bedouins, (New York 1926), p. 46.

but, as I have already pointed out in Chapter I,¹ the second half of the seventeenth century and the early years of the eighteenth were years of drought in Central Arabia. The 'Utūb must have been among the tribes that moved to Eastern Arabia because of the drought.² Local tradition asserts that the 'Utūb were living in al-Aflāj district in Central Arabia. They were driven by drought eastward as far as Qaṭar, then under the suzerainty of the Banī Khālīc. Though no one is sure of how they finally assembled in Kuwait, they must have learned sea-faring in Qaṭar or in al-Ḥasā, for this can explain the local authorities' theory of how they sailed to the north. In fact, local tradition asserts that they had dispersed into various Persian Gulf ports before coming to Kuwait.³ However, as far as local traditions are concerned, they suggest three places, from one of which the 'Utūb must have arrived at Kuwait.

The first implies that they were living near Khōr al-Ṣabbiyya to the south of Baṣra, whence they were driven by the Ottoman Mutasallim of Baṣra because they used to raid the desert caravans coming to Baṣra,

¹ See above, pp. 32-33.

² Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, p. 26.

³ Ṣafahat min Ta'rikh al-Kuwait, p. 9; Al-Rashīd, Ta'rikh al-Kuwait, Vol. I, pp. 15-16.

and to attack the shipping of the Shaṭṭ al-‘Arab.¹ Another alternative is that those families were living on the Persian coast of the Gulf, whence they made their way by sea to Kuwait after being oppressed by the Arab tribes living there;² while others are inclined to believe that they moved to Kuwait from Qaṭar sailing in their boats, as a result of their quarrels with the Āl-Musallam Arabs of Qaṭar.³

However, Al-Qina‘ī resolves the dilemma when he says that the ‘Utūb originally inhabited Qaṭar after their departure from al-Aflāj. From Qaṭar the different families scattered into the various ports of the Persian Gulf littorals. And finally they all came to live together once more at Kuwait. He gives the example of his own family, Āl-Qina‘āt, who came to Kuwait about two hundred years ago from the Persian littoral, ‘Irāq and the south, i.e. Qaṭar.⁴ Thus it is most probable that the

¹Vol. I,
Al-Rashīd, op.cit.,/p. 16, and Al-Nabhānī, Al-Tuhfa, al-Kuwait, p. 128.

²Qays Island, ‘Abadān and other places are given as their settlements before moving to Kuwait. Cf. Ṣafahāt min Ta’rīkh al-Kuwait, p.9.

³This is the local tradition, told to me personally by Shaikh ‘Abd Allāh b. Khālīd Āl-Khālīfa. The Āl-Khālīfa tradition states that the Āl-Khālīfa branch of the ‘Utūb was inhabiting Kuwait earlier than the Āl-Ṣabāh, cf. Nabhānī, op.cit., p. 128.

⁴Āl-Qina‘āt. Al-Qina‘ī in his Ṣafahāt speaks of the Qina‘āt at Kuwait, Zubāra, Baṣra and Najd. It is not quite clear from where they came to Kuwait. According to him (p.100), they might have come from northern

'Utūb came from the south after spending not less than half a century after their arrival from Al-Aflāj, a passage of time which taught them how to become sea-farers and sail to Kuwait.

Arrival at Kuwait

The date of the 'Utūb's arrival at Kuwait is not certain. Yet here we have to distinguish between the coming of the Āl-Ṣabāḥ, whose chief Ṣabāḥ b. Jābir rose to power and became the Shaikh of Kuwait in the 1750's, and the other 'Utūb families. Though Mr. Warden and other officers of the Bombay Government¹ state that about the year 1716 the Āl-Ṣabāḥ, with two important branches of the 'Utūb, namely the Āl-Khalīfa and Āl-Jalāhima, occupied Kuwait and started to direct the affairs of the place, there is a great deal of conjecture in the state-

(cont.) 'Irāq, where they had been settling for some time before.

As for their genealogy, they originally belonged to the Suhāl Arabs.

It seems also that some of them migrated to Zubāra with or after the emigration of Āl-Khalīfa in 1766. Soon after the desertion of Zubāra by its inhabitants in 1213/1798, some of the Qina'āt migrated to Bahrain Islands and others to Persia (see Ibid., pp. 99-100). At Manāma town in Bahrain there is a quarter called after them (Ibid.).

¹See "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs etc." in Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 140. This article, by Lieutenant Kemball, depends on previous articles written by Mr. Warden in 1817. Kemball wrote it in 1844.

ment. In the first place all the 'Utūb did not arrive at one time. Some families arrived there before the others.¹ Secondly, the statement is an anachronism, for, in the year 1716 neither Ṣabāḥ nor Khalīfa were the chiefs of their families, as is stated there.² Yet this should in no way mean that the predecessors of Ṣabāḥ b. Jābir were not at Kuwait in the beginning of the eighteenth century.³

¹Ṣafahāt, p. 9, and Al-Rashīd, Ta'rikh al-Kuwait, I, pp. 14-16.

²The statement runs as follows:

"About A.D. 1716, three considerable tribes of Arabs, called the Bani Sabah, Al Yalahima, and Al Khaleefa, urged by motives of interest or ambition, entered into a compact, and took possession of a spot of ground on the north-western shore of the Persian Gulf, called Kuwait. The Bani Sabah were subject at this time to Shaikh Soleyman bin Ahmed; the Bani Yalahima to Jaubir bin Uttoobee; and the Bani Khaleefa to Khaleefa bin Mahomed." "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs, etc." p. 362.

³Local tradition among the Shaikhs of the Āl-Khalīfa says, according to what Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Khalīd Āl-Khalīfa told me, that their family came to Kuwait earlier than the Āl-Ṣabāḥ, and the head of the 'Utūb was the ruler of Kuwait, and perhaps this is why the Āl-Khalīfa migrated in 1766 to Zubāra when 'Abd Allāh Āl Ṣabāḥ came to be the Shaikh of Kuwait. See below, p. 122.

Rulers of Kuwait, 1700-1750.

There is nothing clear about the rulers of Kuwait in the first half of the century in the consulted records of the English East India Company, the writings of travellers, or the local tradition. Yet it seems that Kuwait, until the early 1750's, was under the direct rule of the Banī Khālīd Amīr. The opening of the eighteenth century saw the strong rule of Sa'dūn b. Muḥammad b. Ghurair Āl-Ḥamīd.¹ After the death of Sa'dūn, his brother 'Alī occupied the seat of government, after a struggle with Dujayn b. Sa'dūn and Munayyi'.² Sulaymān, a third brother of Sa'dūn and 'Alī became the ruler of Eastern Arabia in the same year.³

The struggle for the Shaikhship among the members of the ruling family of the Banī Khālīd, that started after the decease of Sa'dūn in 1722, seems to have given other tribes who were tributaries of the Banī Khālīd some sort of local independence, though at the same time they remained loyal to the Banī Khālīd. In the case of Kuwait that

¹Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 218.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., Vol. I, p. 27.

independence was not achieved till after the 1750's. Mr. Warden, in his sketch of the 'Utūb, which was compiled in 1817, gives the name of Sulaymān b. Aḥmad as the Shaikh of the Ṣabāḥ family as early as 1716.¹ But since no local tradition and no other source besides Mr. Warden's report gives the name of any Sulaymān as the first ruler of the 'Utūb at Kuwait from the Ṣabāḥ family, the Āl-Khalīfa local tradition may prove helpful in this place, otherwise the Governor may have been of the Banī Khālīd. The Āl-Khalīfa tradition states that one of them was ruling in Kuwait prior to the Āl-Ṣabāḥ. Khalīfa, after whom the family was named, and who migrated to Zubāra in Qaṭar in the year 1766, was the son of Muḥammad b. Faiṣal. The Khalīfa version of their rule in Kuwait gives the names Muḥammad and Faiṣal as their chiefs in Kuwait before their departure to Zubāra. These two names could not be mistaken for the Sulaymān of Mr. Warden's report.

In my opinion Sulaymān b. Aḥmad, whom Mr. Warden believed to be the ruler of Āl-Ṣabāḥ, is the same Sulaymān b. Muḥammad or Sulaymān Āl-Ḥamīd, ruler of the Banī Khālīd tribes from 1736-1752.² This theory can be supported on the following grounds. First, it is easy to give the name Aḥmad for Āl-Ḥamīd when mentioning the ruler's family name,

¹"Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs", etc., in Bombay Selections, p. 362.

²Cf. Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol..I, p. 27.

as long as his first name is properly stated, in this case Sulaymān. In the second place, the 'Utūb, according to local tradition, came to live at Kuwait with the permission of the Banī Khālīd ruler.¹ To this one can add that the power of the Banī Khālīd remained strong and centralized in the hands of one Shaikh till the decease of Sulaymān bin Muḥammad Āl-Ḥamīd in the year 1752. Family disputes that started after the death of Sa'dūn in the year 1722 were not of so great a consequence as to give the 'Utūb a chance of complete independence, a chance which became greater from 1752 onwards, not only because of the dissensions in the Āl-Ḥamīd family, but also because of the emergence of the Wahhābī power in Central Arabia and its impact on the territories of the Banī Khālīd.

The rise of Ṣabāh, 1752.

Thus Sulaymān can only by the Amīr of the Banī Khālīd, who was finally driven out of al-Ḥasā by 'Uray'ir b. Sa'dūn, and who died in exile at al-Kharj in southern Najd in 1166/1752.² These internal struggles among the ruling family of the Banī Khālīd gave the 'Utūb the chance to practise some sort of independence.

¹ Ṣafahāt min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, p. 9; Al-Nabhāni, Al-Tuhfa al-Nabhāniyya, al-Kuwait, pp. 128-129..

² Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 27.

Local traditions, though not sure of a certain date for Ṣabāh's rise to power, relate that he was chosen by the inhabitants of Kuwait after the tribal fashion to administer justice and the affairs of the thriving town.¹ Before Ṣabāh, his family do not seem to have attained any fame. His father Jābir was never mentioned in contemporary traditions.²

Ṣabāh's name was not even given by the earliest European travelers who mentioned the name of Kuwait in their accounts, though they said that Kuwait was ruled by a Shaikh.

Relations with the Dutch - Dr. Ives at Kharij, 1758 - limits of the Shaikh's authority.

But as early as 1758 Ṣabāh's authority seems to have been very well established over Kuwait and its vicinity. And, as a result of

¹Al-Rashīd, Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, Vol. II, p. 2., and Saif Marzūq al-Shamlān, Min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, (Cairo 1959), pp. 116-117.

²Shaikh Muḥammad b. 'Īsā Āl-Khalīfa, when asked by al-Shamlān about the father of Ṣabāh I, answered that he was named Jābir. Shaikh Muḥammad quoted a verse that used to be sung by Āl-Bin 'Alī on their departure from Kuwait on their way to Qaṭar in the 1750's, the translation of which is: O for him who could tell the most generous Ṣabāh b. Jābir how we are directing our sails to our end strongly. Al-Shamlān, op.cit., p. 105.

the commercial success of the town, Kuwait became an important place of call for the desert caravans coming from Aleppo. From Kuwait the caravans used to carry goods that were imported from India by Kuwaiti vessels, and at the same time passengers who wanted to travel from the Persian Gulf, via the desert, to Aleppo in Syria, used to join those caravans from there.¹ The story of Dr. Ives and his fellow travellers with the Shaikh of Kuwait is worth rendering in this place, for it is the first instance where Kuwait is mentioned in the work of a European traveller.

In March 1758 Dr. Ives, with other travellers, anchored at Khārij Island on their way from India to Europe.² When Dr. Ives and his party asked Baron Kniphausen, the head of the Dutch settlement at Khārij, the quickest way to get to Aleppo, the latter suggested that they should travel by felucca (boat) to Kuwait, where the Shaikh was "a man greatly obliged to him and in some measure under his influence", and at Kuwait join the caravan proceeding from thence by the desert to Aleppo. That desert route would be covered in twenty-five or thirty days, and would save them at least from two to four weeks compared with travelling by boat to Basra and Baghdād.

¹Ives, op.cit., p. 207.

²For an account of Khārij Island, see Dr. Ives, Voyages, pp. 207-216., Niebuhr, Voyages en Arabie, II, pp. 149-166. Parsons, op.cit., pp. 190-198;

"That desert route the Baron knew it to be a road frequented by people of trade and that an European, attended only by a single servant, had safely travelled over it."¹

Arrangements were made by which a Felucca was sent from Kharij to Kuwait to fetch the Shaikh on the 31st March, but it did not return until the 14th April and on it was "the long expected Arab".² Negotiations were carried out between the Shaikh and Baron Kniphausen as to the amount the English travellers should pay for their conveyance from Kuwait to Aleppo. The Shaikh said that they should pay two thousand piastres.³, while the Baron offered from one thousand to eleven hundred, and thus negotiations failed and the Shaikh returned to his town and the travellers proceeded by vessel to Basra.⁴

"The Shaikh", says Dr. Ives, "after negotiation was broken off, waited upon the Baron, and remonstrated after this manner, 'You use me very unkindly, Sir. Pray what are these travellers to you? I and my tribe have been in friendship with you for a long time, and I could not have expected that you would thus have given the preference to strangers.'"⁵

¹Ives, op.cit., p. 207.

²Ibid., p. 222.

³Eight hundred piastres make one thousand rupees, or one hundred and twenty-five pounds sterling. See Ibid., p. 223.

⁴Ibid., pp. 222-224.

⁵Ibid., p. 224.

Lorimer, when commenting on the arrival of the Shaikh at Kharij, and trying to prove that the latter was "under the influence" of the Baron, seems to be affected by the wording of Dr. Ives in his narrative.¹ In fact the Shaikh's relations with the Dutch were on an equal footing. Both the Baron and Shaikh Ṣabāḥ benefited from carrying trade by a route avoiding Baṣra, the Baron because of hostilities with the Pāshā of Baṣra that one day led him to prison, and the Shaikh because of the pecuniary gains he could get from merchandise carried through his town.

The Shaikh's sphere of influence

This conveyance of trade both by sea and the desert must have put the Shaikh into direct contact with his neighbours. Though it is very difficult to fix a limit to the area under the control of the Shaikh during the first half of the eighteenth century, one can say that his influence might have extended outside the walls of his town. From his story with Dr. Ives and how he promised the traveller a safe arrival at Aleppo, it appears that the Arabs of the desert route from Kuwait to Aleppo were on good terms with him.

However, there is no written evidence to show the limit of the 'Utūb suzerainty north of Kuwait, but it must have extended to Jahra

¹ See Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Vol. I, p. 1000.

village, whose wells had a water of better quality than that of Kuwait. Away from the mainland, near-by islands like Qurain, Umm al-Naml and Failaka were under the rule of the Shaikh.¹ The wealth of the Shaikh, and consequently of the town, can be judged from his refusal of the Baron's offer of one thousand piastres where he had asked for two thousand, in spite of the fact that the whole deal was liable to bargaining.

The Shaikh's resources

This rapid growth of the 'Utbi town can be attributed to the bulk of trade that was carried by the merchants of Kuwait and other merchants who used Kuwait as a station for the caravans that carried their goods from southern and eastern Arabia to Syria.² Pearl fishing formed another source of wealth, by which, according to Niebuhr, the town kept busy a fleet of over eight hundred small boats.³ It may be interesting to note that the 'Utub used to sail to the south for pearl fishing, because the vicinity of Bahrain was the richest place in pearls in the Banī Khālid territory.⁴

¹Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, pp. 286, 296.

²The caravan by which Dr. Ives and his companions were supposed to travel consisted of 5000 camels and one thousand men. See his Voyage, p. 222.

³Niebuhr, Description, p. 296.

⁴For pearl fishing, see Chapter VI, p. 314-316.

The 'Utbi families

Other 'Utbi families besides Āl-Ṣabāh, the ruling Shaikh, shared in the ease of conveyance of merchandise and in the pearl fishery. Among the first families mentioned by local traditions and in the Records of the Bombay Government are Āl-Jalāhima, Āl Khalīfa, Āl-Zāyid, Āl-Ghanim, Āl-Badr, Āl-Rūmī, Āl-Khalīd, Āl-Qinā'āt, Āl-Ṣaif and others.¹

Description of the early settlement

These families seem from the very beginning to have settled in a way that made every part of the town take a certain family or more. The town was thus divided into "Ḥayy-Sharq" (People of the East), Qiblī or Jiblī, i.e. the West, because this is the direction of Makka, and the Waṣaṭ, or centre. In the central quarter lived Āl-Ṣabāh.²

The town's wall

Local tradition states that the town was not walled from the very beginning because the authority of the Banī Khalīd was respected by

¹ Ṣafahāt min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, p. 67; Min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, p. 115,

"Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe, etc." p. 362. Some of these families are living nowadays both at Bahrain and Kuwait, e.g. Āl-Jalāhima, who are called in Kuwait Āl-Naṣf. See Al-Rashīd, Vol. I, p. 18.

² The 'Utūb and other newcomers to the town kept those divisions till the last ten years, when new town planning carried people out of Kuwait town, when the wall was demolished in 1956.

other Bedouin tribes. But when the Banī Khālid lost their influence, as a result of internal struggles between members of the ruling branch, Kuwait was walled, but these local authorities do not give a date for the building of the wall. Yet we can roughly say that it was begun in about 1760, i.e. about eight years after the Banī Khālid had lost much of their influence among the Arab tribes. This wall was built of mud. Heavy rain used to damage most of it, yet it served as a defence against Bedouin raids as late as the early twentieth century. The reason for building a wall around Kuwait as given by local historians was to defend the town against the aggression of neighbouring Arab tribes, when the Banī Khālid's influence was shaken, as previously mentioned.¹ Thus, though no definite date is given by local authorities for the building of the wall, one can say that it might therefore have been built during the reign of Ṣabāḥ, because it was then that the Banī Khālid's rule began to totter. The East India Company Records clearly state that the town was walled as early as the 1770's.²

Early Administration

This lack of protection for the town made the local Shāikh, Ṣabāḥ, exercise more power. Local tradition states that Ṣabāḥ was chosen by

¹Ṣafahāt min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, p. 13.

²F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, dispatch No. 1152, paragraph 3.

the different families¹ so that his rule may not have been as despotic as one would have expected. This is due in the first place to the fact that the 'Utūb from the very beginning were settler Arabs, not nomads. The nomadic stage came to an end after their departure from Qaṭar early in the seventeenth century. Though the powers of the Arab Shaikhs were extremely great at that time in Arabia, the Shaikh of Kuwait had to consult his townspeople every now and then, especially where commercial interests were concerned.² If we can judge from what happened later in about 1775, when Baṣra was occupied by the Persians, and when many of its merchants moved to Kuwait and Zubāra, the 'Utbī settlements, we can say that the merchants of Kuwait did really share in the politics of their town.³

Administration of Justice

The Shaikh, as in almost every part of Arabia then, had to see that justice was evenly distributed among his people. In practising that he was expected to resort either to the Qur'ān and Sharī'a law

¹ Al-Qinā'ī, Safahāt, p. 11.

² Ibid.

³ The ruler's family shares in the trade of the town today, a thing which the Āl-Ṣabāḥ had to work into as their number grew.

or to the 'urf or the Sālifa (custom), which is practised by experience. The two local Kuwaitī historians who tackled this problem, namely al-Qinā'ī and al-Rashīd, state that Kuwait did not see the Sharī'a law working all through the eighteenth century and even after that.¹

It was not necessary in this case to ask the ruler to intervene, as it was the custom to ask any man thought to have the required prudence to settle any conflict.² In the case of the 'Utbi rule in Kuwait, and later in Zubāra, it can be assumed that what was customary at al-Hasā was carried with the 'Utub to these places. In other words, there must have been a judge (Qādī) at Kuwait from the start. 'Ulamā' or learned men were in abundance at al-Hasā in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 'Uthmān b. Sanad, in his work Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, gives the biographies of twenty 'Ulamā' who were mostly his contemporaries, i.e. late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.³ Their influence was great, not only on the people but also on the rulers. Almost every town in al-Hasā and Najd had its school of 'Ulamā'. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, the great Wahhābī reformer, was the son of Shaikh 'Abd al-Wahhāb b.

¹ Cf. al-Rashīd, Vol. I, pp. 75-76, and al-Qinā'ī, op.cit., pp. 33-35.

² Ibid.

³ 'Uthmān b. Sanad died in the year 1242 A.H. /1826. See Kāzīm al-Dujaylī, article on 'al-Shaikh 'Uthmān b. Sanad al-Baṣrī' in Lughat al-'Arab (Baghdād, Dhul Qa'da 1331/October 1913), pp. 180-186.

Sulaymān, the Qāḍī of 'Uyayna. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb had to fight hard against the other 'Ulamā' to convince them of his teachings. He had travelled to various towns in Najd and Ḥijāz in the 1720's, where he listened to the 'Ulamā' in Makka, Madīna and other towns of Ḥijāz.¹

Among the biographies 'Uthmān b. Sanad gives in the above-mentioned work is that of Shaikh Muḥammad b. Fayrūz² and his son Shaikh 'Abd al-Wahhāb b. Muḥammad b. Fayrūz.³ The name of the first is given by the local tradition of Kuwait as the first judge of the town.⁴ The date given by al-Rashīd and al-Qinā'ī for the death of Muḥammad b. Fayrūz is 1135 A.H./1722. Yet they state that Ṣabāḥ was the first ruler and ibn Fayrūz was the Qāḍī during his reign.⁵ As we have already seen that Ṣabāḥ could not have come to power earlier than 1752, we have to say that both al-Qinā'ī and al-Rashīd are mistaken in giving Shaikh Muḥammad b. Fayrūz's death at that date. 'Uthmān b. Sanad gave the year 1146 A.H./1733 for ibn Fayrūz's birth and the year 1216/1801 for his death.⁶ He added that ibn Fayrūz was born in Hajar (al-

¹ Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., pp. 30-31; Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 6-7.

² Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, pp. 93-94.

³ Ibid., p. 96.

⁴ Ṣafahāt min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, pp. 35-36; Al-Rashīd, Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, Vol. I, pp. 75-76.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, p. 96.

Ḥasā) and buried in Zubair, a town between Baṣra and Kuwait.¹ As it was natural for these 'Ulamā' to travel from one town to another, I am inclined to think that the dates 'Uthmān b. Sanad gives are correct, while the year 1135/1722 is not.²

However, from the facts stated about Ibn Fayrūz and his job as the first Qādī in Kuwait, and from the dates given by Ibn Sanad for his birth and death, we can decide that Ibn Fayrūz was the first Qādī of Kuwait, and that he officiated under the rule of Shaiḫ Ṣabāḥ.

'Abd Allāh b. Ṣabāḥ, the second ruler, 1762.

If local traditions do not agree on the date when Ṣabāḥ was chosen as ruler, they differ greatly on the date of his death. Only one gives it as 1190 A.H./1776, which is not right.³ Ṣabāḥ left five male descendants: Salṃān, Mālīj, Mubārak, Muḥammad and 'Abd Allāh, who was the youngest. All local traditions agree that the youngest was chosen as his successor for special merits, such as bravery, justice, wisdom, and generosity, which an Arab usually desires to see in his Shaiḫ.⁴

¹Ṣabā'ik al-'Asjad, p. 96.

²Al-Qinā'ī gives the following list of Qādīs in Kuwait:

1. Muḥammad b. Fayrūz.
2. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-'Adsānī (1170/1756 - 1179/1765).
3. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-'Adsānī, (1179/1765 - 1208/1793).
4. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-'Adsānī, (1208/1793 - 1225/1810).

They were all Qādīs in the town of Kuwait during the 18th century. It

(cont.)

Lorimer, writing his chronicle after the East India Company Records, states that 'Abd Allāh became ruler in about 1762.¹ Uthmān b. Sanad, though not giving an exact date, shows that 'Abd Allāh was ruling for some years before 1188/1774.² Al-Qinā'ī gives the year 1229 A.H./1813 for 'Abd Allāh's death.³ Al-Rashīd gives the same date.⁴ Al-Qinā'ī adds that he ruled for about seventy years, which means that he became Shaikh in 1159/1746. But as this is inconsistent with what we have discussed concerning the rise of Sabāh as Shaikh in 1752, the year 1762 can be fixed as the year of his rise to power. This year can give an explanation for one of the main reasons for the emigration of the Āl-Khalīfa from Kuwait to Zubāra in Qaṭar four years later in the year 1180/1766. Though the question of the departure of Āl-Khalīfa will be

(cont.) may be worthwhile noticing that three of them were of the Āl-Adsānī family who originally came from al-Ḥasā. (See Al-Qinā'ī, op.cit. p.36, and Al-Rashīd, op.cit. p. 76). The dates in the list are given according to al-Qinā'ī.

³Al-Rashīd, Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, Vol. II, p. 2, gives this date. But 'Abd Allāh ruled for 50 years and he died in 1813. See Portuguese Collection, p.

⁴Ṣafahāt min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, p. 10; Al-Rashīd, Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, Vol. II, p. 2.

¹Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Vol. IV, Table 9.

²Saba'ik al 'Asiād, p. 18.

³Ṣafahāt, p. 10.

⁴Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, Vol. II, p. 9.

discussed in the following chapter, yet we can mention here that local tradition gives as one of the reasons for their emigration the fact that 'Abd Allāh succeeded his father and not one of his cousins, i.e. the Āl-Khalīfa, who were the Shaikhs of the 'Utūb at Kuwait before Ṣabāḥ b. Jābir.¹ That emigration took place in 1180 A.H./1766. Thus 'Abd Allāh must have become ruler some time before 1766.²

Conclusion

Thus, through all the first half of the eighteenth century, the 'Utūb were establishing themselves in Kuwait. They chose their Shaikh Ṣabāḥ, after whom the present ruling family was named, in about 1750. Ṣabāḥ was succeeded by his son 'Abd Allāh, in the 1760's, and it was during his early rule that the Āl-Khalīfa division of the 'Utbi coalition emigrated to Qaṭar where they established Zubāra, the second 'Utbi settlement.

¹This is what Shaikh 'Abdallāh b. Khālid Āl-Khalīfah told me personally.

²See Saba'ik al-'Asjad, p. 18; and "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs, etc." in Bombay Selections, p. 362.

Chapter III

THE GROWTH OF KUWAIT -

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZUBĀRA, 1766 -

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE 'UTBĪ

NAVAL POWER (1762 - 1775)

Chapter III

THE GROWTH OF KUWAIT -

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZUBĀRA, 1766 -

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE 'UTBĪ

NAVAL POWER (1762 - 1775)

This chapter will follow the progress the 'Utbī settlements of Kuwait and Zubāra made until 1775. During its duration certain developments took place in Kuwait. These led to the emigration of the Āl-Khālifa to the south. They were followed by other 'Utbī families, most famous among whom were the Āl-Jalāhima. The various questions relating to this 'Utbī movement and the relations of the 'Utūb with the different influential powers will therefore be attempted in this place.

The 'Utbī settlement of Kuwait began to flourish rapidly after the 1750's, and by the 1760's it began to draw the attention of other rival Arab powers in the Gulf. The position of other powers besides these, namely the Persians, the Ottomans and the English East India Company, did not hinder that growth. For the Persians, as formerly stated, had neither the sea power nor the internal peace to think even of their own coast of the Gulf. The Ottoman Pasha in Baghdād and the Mutasallim of Baṣra were no better off than the Persians, and they did not seem to be ready to molest the Banī Khālīd predominance on the

eastern shores of the Gulf. To the East India Company the 'Utūb had so far given no trouble. Until then piracy had never been a characteristic of the 'Utūb.¹ The only force that could directly affect the 'Utūb, namely, the Wahhābī power, was still not consolidated. Direct contact with the maritime Arab powers in the Gulf did not start till the year 1766, when a part of the 'Utūb moved southwards and chose Zubāra in Qaṭar as their new settlement.² The most powerful Arabs on the Persian littoral of the Gulf were then the Banī Ka'b, whose stronghold was at Dawraq,³ the Arabs of Bandar Rīq and the Arabs of Abū Shahr.⁴

¹See "Historical Sketch of the Jawasmi," etc. in Bombay Selections, XXIV., p. 307.

²Ibn Saḥad, Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, p. 18. "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe, of Arabs," in Bombay Selections, p. 362.

³Banī Ka'b originally came from Najd in the seventeenth century and established themselves to the east of Baṣra on the Persian-Ottoman borders. See Niebuhr's Description de l'Arabie, pp. 276-277.

⁴The last two tribes came originally from 'Umān. The Shaikh of Bandar Rīq was Mīr muhanna, and he came from the Bani Ṣa'b tribe. The ruler of Abū Shahr, Shaikh Naṣr, belonged to the Maṭarīsh, an 'Umānī tribe. There were other Arab tribes living in the area under the domination of these two Shaikhs, cf. Ibid., pp. 273-80.

The Ka'b activities

Those Arabs living on the northern and eastern shores of the Gulf did not show any interest in Kuwait till the 1760's when, due to the growing sea trade of the 'Utūb, and the growing trend towards piracy among the Ka'b, the latter began to hinder the 'Utbī trade.¹ Banī Ka'b were not only threatening the trade of Kuwait, but also the East India Company's trade that was destined for their Factory at Baṣra. Karīm Khān Zand, the Vakīl of Persia, tried, but unsuccessfully, to subdue Shaikh Sulaymān in 1759. An Anglo-Ottoman expedition against the capital, Dawraq, in 1765, proved fruitless.²

The Wahhābīs move

In the west, the Wahhābīs were trying very hard to consolidate their power in Central Arabia. At the same time they started to expand eastwards at the expense of the Banī Khālid. The late 1750's and the early 1760's show that the Wahhābīs were not an equal match for the Banī Khālid. The two Wahhābī chroniclers, Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr,

¹Local tradition in Kuwait states that the enmity between the Banī Ka'b and Āl-Ṣabāḥ started when Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāḥ refused to give his daughter (some say his sister) in marriage to Shaikh Sulaymān of the Banī Ka'b. See Ta'rikh al-Kuwait, Vol. II, p. 3.

²The Persian Gulf, op.cit., p. 184.

clearly point out this fact when chronicling the events of 1171/1757 and 1172/1758.¹ However, Abd al-'Azīz, the Wahhābī Amīr, raided al-Ḥasā in 1176/1762.² But two years later 'Ar'ar b. Dujayn b. Sa'dūn, the Shaikh of Banī Khālīd, tried twice in 1178/1764 to occupy al-Dir'iyya, the Wahhābī capital.³ The author of Lam' al-Shihāb states that 'Ar'ar did not molest the Wahhābīs for seven years, which ended in 1764, because the Wahhābīs demanded peace;⁴ peace might have been planned for seven years, but 'Ar'ar did not keep his promise, and took the opportunity of attacking the Wahhābīs who were fighting against two great opponents, namely Dahhām b. Dawwās, the chief of al-Riyāḍ, and the 'Ajman tribes of the Yaman.⁵

Al-Khalīfa move to Zubāra

This unsettled state of affairs in Arabia, Persia and Ottoman 'Irāq made it possible for a large division of the 'Utūb to depart from Kuwait and establish a new settlement at Zubāra in Qaṭar.

Reasons for the departure of the Al-Khalīfa.

Local tradition among the 'Utūb of Kuwait gives as a major reason

¹Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 64; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 42.

²Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 72; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 46.

³Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 77.

⁴Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 43-44.

⁵Ibid., Alois Musil, Northern Najd, (New York, 1928), p. 259.

behind the emigration of Āl-Khalīfa the above-mentioned disputes with the Banī Ka'b which led to the humiliation of Āl-Ṣabāh and consequently of the settlers at Kuwait. Āl-Khalīfa did not like to come to terms with the Ka'b or did not like the policy of Āl-Ṣabāh, the ruling family, and thus migrated to Zubāra. Though this reason sounds very convincing, it cannot stand as the only reason explaining the emigration.

Mr. Francis Warden, in his "Historical Sketch of the 'Utūb", after stating that Kuwait, having attained in the first fifty years (1716-1766) a very high degree of prosperity, goes on to say that "the accumulation of wealth rendered the mercantile branch (Āl-Khalīfa) desirous of seceding from the original league, that they might singly enjoy to add to their acquired riches". He continues that Āl-Khalīfa, then under the chieftainship of Khalīfa b. Muḥammad, whose name the family bore, "were obliged to have recourse to dissimulation to effect their purpose". Khalīfa undertook to accomplish it. He represented to the other two, the Āl-Ṣabāh and Āl-Jalāhima,² the prospects of wealth that presented themselves by proceeding to the shores of that part of the Persian Gulf, the most productive of pearls, and, by forming a settlement

Al-Rashid,

¹Yusuf b. 'Isa al-Qinā'ī, op.cit., p. 11.; / Ta'rikh al-Kuwait, Vol. II, p.5.

²Jalāhima are known today as Āl-Nisf, and they are represented both at Kuwait and Bahrain by rich merchants.

on some contiguous spot, conducting the fishery themselves. The Āl-Ṣabāḥ agreed to this plan of their kinsman's, and thus Khalīfa started, with a great number of his family, towards the south.¹

To the above-mentioned factors given for the emigration of Khalīfa² and his family, it is worthwhile rendering the story told by the Āl-Khalīfa now which says that Khalīfa's grandfather was ruling at Kuwait or wherever the 'Utūb might have been before that. This grandfather, Faiṣal by name, gave his daughter in marriage to Jābir, the father of Shaikh Ṣabāḥ. When Shaikh Ṣabāḥ was chosen as ruler, his uncles did not object to that choice, hoping that the next ruler would be chosen from Faiṣal's branch. But the choice of 'Abd Allāh, the youngest son of Ṣabāḥ, irritated Khalīfa, who was expecting to take over after Ṣabāḥ, and made him depart from Kuwait.³

¹"Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe etc." Bombay Selections.

Vol. XXIV, pp. 362-363.

²Al-Qinā'ī mistakenly gives the name of Muḥammad b. Khalīfa instead of Khalīfa, Ṣafahat, p. 11., while Ibn Sanad, who is more authoritative, being contemporary with the events described, gives the name of Khalīfa with the title of "Ashraf Banī 'Utba", the noblest among the 'Utub, Sabai'k al-'Asjad, p. 19.

³This may explain why Ibn Sanad refers to Khalīfa as "Ashraf Banī 'Utba", see above. I was told of this tradition by the above-mentioned Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Khālid Āl-Khalīfa.

The choice of Zubāra.

The departure of Khālifa and his followers was undoubtedly effected by sea. The 'Utūb had already established their sea power and knew how to sail the Gulf in safety. They shared in the pearl fishery seasons¹ by sending their boats to the shores of the Gulf near Bahrain and Qaṭar where everybody was free to indulge in this trade without any restrictions other than paying a certain amount of money to the ruler either of Bahrain or Qaṭar. They had already shared in the conveyance of merchandise to the different ports of the Gulf, and hence they were apprenticing themselves for future sea ventures. On their way to the south, and before landing at Zubāra, the emigrants called at Bahrain where they tried to land and settle, having formerly touched at the place, but the rulers of Bahrain, the Banī Madhkur Arabs, would not allow them to halt. Bahrain was then under the suzerainty of the Shaikh of Abū Shahr, who in his turn recognised the authority of the Shāh of Persia and used to pay him irregular tribute on behalf of Abū Shahr and Bahrain.²

However, the coming to Zubāra was not all of a sudden. The place was well known to the 'Utūb, not only because of their former experience on land when they first came to Qaṭar, before settling at Kuwait, but

¹Pearl fishing takes place in the hot months of the summer, see Carsten Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 286; "Report on the Trade of Arabia, etc." in Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, pp. 407-408.

²Carsten Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, pp. 284-286.

also because they carried trade to and from Bahrain, Qaṭar and Al-Ḥasā by sea and by land.¹

Surroundings of Zubāra

Nevertheless the emigrants chose Zubāra as a settlement, but before describing this settlement let us for a while try to acquaint ourselves with the local powers that could affect it. Though our information on Zubāra is very scanty, yet it is sufficient as regards its environs. A strong Arab tribe was ruling Qaṭar peninsula, who were called Āl-Musallam. The Āl-Musallam were there when the 'Utūb left Qaṭar for Kuwait early in the eighteenth century. They paid tribute to the Banī Khālīd who were, as previously stated, ruling al-Ḥasā and all the eastern coasts of Arabia from Qaṭar in the south to the vicinity of Baṣra in the north. Good relations were still prevailing between the 'Utūb and the Banī Khālīd. Thus the 'Utūb did not meet with any resistance when they landed on the western coast of Qaṭar and in the territory of the Banī Khālīd. To the north of Zubāra lie Bahrain

¹Desert caravans used to come from 'Uman in the south of Arabia to Baṣra and Aleppo in the north, c.f. Ives, op.cit., p. 222; Carsten Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 295; "Report on the Trade of Arabia bordering on the Persian Gulf", p. 408-9. For the 'Utūbī trade see Chapter VI below.

Islands, then and earlier called Awāl by the Arabs.¹ The Bahrain Islands were then under the direct rule of the Arabs of Abū Shahr. Their inhabitants were a mixture of Arab tribes, the majority of whom were of Huwala extraction.² Bahrain was, more or less, coveted for its pearl fisheries and its vast palm plantations that produced a yearly income of a lakh of rupees,³ most of which was spent on maintaining the garrison of Awāl.⁴

Description of Zubāra

The emigrating 'Utūb, after being prevented from landing at Awāl, sailed to the east, where they landed at Zubāra. It is not possible to give a detailed description of Zubāra at that time, mainly because no reference to it was made earlier than 1766, and because its prosperity did not continue for more than forty-four years, until it was attacked and damaged by the Sultān of Masqat in 1810/11.⁵

¹Carsten Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 284.

²Ibid., p. 286.

³Ibid.

⁴See Chapter VI on Pearl Fishery, p. 314.

⁵"Chronological Table of Events" in Bombay Selections, XXIV, pp. 124, 141; "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe, etc." p. 368 in Ibid.

However, we can draw a picture of Zubāra from later accounts by the officers of the English East India Company,¹ and from local tradition.

Situation

Zubāra, now a ruined and deserted town, lies on the western side of the Qaṭar promontory, about five miles south of Khōr Ḥassān.² It

¹Two of these reports were compiled, the first in 1818 by Captain Robert Taylor, Assistant Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, the second by Captain George Barnes Brucks of the Indian Navy in 1822-29. Captain Brucks was one of five officers of the Indian Navy who from 1821 to 1829 worked on a survey of the navigation of the Persian Gulf.

²This town was the resort of the Jalāhima, an 'Utbī division who later turned pirates after the establishment of Zubāra in 1766 and the conquest of Bahrain in 1782. See "Sketch of the Proceedings (from 1809-1818) of Rahmah bin Jaubir, Chief of Khōr Hassan", prepared by Mr. Francis Warden, Member of Council at Bombay; with Continuation to the Period of that Chief's Death in 1826; "A Brief Sketch of the Proceedings (down to the year 1831) of Shaikh Busheer bin Rahmah, son and successor of the above Chief"; by Lieutenant S. Hennel, Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf, in Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, pp. 521-529.

stands at the foot of a deep bay of the same name, of which the western point is Rās-'Ushairij, and which contains a small island also called Zubāra.¹ Thus from the different descriptions of Zubāra we can infer a possible picture of the town in the 1760's and after. Captain Robert Taylor in 1818 states that Zubāra had then 400 houses, and its people were allied to those of Khōr Ḥassān, i.e. Āl-Jalāhima.² Captain G. B. Brucks, writing in 1824,³ says "Zubāra is in latitude 26°N., long. 51° 8' 30"E. It is a large town, now in ruins. It is

¹It is interesting to note that Qurain (Kuwait), the early 'Utbī settlement, also has an island named Qurain; and Rās 'Ushairij is common to two promontories both at Kuwait and Zubāra. Zubāra was described at the beginning of the present century by J. G. Lorimer, who visited the various sites of the Persian Gulf in 1904, before compiling his authoritative work, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf.

²Extract from Brief Notes, containing Historical and other Information connected with the Province of Oman, Muskat, and the Adjoining Country; the Islands of Bahrein, Ormus, Kishm, and Karrack; and other Ports and Places in the Persian Gulf", prepared, in the Year 1818, by Captain Robert Taylor, in Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, p. 17.

³See note on the map facing p. 531 of the Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV.

situated in a bay, and has been, before it was destroyed, a place of considerable trade". He adds that the place had but very few inhabitants, and that it was "originally the principal of the Uttoobee Tribe, until they separated".¹ Lorimer gives more detailed information of the town's fortifications when he says that "the town was the stronghold of Al-Khalīfa, the ruling family of Bahrain"; and that it was "walled and some 10 or 12 forts stood within a radius of 7 miles round it, among them Furaiḥah, Ḥalwān, Līsha, 'Ain Muḥammad, Qal'at Murair, Rakaiyāt, Umm-al Shirwail and Thaghab. All of these are now (1904) ruinous and deserted, except Thaghab, which the people of Khōr Ḥassān visit to draw water. Murair is said to have been connected with the sea by a creek, which enabled sailing boats to discharge their cargoes at its gate, but the inlet is now silted up with sand."²

Water Supply

Zubara, the new 'Utbi settlement, like its predecessor Kuwait, had no water supply, though that supply was to be found in Qaṭar pen-

¹Captain George Barnes Brucks, "Memoir descriptive of the Navigation of the Gulf of Persia; with Brief Notices of the Manners, Customs, Religion, Commerce, and Resources of the People inhabiting its Shores and Islands", in Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, p. 562.

²J. G. Lorimer, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 1533-34.

insula in large quantities. The nearest water supply was one league (Farsakh) and a half away from the walls of the town.¹ It seems that the emigrants were so greatly affected by their long stay at Kuwait that they did not mind about the water and the vegetation as long as their chosen site offered them a suitable harbour for the trade which they had been carrying on during their residence at Kuwait.²

Early Settlement at Zubāra

However, the emigrating 'Utūb started to settle down quickly at Zubāra and dealt prudently with the two major powers that seemed to influence their settlement. The first of the two and of course the dominant power was that of the Banī Khālīd, under whose patronage the 'Utūb had established their first settlement at Kuwait. There is no indication that the 'Utūb of al-Zubāra were oppressed or vexed by the Banī Khālīd. However, there was no reason why any disputes should take place. The relations between the 'Utūb and the second power, Āl-Musallam, on the other hand, were not altogether cordial. Though no contemporary authorities explain the nature of these re-

¹ Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 95.

² The lack of water within the town itself gave the Wahhābīs the chance of taking it by means of cutting it off from its water supplies later towards the end of the century. See Chapter V, p. 128-129.

lations, yet we can judge that they were not friendly, because the 'Utūb started from the very beginning to build a wall and forts to defend their town.¹ It has already been stated that local Shaikhs in the Banī Khālid territories began to develop some sort of local independence after the death of Sulaymān b. Muḥammad, the Shaikh of the Banī Khālid, in 1752.² The 'Utūb of the north, at Kuwait, practised some sort of independence. In the same manner Āl-Musallam in Qaṭar seemed to have begun to practise some sort of independence. The 'Utūb of Zubāra, feeling that the Shaikh of the Banī Khālid was unlikely to help them on account of his quarrels with other chiefs of his ruling family and the struggle with the rising power of the Wahhābīs, found it very necessary to depend upon their own resources in defending their town.³ The local traditions of the Āl-Khālīfa state that Āl-Musallam wanted the 'Utūb of Zubāra to pay them tribute, which the latter refused to do, and made ready to defend their town against any aggression by the Āl-Musallam by rapidly finishing the wall and the fort called Murair by 1182/1768, just two years after their arrival at Zubāra.⁴ Though the presence of these tribes did

¹ Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 95.

² See above, p. 102.

³ Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 80-84.

⁴ Al-Nabḥānī, Ta'rikh al-Bahrain, p. 121. Āl-Musallam, like the Banī Khālid, belonged to Rabī'a. While Banī Khālid were living in al-Ḥasā, Āl-Musallam lived in Qaṭar at Furaiḥa and Fuwairiṭ,

not alarm the 'Utub at the very beginning of their settlement at Zubāra, because of the awe in which they all held the Banī Khālīd, yet they turned against the 'Utub and endangered Zubāra later when the Wahhābīs made war against the 'Utub town in the 1790's.¹

How Zubāra fared

If it took the first 'Utub port, Kuwait, about fifty years to develop from a fishing centre into a town of consequence,² Zubāra in a very few years became a great rival to other ports on the Persian Gulf, a circumstance which soon made the Arabs on the Persian coast direct their attacks against it.³

(cont.)

and could call to war 2000 men. Lam' al-Shihab, f. 235. Of less importance than Āl-Musallam and of Rabī'a extraction, two other tribes lived in Qaṭar. The first was Āl-Ābī Ḥusain, living at al-Yūsufiyya and having 1500 fighters, the second al-Ma'ādiyya, numbering 3000 fighters and inhabiting al-Ruwayḍa and al-Muṭaybikh. Besides these tribes, other tribes inhabited Qaṭar who could collect 5000 fighters.

Ibid., f. 236.

¹See Ibid., ff. 94-95, 101-103; Ibn Bishr., op.cit., Vol. I, p. 106;

Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 198.

²"Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs", . . .

Bombay Selections, XXIV, pp. 362-63.

³J. G. Lorimer, op.cit., Vol. I, i, p. 787.

The very rapid growth of Zubāra was occasioned by the participation of the 'Utūb in the pearl fishery on the rich coasts of the Banī Khalīd. Trade in pearls, especially in Bahrain, goes back to time immemorial. Zubāra's share in the pearl trade was very small at the beginning, but that little share gradually increased.¹ One of the earliest settlers of the place was Rizq al-As'ad, the famous Kuwaitī merchant. This merchant is said to have accompanied Khalīfa, the founder of the Āl-Khalīfa dynasty, in his journey from Kuwait to Zubāra as early as 1766.² To show the great wealth Rizq accumulated in a very short time, ibn Sanad relates that he started trading in pearls with three dīnars which he borrowed from the Governor, Wālī.³ Soon those three dīnars multiplied. 'Uthmān b. Sanad thinks that Rizq was the first among the 'Utūb to choose the site of Zubāra, and Khalīfa joined him in building the town,⁴ and to encourage the merchants to come to the new town and share in building up its trade,

¹Ibn Sanad, Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, pp. 18-19.

²Ibid.

³Though ibn Sanad does not state clearly who the Wālī was, I should think that he means the ruler of al-Ḥasā, 'Uray'ir b. Dujayn, since the author says that Rizq left Kuwait for al-Ḥasā. Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, p. 18.

⁴Ibid., p. 19.

the two friends, Khalīfa and Rizq, thought it a wise policy to put no duties of any kind on the trade.¹ In the "Report on the Trade of Arabia", this fact is confirmed when the Report states that "The Government of Zeberra (sic) does not collect Duties of any Kind on mercantile Articles".²

Free Trade at Zubāra

There can be no doubt that this newly established harbour with its policy of free trade began to affect the trade of the two already existing ports of the Banī Khālīd, namely al-Qaṭīf and al-'Uqair. In these two ports the duties paid on imported goods were not high when compared with the duties in other ports of the Gulf, as

"the Government of Catiffe is extremely favourable to Merchants who there enjoy complete Protection in their Persons and Property, and the Duties collected at that Place are very moderate, and are confined to Imports. A Zirmaboob³ is levied on a Bale of Coffee, or a Robin⁴ of Pepper and about one per cent is levied on all other Articles, except Provisions!"⁵

¹Ibn Sanad, Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, p. 20.

²See "Report on the Trade of Arabia" in Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

³This is an Ottoman currency. According to Lives, who was in Baṣra in 1758, one Zirmaboob of Baṣra currency was equal to 19 Marmoodas and 75 Fluce. Each Marmooda was equal to 100 Fluce. See his Voyage, p. 236.

See also Lives, p. 236. Fluce is a unit of coinage and the Fluce is a unit of weight.

⁴Robin, or Robbin, a term used in Malabar for a measure of grain.... anonymous authority makes it a fourth of a Khandi or Candy. In that

Al-'Uqair was the harbour through which al-Ḥasā town, the residence of the Shaikh of the Banī Khālid, used to get its own provisions and other merchandise for the Banī Khālid tribes of the interior.¹ Through al-Qaṭīf other interior towns in Najd such as al-Dir'īyya, al-Riyāḍ, and Manfūḥa were thus supplied.² This 'Utbī policy of free trade at Zubāra was not applied to Kuwait, where its government "collected Duties on mercantile Importations similar to those collected by the Government of Catiffe",³ which were trifling when

(Cont.)

case it may be a barbarism for the Arabic Raba or Arba, four, a fourth. See Wilson, H.H., A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Termsof the Govt. of the British India. etc. (London, 1855), s.v. Robin.

⁵See "Report on the Trade of Arabia etc." in Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

¹Captain G. Forster Sadleir, Dairy of a Journey across Arabia from el-Khatif in the Persian Gulf, to Yambo in the Red Sea, during the year 1819 (Bombay 1866), p. 30.

²Ibid., see also "Report on the Trade of Arabia etc." in Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 408.

³Ibid., p. 409.

compared with the duties collected by the Government at Masqat, where they amounted to "6½ per cent on all Importations, even Provisions not excepted".¹

The duties collected by the Government of Baṣra on all goods imported there by sea or from Baghdād, and all goods exported from thence by sea or by Aleppo, except on those made by Europeans and on provisions, were very heavy.

"Importations of fine Goods from Sea and from Baghdād pay 7½ per cent duties and Importations of gruff Goods from Sea and from Baghdād pay 8½ per cent Duties, Exportations to Aleppo pay similar Duties and Exportations to Sea for all Kinds pay 5½ per cent Duties."²

The coming of the Āl-Jalāhima

As a result of this trade policy in the ports of the Gulf, the merchants favoured the 'Utbi ports when carrying goods from India and Arabia to Syria and other Ottoman territories. This resulted in the rapid growth of the new 'Utbi settlement, and consequently large numbers from Kuwait migrated to Zubāra to share in its accumulating wealth. Among the emigrants were the Āl-Jalāhima, another large

¹"Report on the Trade of Arabia etc." in Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 407.

²Ibid., p. 411.

'Utbi family who had already proved to be the best mariners among the 'Utub.¹ Nothing is stated about the numbers of the Āl-Jalāhima or the other new emigrants, but their numbers seem to have been so considerable that the early settlers, fearing their competition, had soon to drive them away.² Āl-Jalāhima do not seem to have emigrated to Qaṭar till their cousins, the Khalīfas, had established themselves very strongly at Zubāra, which seems to have inspired the 'Utub of Kuwait to join them.³ By the 1760's the influence of three leading 'Utbi families seems to have established itself among the other 'Utub. We have already dealt with the Āl-Ṣabāh, the Shaikhs of Kuwait, and the Āl-Khalīfa, the Shaikhs of Zubāra. The third family was that of Āl-Jābir who came to be known as Āl-Jalāhima, and who gained fame later in the eighteenth century as pirates.⁴

¹The name Jalāhima is not used today by the descendants of that 'Utbi family. They are called Āl-Nisf, and are quite considerable both at Kuwait and Bahrain.

²"Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Arabs", etc., Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 363.

³Ibn Sanad, Sabā'ik al-'Asjad, pp. 18-19.

⁴See "Sketch of the Proceedings (from 1809 to 1813) of Rahman bin Jaubir, Chief of Khor Hassan", etc. Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, pp. 522-529.

Reasons for the coming of the Āl-Jalāhima to Zubāra

Why the Jalāhima¹ emigrated to Zubāra may seem a less controversial question than why the Khalīfas did so. Āl-Jalāhima were described as mariners from the very beginnings of Kuwait early in the eighteenth century; this, no doubt, gave them the chance to know where to find the best sites for pearl fishing. The Āl-Khalīfa had succeeded earlier in persuading the Āl-Ṣabāḥ and the Āl-Jalāhima to leave Kuwait, hoping for benefits for the whole 'Utūbī tribe in the shape of larger profits from pearl fishing. This hope was not realised. Āl-Jalāhima went for their own benefit, to add to their own wealth. On the other hand, quarrels seem to have taken place between the Āl-Jalāhima and the Āl-Ṣabāḥ soon after the departure of the Āl-Khalīfa, and the discovery shortly thereafter that the remaining 'Utūb were in financial difficulties caused by the Āl-Khalīfa's monopoly of the pearl trade, complicated matters further. Thus there was no room for both the Āl-Ṣabāḥ and the Āl-Jalāhima in Kuwait; consequently,

¹ Since the Jīm is usually pronounced Yā among the 'Utūb of Kuwait and Bahrain, the word Jalāhima is always pronounced Yalāhima; and thus the officers of the Bombay Governments in their reports use "Yalāhimah", cf. "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs etc.", Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, pp. 362-365; "Sketch of the Proceedings of Rahman bin Jaubir," etc. in Ibid., pp. 522-529.

"The more powerful clan of the two, the Āl-Subah, soon felt the absence of their commercial brethren (Āl-Khalīfa), in a deficiency of their finances; and, following the example of their renegade brethren, first refused the Āl Yalahimah their share of the revenue, and ultimately expelled them from the port and town of Koweit."¹

Shaikh Jābir directed the sails of his clan towards Zubāra, where they were kindly received by their kinsmen, who assigned "to each... according to his rank, an adequate income". But in a few years the Āl-Jalāhima asked for a larger share, which the Āl-Khalīfa denied them.

"Urged by necessity, and a sense of wrong, the Āl-Jalāhima quitted Zabara, and took up their residence at Reveish, a barren spot at a short distance eastward of Zabara, and turned their whole attention to the increase, equipment, and preservation of their fleet, contemplating the object of revenging themselves on their proud and perfidious neighbours."²

Struggle between the Āl-Khalīfa and the Āl-Jalāhima

Khalīfa, who was paving the way for his new settlement with difficulty against the fears of the Āl-Musallam, had to face a grave danger caused by his cousins, the Āl-Jalāhima, who commenced an ex-

¹"Historical Sketch of the Uttoohee Tribes, etc." p. 1, in Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 363.

²Ibid.

tensive system of maritime depredation and, by capturing his property and that of his clan, "created in the mind of Āl-Khalīfa fears for their existence, and such a thirst for the punishment and destruction of the Jalāhima Chief, that, adding to their own force all the mercenaries their pecuniary resources could obtain, they environed the marauders on every side." The treasures which the Āl-Jalāhima had amassed, which they were determined to defend to the last, and the feelings of animosity that existed between them, led to a desperate contest: the Jalāhima Chief having been killed at an early period of the action, the overwhelming superiority of their enemies obtained a complete victory, and a few infants and females were alone saved from the massacre that ensued.¹

This decisive victory resulted in establishing the suzerainty of the Āl-Khalīfa over all the other 'Utbi clans in the vicinity of Zubāra. Yet this should in no way be taken to mean that the Āl-Jalāhima and the Āl-Khalīfa did not bury their hostilities very deep when a common enemy threatened them soon after 1775, when the Arabs of Abū Shahr, Bandar Rīq and Dawraq joined forces to humiliate Zubāra, the new thriving 'Utbi settlement, an aggression that ended, as we shall see later, by the 'Utbi

¹"Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribes, etc." in Bombay

Selections, p. 363.

occupation of Bahrain in 1782. Thus the spread of 'Utbi influence into this area brought them into direct contact with the Persians, or, more accurately, with the Arabs of the Persian littoral of the Gulf, whose Shaikhs in this way or that admitted the suzerainty of the Shah of Persia.¹ In that struggle all the 'Utbi clans joined hands and successfully attacked and occupied Bahrain, but the reward of the Āl-Jalāhima was not as they had expected.²

'Utbi relations with other powers in the Gulf (1766-1770)

Let us turn for a while to the state of affairs in the countries bordering on the Persian Gulf to see how these conditions facilitated the growth of the two 'Utbi settlements of Kuwait and Zubāra.

The Wahhābīs in the 1760's

On the mainland of the Arabian peninsula there were four conflicting powers whose internal strife gave an excellent opportunity for the 'Utbi towns to add to their rapidly increasing prosperity. The first two powers that could directly affect the 'Utūb were the Banī Khālīd and the Wahhābīs. The struggle between these two opponents, previously alluded to, began to enter a very serious stage when 'Uray'ir the Amīr of the Banī Khālīd, in 1178/1764 besieged al-Dir'iyya, the

¹ See next chapter, p. 141.

² Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs etc., in Bombay Selections, p. 365.

capital of the Wahhābīs, which had already been attacked by the 'Ajman tribe of Najrān.¹ Though 'Uray'ir failed to capture al-Dir'iyya, yet this battle showed the Wahhābīs that the Banī Khālīd would seize every opportunity to destroy them, and that they should put no faith in any promises of a truce that the Banī Khālīd might offer. 'Uray'ir had violated an existing truce when he saw Dir'iyya being attacked by Dahhām b. Dawwās, the Chief of al-Riyāḍ.² Though no other battles of significance took place between the two combatants till the 1770's, the Wahhābīs went on consolidating their power in Najd, waiting for their chance to fall on the Banī Khālīd. Thus the Wahhābī danger was still far from threatening the 'Utūb, who thus were still enjoying the Banī Khālīd protection.

¹ 'Uman's wars with the Qawāsim

To the south and on the mainland of Arabia also, the other two powers, the Qawāsim in al-Ṣīr³ and the Sulṭān of Masqaṭ, were no better off, as far as their mutual relations were concerned, than the first two combatants.

"As early as 1758 Imām Ahmad b. Sa'īd, having consolidated his power and gained complete ascendancy

¹Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 76-80; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 48; Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 42-43.

²Ibid.

³Al-Ṣīr is known today as Trucial 'Uman.

over the 'Umānī tribes, was able to undertake operations in al-Ṣīr, generally known as the Pirate Coast, in order to reduce to subjection the Qawasim and other warlike tribes, who had hitherto remained entirely independent."¹

In 1762 Imām Ahmad despatched Sayyid 'Alī b. Saif with four ships and ten dhows to al-Ṣīr, with orders to blockade the area strictly. The result was the recognition of the Imām's supremacy by all except Rās al-Khayma.²

In 1763 Shaikh Ṣaqr, with his uncle 'Abd Allāh, proceeded to Rustāq in 'Umān, where, at an interview with the Imām, it was arranged that the blockading fleet should be withdrawn and that the Qawasim port of Julfār (Rās al-Khayma) should be considered independent of the Imām's authority. The political state of affairs then outlined remained unaltered for more than twenty years.³ The state of hostility or suspicion that characterised the relations between the Imām of 'Umān and the Qawasim gave in its turn the 'Utbī settle-

¹"The Qawasim are a branch of the great Huwala clan. They occupy the Persian coast from Gombroon to Ras Berdistān. They got their name from Shaikh Qasim, the grandfather of the notorious Shaikh Rashīd bin Muttar, who ruled at this time and who resided at Julfār or Ras al-Khayma." Colonel S. B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, two volumes (London, 1919), Vol. II, p. 269.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

ments an additional chance to develop without being molested by either the Imām or the Qawāsim till the year 1782. In this year the 'Utūb attacked Bahrain and had to fight against the Arabs of Abū Shahr who had occupied those islands in 1753.¹

Situation in Persia bordering on the Gulf (1760-1770)

In the introductory chapter, it is stated that the position of the southern coast of Persia had always had something to do with the Arabian littoral of the Gulf, mainly because it was inhabited by Arabs and because other Arabs continued to migrate from the eastern shore of Arabia and to settle there among their kinsmen. When Nādir Shāh tried to consolidate his power among the Arab population in southern Persia, he depended on Persian troops only in his land operations and Persian officers in his fleet. Thus he kept the Arabs of southern Persia out of his army and fleet, a policy which terminated in his failure to achieve Persian supremacy in the waters of the Gulf.² From 1747, the year of Nādir's death, until 1757, when Karīm Khān Zand rose to power, anarchy was the order of the day in Persia. With the advent of Karīm Khān and the trial of strength involved in consolidating his power over most of Persian territory, a new era seems to have begun in the re-

¹Miles, Countries and Tribes, II, p. 269.

²As Niebuhr commented, "the Sunnī sailors of Nādir's fleet killed their Persian officers and handed the fleet to the Arabs". Description de l'Arabie, p. 273.

lations between the Arabs of southern Persia and Karīm, and to have continued until his death in 1779. Karīm, contrary to Nādir, sought the help of those Arabs all through his struggle for power.¹ Yet this does not mean that those Arabs co-operated willingly with Karīm Khān; on the contrary, they gave him much trouble. But before discussing the relations of Karīm and the Arabs, a brief description of the position of the major Arab tribes on the Persian littoral seems necessary in the present context.

Karīm Khān and the Arabs

Three major Arab forces were making the history of southern Persia in the 1760's. They were the Arabs of Abū Shahr, then under the rule of Shaikh Naṣ'r Āl-Madhkur of the Maṭarīsh Arabs of 'Uman, the Arabs of Bandar Rīq to the north of Abū Shahr, and the Banī Ka'b of al-Dawraq. Reference had already been made in Chapter I to their activities in the first half of the eighteenth century.² In addition to these three major Arab forces there were the other Arab tribes who were of the Huwala stock and were inhabiting the southern parts of the Persian shore and the islands of Qishm, Qais, Hurmuz, and other smaller and less significant islands in the Gulf. These latter Arabs did not play much of a role in the sequence of events during the 1760's, as

¹Malcolm, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 134.

²See above, pp. 73.

their place was taken by the Qawāsim; however, as these events do not concern the 'Utūb, we shall not deal with them at this time.

Shaikh Naṣīr of Abū Shahr

The Arabs of Abū Shahr had already occupied Bahrain in 1753¹ and they were the rulers of these islands when the 'Utūb came to Zubāra in 1766.² Niebuhr on his way from Masqaṭ to Baṣra landed at Abū Shahr in February 1765,³ and when he spoke of the independent Arab states upon the sea coast of Persia, he included Abū Shahr among them and stated that it was then the sea-port of Shīrāz, the capital of Karīm Khān, the Vakīl of Persia.⁴ By the year 1763 the English East India Company had established a Factory there in preference to Bandar 'Abbās (Gombrōon), where the French fleet had attacked and destroyed the English Factory in 1759.⁵

"The Arabs inhabiting the district of Abū Shahr were not of the Huwala tribe. There were among them three eminent families; the first two of which had been from time immemorial settled in that place. The third, named Maṭārish, had come

¹J. G. Lorimer, op.cit., Vol. I, i, p. 738.

²See above, p. 123.

³C. Niebuhr, Voyage en Arabie, Tome second, pp. 75-78.

⁴See Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 273.

⁵See Low, History of the Indian Navy, Vol. I, pp. 152-153.

lately from 'Umān, where they had been employed in fishing, and they soon entered into an alliance with the other two and found means to usurp the sovereign authority which they had been holding for several years before 1765."¹

Shaikh Nās'r of Abū Shahr did not only possess that town and Bahrain, but he also

"had considerable domains in Kermasīr, which he held for Karīm Khan, with whom Shaikh Nās'r's children were placed as hostages for their father's fidelity. It was a happy circumstance for Schirās (sic) that the Prince of Abū Shahr could thus be retained in the interests of Persia by means of his possessions in Kermasīr."²

The Shaikh of Abū Shahr owned a fleet which enabled him to retain his sovereignty over Bahrain Islands till their occupation by the 'Utūb in 1782.³

Bandar Rīq

To the north of Abū Shahr was the Shaikhdom of Bandar Rīq, whose Shaikh had influence not only on the neighbours of that town but also on several other places in Kermasīr. Both of the Shaikhs of Abū Shahr and Bandar Rīq had already worked in harmony in 1753 and occupied the islands of Bahrain. This may be attributed to the fact that they were originally 'Umānī Arabs, the former belonging to al-Maṭārīsh and the latter to Banī Sa'b. The ruling Shaikh of Bandar Rīq was in the 1760's

¹Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 273.

²Ibid., p. 274.

³Ibid.

Mīr Muhannā, the son of Mīr Naṣr. Mīr Muhannā's grandfather, who had established the rule of the family at Bandar Rīq, had been, like his tribe a Sunnī not a Shī'ī Moslem. Yet, because of his relations with the Persian Shāhs, he thought it wiser to change to a Shī'ī, and to marry a Persian Shī'ī lady. The result of this change was that the ruling family "were no longer counted by the Arabs among their genuine nobility".¹ Mīr Naṣr and his son Mīr Muhannā played an eminent part in the history of the Persian Gulf from 1753, when Mīr Naṣr agreed to let the Dutch establish a Factory at Khārij Island, until the year 1769, when Mīr Muhannā was obliged to quit Khārij and seek refuge at Kuwait. The Shaikh of Bandar Rīq had to fight against the Dutch, the Persians, and the English. Soon after the Dutch had established themselves at Khārij, Mīr Naṣr fell into conflict with Baron Kniphausen, who refused to pay him more than the agreed amount for the Dutch establishment at Khārij.² This enmity continued when Mīr Muhannā usurped the power from his father, whom he strangled to death in about 1758.³ Mīr Muhannā's relations with

¹Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 274.

²Ives, op.cit., p. 213.

³Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 274. Mīr Muhannā finally occupied Khārij in December 1765 and drove the Dutch away. See letter from Mr. Wrench (Baṣra Factory) to the Court of Directors, London, dated Baṣra, 21st Aug. 1764, where he expects the Dutch to surrender soon. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 16, Dispatch No. 819.

Karim Khān were very bad as well, but his relations with the Pasha of Baghdād and the Mutasallim of Baṣra were cordial.¹ Mīr Muhannā's relations with the English East India Company will be dealt with later on,

Banī Ka'b

The third major Arab power which had played a great part in the trade and the politics of the Gulf was that of the Banī Ka'b, who interest us for the time being more than the Banī Ṣa'b and al-Maṭārīsh, because of their direct relations with the 'Utūb and the Banī Khālīd.

Origin of the Banī Ka'b

The original home of this tribe is Najd, whence, in the seventeenth century, some made their way

"to the farthest point upon the side of the Persian Gulf, then occupied by the Afshar Turks. Their power rapidly increased by the middle of the eighteenth century under the reign of their Shaikh Sulaymān, whose fame reached Europe, in consequence of a quarrel he had with the English, in which he took some of their ships."²

Shaikh Sulaymān, who continued to rule till 1766, wrested Dawraq and

¹Yet these cordial relations did not prevent the Pasha from ordering the Mutasallim to cut off the head of Mīr Muhannā after his arrival at Baṣra from Kuwait in 1770; cf. Parsons, op.cit., p. 198.

²Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 276; Niebuhr Voyage en Arabie, Tome II, pp. 151, 186.

then Fallahiya from the Afghārs. He obtained and maintained his virtual independence by playing off the Ottoman and Persian authorities one against the other, between whose countries his territories lay; at the same time withholding tribute from both countries.¹

Karīm Khān attacks the Banī Ka'b

In 1757 Karīm Khān, whose authority in Persia was then not fully established, attacked the Banī Ka'b with the intention of subduing them, but difficulties in other parts of his realm prevented his doing more than extort a tribute, and the attack only served to render Shaikh Sulaymān more aggressive, for he at once set about creating a fleet, the first vessel of which was launched in 1758,² and it was not later than 1765 when he had ten large gallivats and about seventy small vessels.³ In the same year Karīm Khān sent a second expedition against the Banī Ka'b, in which the Pasha of Baghdād had agreed to co-operate, but, on consequence of the unpreparedness of the latter, Shaikh Sulaymān crossed to the west side of Shatt-al-'Arab and found refuge in Ottoman territory. Karīm, however, destroyed Dawraq, the Banī Ka'b's

¹Niebuhr, Voyage en Arabie, Tome II, pp. 187-188; Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 187.

²Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 276.

³Ibid.

capital.¹ Niebuhr, who was at Baṣra in 1765, says that the territory of the Banī Ka'b extended from the desert of Arabia to the country of Ha'ndīan² and northward to the principality of Ḥawīsa, another town inhabited by the Arabs.

"The territory was watered by several rivers, large and small. It abounded in dates, rice, grain, and pasture. Its principal cities were al-Dawraq, Ḥafar and Ghoban."³

The Ottomans and the English fight the Banī Ka'b

Soon after the failure of Karīm's expedition, the Banī Ka'b became troublesome to the Ottomans, who commenced operations against them. The English were drawn into the quarrel by becoming allies of the Ottomans in their struggle. Various attempts made by the latter two powers, acting in concert, to subdue the Banī Ka'b proved unsuccessful. In the same year the English found themselves joining in two battles, the first against the island of Khārij, when they took the side of Karīm Khān against Mīr Muḥannā, a battle which proved indecisive, and the second against the Banī Ka'b, who, soon after the abortive Anglo-Persian attack on Khārij, suddenly seized three English

¹Niebuhr, Voyage en Arabie, II, p. 188; Description de l'Arabie, p. 276.

²A small district north from Bandar Rīq, and bordering on the possessions of the Banī Ka'b, subject to an Arab Sovereign - Niebuhr, Description de l'Arabie, p. 277.

³Ibid. Niebuhr states that Shaikh Sulaymān used to reside at Ghoban, not at Dawraq.

vessels in the Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab. The Bombay Government speedily equipped the largest expedition that had sailed for many years from India for the Gulf, consisting of four vessels and a small detachment of European infantry and artillery. Concerted action between English and Ottomans followed by sea and land, and an attempt was made to recapture the seized vessels, but they were burnt at their moorings and the British, in attempting to storm some Kaʿb redoubts on Khōr Mūsa, met with a disastrous repulse.¹

At this junction Karīm Khān intervened, asserting that the Banī Kaʿb were Persian subjects, and insisted that both Ottomans and English should retire from Persian territory. The Ottomans thereupon withdrew, and the campaign came once more to an inconclusive end, much to the chagrin of the English, as strong reinforcements were on the way from Bombay.²

Following upon these repeated failures, the English maintained a naval blockade of the Kaʿb waterway for about two years, at the end of which time the vessels of the blockading squadron had fallen into such a "melancholy condition... as well with respect to stores as men" that the blockade had, perforce, to be raised. The Banī Kaʿb remained

¹Niebuhr, Voyage en Arabie, II, p. 187; see F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 16.

dispatches Nos. 893, 918, 920 and several others of the years 1765-66.

²Niebuhr, Voyage en Arabie, II, p. 188.

unsubdued and continued for a long period to be a thorn in the side of the Ottomans and of the Persian and English trade in turn. The complaints of the East India Company's Factory at Baṣra which reached the Court of Directors in London were so strident and effective that the Court submitted a very urgent long request to the British Government suggesting that the latter should send a strong fleet to India and the Persian Gulf "to protect the interests of the East India Company and the British nation".¹

'Uṭbī relations with the other Powers in the Gulf till 1775.

A. The Wahhābīs

Thus the 'Uṭb of Kuwait and Zubāra had to establish some sort of relations with each of the above-mentioned powers. On the mainland of Arabia there had been no change in the balance of power between the Wahhābīs and the Banī Khālīd, in spite of the fact that the Wahhābīs achieved their aim of consolidating their power finally in Najd after their conquest of al-Riyāḍ, the capital of Dahhām b. Dawwās, in 1187/1773, an event which made the Wahhābīs turn their

¹The address was signed by Mr. H. I. Crabb Boulton and G. Colebrooke of the East India House, London, and submitted to Lord Viscount Weymouth, and dated 17th March, 1769. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 16, dispatch No. 9.

faces towards Eastern Arabia.¹ Banī Khālīd were still united and maintained the power to face any Wahhābī attack on their land. But soon after the death of their chief 'Uray'ir in 1774, war broke out between his two sons Buṭayn and Sa'dūn, and it ended by the murder of the former in 1777.² Banī Khālīd, up to this time, used to carry the war into Najd, and thus Kuwait and Zubāra went on with their flourishing trade without any fear of Wahhābī intervention.

B. The Arabs of Persia.

The great threat to the two 'Utbi towns came from the sea.. Mīr Muḥannā of Bandar Rīq had already taken Khārij from the Dutch in 1765, and continued his piracy, capturing any ship he could lay hands on.³ Bahrain under the Arabs of Abū Shahr was the nearest spot under Persian supremacy which could come into contact with the 'Utūb, who must have started monopolising the conveyance of trade from Masqaṭ to Eastern and Central Arabia.. As Bahrain was the most famous place in the Persian Gulf for the pearl trade, the occupiers of the Islands started

¹Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 94-100. Ibn Ghannām was so greatly moved by the event that he commemorated it by a long poem.

See also Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 60-61.

²Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 62.

³An address from Benjamin Jervis (Bushire Factory) to Charles

Crommelin, President at Bombay, dated Bushire 5th January 1765,

F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 16, dispatch No. 901.

to feel the rivalry of both Kuwait and Zubāra in that trade. Banī Ka'b, as we shall see soon, represented the major menace.

C. Mīr Muhannā at Kuwait, 1769

The 'Utūb had already established good relations with Khārij Island since the Dutch occupation of that place in 1753.¹ These good relations must have persisted during the rule of Mīr Muhannā at Khārij, and this could explain why Mīr Muhannā, after being hard pressed by Karīm Khān,

"with a few of his favourites, and men sufficient to man a swift-sailing boat, embarked in a dark night (not forgetting to carry treasure sufficient) and next evening arrived at Grane (Kuwait) in Arabia, which is governed by a deputy of the Turkish governor of Bussora, and is about sixty miles from the island of Karak (Khārij). From thence he and his adherents went to Bussora (Baṣra), where he thought himself sure of finding an asylum, having strictly conformed with the treaty made with the pasha of Bagdad, in not molesting any ship or vessel going to or from Bussora. The musolem (Muta-sallim) received him kindly, and entertained him as the friend of his master the pasha."²

¹ See above, p. 103-106.

² Parsons, op.cit., pp. 196-198. To carry the story of Mīr Muhannā to its end, Parsons added that "After Maer Mahanah had been some time at Bussora, the musolem acquainted the pasha of Bagdad, that he solicited the pasha's protection, and that he might be permitted to come to Bagdad to kiss his hands. The pasha having been made acquainted with his unnatural cruelties, thought him unworthy of life, and sent orders to the musolem of Bussora to put him to death on the receipt of his letter..." Mīr Muhannā was killed, but his companions were suffered to live unmolested.

Though Parsons states that Kuwait was a dependency of Baṣra, there is no evidence to assert this fact; and I am therefore inclined to believe that the relations between the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Mutasallim of Baṣra were then friendly, and this made Parsons jump to this conclusion. It has always been a policy of the 'Utbī Shaikhs to keep friendly with the other powers in the area, but this friendliness should not be taken as a sign of dependence or subjugation. What might have dictated that state of friendliness was the growing power of the Banī Ka'b on one hand and of the Arabs of Abū Shahr on the other.

D. Banī Ka'b

We have already seen how the Banī Ka'b were causing the Mutasallim of Baṣra and the English East India Company great trouble, and how Karīm Khān, the Vakīl of Persia, intervened to prevent the subjugation of the Banī Ka'b. Shaikh Naṣr of Abū Shahr was in the same way under the protection of Karīm Khān,¹ who made him admiral.

¹Parsons, op.cit., p. 189.

of the Persian fleet in the Gulf.¹ To keep away the impending danger of the Banī Ka'b and Shaikh Naṣr, the 'Utūb, both at Kuwait and Zubāra, sought the friendship of the English East India Company and the Ottomans in Baṣra. The 'Utūb, who until then had not acquired the naval power that could defy the Arabs of the Persian coast, were keeping on good terms with the Banī Khālīd. But this friendship did not prevent the Banī Ka'b in 1774 from taking and plundering al-Qaṭīf, the rich port of the Banī Khālīd which was "most remarkable for its pearl commerce".² "The Chaub"(Ka'b) gallivats returned "to Doorack (Dawraq) with the plunder of Catiffe which is said to be very considerable."³ Though Banī Ka'b alone carried out that attack on al-Qaṭīf, yet it is worth noticing that they had since 1770 been working in harmony with Shaikh Naṣr of Abū Shahr, both being used by Karīm Khān as instruments in carrying out his policy against the Ottomans and others in the Gulf, best exemplified in the Siege of Baṣra in 1775.

¹As the Persians had no fleet of their own they depended, during the rule of Karīm Khān, on the fleets of the Ka'b and Abū Shahr; (cf. Malcolm, Vol. II, p. 141).

²An address from H. Moore, W. D. Latouche, G. Abraham (of the Baṣra Factory) to the Court of Directors, London, dated Baṣra, 13th May 1774. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, dispatch No. 1074.

³Another address from the same gentlemen of the Baṣra Factory to the Court of Directors, London, dated Baṣra, 28th July, 1774. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, dispatch No. 1075.

Plague at Baṣra, 1773

That attack on al-Qaṭīf was carried out soon after 'Uray'ir, the chief of the Banī Khālīd, had died, and when the town was just recovering from a great and serious epidemic that had spread to it from Baṣra. As this plague had much to do with other events in the area, a short discussion of its consequences may prove necessary in the present context.

Early in 1773 it broke out at Baṣra on its way from Baghdād to the south. In Baghdād it was of such severity and violence that it put a stop to every activity in the city, including trade, which suffered heavily.¹ In the months of April and May 1773 it devastated Baṣra.² Members of the English Factory at Baṣra had left the town before the plague reached it and went to Bombay, leaving the Factory to the care of Surgeon Reilly. Soon after the plague started to devastate the town many inhabitants left, carrying the epidemic with them to Kuwait, al-Qaṭīf, Bahrain, and many others towns on the Arabian coast of the Gulf. Though loss of life was less on the Arabian

¹ See letter from Mr. Moore, Mr. Latouche and Mr. Abraham of the Baṣra Factory to the Court of Directors, London, dated 1st April 1773.

F.R.P.P.G. Vol. 17, dispatch No. 1056.

² An address from Mr. Michael Reilly (surgeon at Baṣra Factory) to Mr. Charles Thomas Coggan, of the East India Company, London, dated Baṣra 17th August 1773. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, dispatch No. 1060.

coast than in Baṣra, the number of deaths was estimated at two million.¹ It is worth noticing that Banī Ka'b's territories and the Persian littoral of the Gulf did not suffer many losses because they took the necessary precautions by stopping all kinds of communication with the affected areas.² Baṣra's casualties, with those of the surrounding villages, were estimated at 200,000 deaths.³ Mr. Moore and his colleagues, after returning to the Factory at Baṣra, giving the above-mentioned figures, say in the same address:

"Neither will this account appear to be exaggerated when it is considered that for near a month the daily deaths in the town (i.e. Baṣra) alone amounted from 3,000 to 7,000 - at length about the 25th May when least expected the disorder suddenly ceased, leaving Bussora in particular almost destitute of Inhabitants."⁴

Consequences of the plague

This horrible plague was damaging to the trade of Baṣra and thus gave the rival ports on the coast of the Gulf a better chance to compete with Baṣra. Abū Shahr, on the Persian coast, whose importance as the greatest emporium of the Gulf trade was greatly diminished after

¹ See letter from Mr. Moore and colleagues of the Baṣra Factory to the Court of Directors, London, dated Baṣra 16th January 1774,

F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, dispatch No. 1061.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. Ibn Ghannām, who was also contemporary to the event, states that the number of deaths ran into hundreds of thousands, and adds

the English East India Company had preferred Baṣra to it, was waiting for such an opportunity to regain it.¹ Kuwait and Zubāra, though on good terms with Baṣra, began to attract much of its trade. Their relations with the English Factory at Baṣra continued to grow, and their boats, as well as other Arab vessels, were hired by the Factory to carry dispatches to Masqaṭ on the way to Bombay.² Yet the shift of the English Gulf trade from Abū Shahr to Baṣra, which took place after 1770 and made Baṣra the richest port of the Gulf, did not pass without Persian resistance. Karīm Khān went on with his plans to capture Baṣra from the Ottomans. The Ottoman Mutasallim of Baṣra, being aware of the Persian plan, lost no opportunity of strengthening his naval power, taking into consideration that no attack on his walled town could succeed unless accompanied by a strong naval

(cont.)

that most of the population of Baṣra perished as a result of the plague. Ibn Ghannām, op.cit. Vol. II, pp. 99-100.

¹In 1763 Karīm Khān Zand, by a royal grant, conferred on the English more privileges than any other European nation enjoyed respecting trade with Persia, as the Grant stated that "No other European nation, or other persons, shall import any woollen goods to any port on the Persian shore in the Gulf but the English Company only. Should any one attempt to do it, their goods shall be confiscated." F.R.P.P.G. Vol. 16, dispatch No. 782.

²See a letter from Messrs. Moore, Green, Latouche and Abraham, Baṣra Factory, to the Court of Directors, London, Baṣra, 9th December 1774.

force. Thus early in 1774 "the two Ketches of 14 guns each, which the Bashaw (Pasha) requested might be built for him at Bombay some time ago, arrived with the Revenge" and were delivered to the Ottoman authorities at Baṣra after their cost had been paid into the Company's treasury at Bombay.¹ Karīm Khān found naval help from the Ka'b and Abū Shahr fleets. His preparations ended in 1775 with the famous siege of Baṣra, in which the 'Utūb found themselves inevitably involved. As had always been the case whenever war broke out between Persia and Ottoman 'Irāq, or between other powers of the Gulf, it was always very difficult for any power to keep out of the fray. The position in the Gulf in 1775 during the siege of Baṣra will be dealt with in the following chapter.

Conclusion

The establishment of the 'Utūb at Zubāra and the growth of their trade both at Kuwait and at Zubāra aroused the jealousy of the other maritime Arabs of the Gulf and especially those on the Persian littoral, namely the Arabs of Bandar Rīq, the Banī Ka'b and

¹ See a letter from Messrs. H. Moore, W. D. Latouche and G. Abraham, of the Baṣra Factory, to the Court of Directors, London, Baṣra, 16th January 1774. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, dispatch No. 1061.

of Abū Shahr. The last were the nearest to the 'Utūb of Zubāra because Bahrain was under the suzerainty of Abū Shahr. With the struggle between the Ottomans and the Persians that started in 1775 by the long siege of Baṣra, the 'Utbī towns had another chance to accumulate more wealth - and gain more importance - as safe centres for trade. The free trade policy at Kuwait and Zubāra was a factor of great consequence in drawing the merchants as well as the capital to trade in 'Utbī land. It was not easy for Abū Shahr to give way to Zubāra and Kuwait. This tension in relations naturally led to war in which the 'Utūb were victorious and occupied Bahrain in 1782.

Chapter IVSTATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE 'UTEI STATES 1775 - 1790

Chapter IV

STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE 'UTBĪ STATES 1775-1790

In the period covered in this chapter, 1775-1790, two major events took place that had important effects on the rising 'Utūb. The first was the siege and occupation of Baṣra by the Persians (1775-1779) which had a direct impact on the 'Utūb who, though they did not openly share in the fight, shared in its consequences as will be shown below. The second great event whose consequences are still felt to the present day was the occupation of Bahrain Islands by the 'Utūb. An attempt will be made to trace the growth of 'Utbī sea power that enabled them to achieve it.¹

To understand the effects of the siege and occupation of Baṣra on the 'Utūb in particular and Eastern Arabia in general, it is necessary to give a brief summary of that event, in which Ottoman, Persian and Arab forces were involved. The British did not maintain

¹The study is mainly based on the unpublished Factory Records of the English East India Company and other reports of the officials of the same Company published in Volume XXIV of the Bombay Government Selections in 1856.

their policy of non-interference and fought on the Ottoman side.¹

The siege, March 16th 1775 - April 15th 1776.

No sooner had Baṣra recovered from the devastating plague of 1773 than rumours of the proposed Persian attack on the town began to grow. In 1775 the danger became more acute, conferences were daily held between Sulaymān Aḡnā, the Mutasallim, the Qapṭān, the notables of Baṣra and the British Agent.

"On January 15th, 1775", says Parsons,² "advice arrived from Bushear, in Persia, that an army had left Shiras (now the capital of Persia) consisting of upwards of fifty thousand men, commanded by Sadoe Khan (brother to Kerim Khan, the present ruler of Persia); and that he was on his march for Bussora, being resolved to take the city. This report caused great alarm among the inhabitants."³

¹For a detailed account of the event see Parsons, op.cit., pp. 162-186, Low, op.cit., pp. 166-172. The Arabic sources unfortunately comment very briefly on the attack and its results but give no particulars. There seem to have been no Arab historians or 'Ulamā' in Baṣra after the devastating plague of 1773. The event did not interest the Wahhabī chroniclers. The contemporary writer Ibn Ghannām, and Ibn Bishr, writing in the 1830's, gave it only one line each in their chronicles in the events of the year 1188 A.H.

²Parsons was an eyewitness to these events and participated in the defence of Baṣra against the attacking Persians.

³Parsons, op.cit., p. 162.

The motives behind the Persian attack on Baṣra.

Though this is not the place to trace Perso-Ottoman hostilities in detail, yet it is necessary to point out that the prosperity of Baṣra in the 1760's, after the removal of British trading activities to their Factory there instead of Abū Shahr, was among the causes of "strained relations between Pasha and Regent".¹

However, Karīm Khān, jealous of the increased importance of Baṣra, and being faced also with discontent in his army, decided to despatch his expedition against it; and, "seeking a pretext, he demanded the head of the Wālī of Baghdad as a punishment for daring to levy a tax on Persian pilgrims to Kerbelā".²

The coming of the Persians, March 16th, 1775.

On March 16th the Persian army, under the leadership of Šādiq Khān, the brother of Karīm Khān, arrived "at the mouth of Avisā [Hawīza] creek in Persia, where there is a town called Swab [Suwaib]".³ The

¹The Pasha of Baghḍād and the Regent of Persia. See Longrigg, op.cit., p. 188.

²Sykes, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 281.

³Parsons, op.cit., p. 164; Longrigg, op.cit., p. 190. Longrigg says

that the Persian army "reached the Shaṭṭ ul 'Arab near the mouth of the Suwaib river". It seems that the "Suwaib river" was then called Hawīza river or creek, as Parsons puts it, and as the contemporary map drawn by Niebuhr shows it. Swaib was the name of a town. See Voyage en Arabie, II, map facing p. 199, and p. 202 for Hawīza and Swaib.

siege dragged on for thirteen months, until the town surrendered to Ṣādiq Khān by the middle of April 1776.

The Allies of both camps

In alliance with the Persians were the Arabs inhabiting the Persian littoral of the Gulf. The Arabs of Abū Shahr, under the rule of Shaikh Naṣr, seem to have supplied the attacking Persian army with ammunition and provisions,¹ without which the Persian army was expected "soon to decamp".² The Shaikh of Bandar Rīq seems also to have been on good terms with Karīm Khān, and to have assisted in the siege.³

On the Persian side were also the Banī Ka'b, whose boats would be invaluable to either side. It seems that there was a previous agreement between the Banī Ka'b and Karīm Khān that they would join him, because Ṣādiq Khān, with the Persian army, marched through their land and camped in their territory at Swaib, as previously stated.

¹Shaikh Naṣr was the admiral commanding the Persian fleet in the Gulf (Parsons, op.cit., pp. 189-200). Parsons calls him "Sheik Nassah",

²ibid., p. 169.

³When Parsons, with the Agent and men of the Basra Factory, arrived at Abū Shahr on April 27th, 1775, they were received by "the governor and chiefs of the town; with them was sheik Alli, governor of Banderick, who was here on a visit." Ibid., p. 199.

The Banī Ka'b, as well as the Arabs of the Persian littoral of the Gulf, seem to have put the greater part of their fleets, both commercial and fighting vessels, at the service of the Persians.¹

The Allies of the Ottomans.

With the Ottomans, or rather, on the side of Sulaymān Agha, the Mutasallim of Baṣra, were the Arabs of the Muntafiq tribe who, under their Shaikhs Thāmir and 'Abd Allāh, were supposed to play a major part in the defence of the besieged town, and to withstand the Persian advance. During the siege the cooperation of parties of the Banī Khālīd and the Muntafiq outside enabled caravans to reach the city.² The Masqaṭ fleet went to the rescue of the besieged town in August 1775 on the demand of the Mutasallim,³ and was reported to have forced its way up Shaṭṭ al-'Arāb to Baṣra on October 14th, 1775, and to have been a great help to the besieged

¹Of the sea power of Abū Shahr, Parsons, op.cit., p. 188, noted when he reached the harbour that "At present all the galliotes are employed in the siege of Bussora, as are also many of the largest merchant vessels".

²See Longrigg, op.cit., p. 192.

³See Parsons, op.cit., pp. 206-207. Parsons was at Masqaṭ on August 3rd. He saw "the great part of" the Sulṭān's fleet "loading with provisions, for the relief of Bussora, and expect to depart in about fifteen days".

city.¹ Besides these Arab allies, Sulaymān Agha succeeded in persuading the British Agent of the Basra Factory to join him in repelling Persian aggression.²

"At this time a squadron of ships of the Bombay Marine was lying in the river Shatt-ul-Arab, near the creek off the city, consisting of the 'Revenge', a frigate of twenty-eight guns, 'Eagle', of sixteen guns, and 'Success', ketch, of fourteen guns; beside two other ketches of fourteen guns each, built at Bombay for the Pasha of Bagdat."³

The Pasha's ketches were "commanded by an English midshipman, in the company's service", and had "on board, a few English sailors", the remainder of the crew were "Turks", and they carried British colours.⁴ In fact the British "gentlemen of the Factory and the English East India Company's cruisers joined the Mutasallim's forces wholeheartedly till their retreat from the field of battle."⁵

¹W.D.Latouche and G. Abraham (Abū Shahr) to Court of Directors, 2.xii. 1775, F.R.P.P.G. Vol. 17, No..1109. Mr. Warden is wrong in giving the date of the arrival of the Masqaṭ fleet at Basra as "early in the month of August". See his "Historical Sketch of the Rise and Progress of the Govt. of Muskat", etc. in Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, p. 170.

²The Agent was Mr. Green. See Parsons, op.cit., p. 169.

³Low, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 166.

⁴Parsons, op.cit., p. 152.

⁵By April 9th the British were deserting the town (Parsons, op.cit., p. 174) and by the 13th of the same month the British ships, with some of the Pasha's, were making for Abū Shahr (Ibid., p. 181).

Other forces.

Two other forces in the Gulf were expected to join either the Persians or the Ottomans, namely the Qawāsim of Rās al-Khayma and the 'Utūb. No mention of the first was made in connection with the Basra affair of 1775, though they were reported to have "become more powerful than ever both by land and sea". The absence of the Qawāsim might be attributed to the fact that they were then at war with the Sulṭān of Masqaṭ.¹ However, because of their traditional enmity with Masqaṭ, one would not have expected them to join the Ottoman side in the Basra affair. As a matter of fact, later on, when the 'Utūb were at variance with the Shaikh of Abū Shahr and with the Banī Ka'b, the Qawāsim joined the Shaikh of Abū Shahr in his fruitless attempt to re-occupy Bahrain Islands in 1783. Shaikh Naṣr, as formerly stated, was an ally of Karīm Khān, then Regent of Persia.²

The position of the 'Utūb

It is not easy to identify the part played by the 'Utūb in the siege. Parsons refers to Kuwait only twice, the first time when "the

¹In 1775 the Qawāsim were at war with the Sulṭān of Masqaṭ, but they seem to have appeared from 1775 to 1778 as traders, not raiding any of their neighbours. See "Historical Sketch of the Joasmee Tribe of Arabs", etc. in Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, p. 301. Miles too speaks of their growing power in 1775, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 274.

pasha's two galliotes" were ordered to repair to its harbour in the afternoon of April 13th,¹ and the second when the 'Eagle' and one of the Pasha's ketches, which were on their way from Basra to Abū Shahr on April 14th, 1775, "noticed two trankeys coming from Abū Shahr and going" to Kuwait.² Parsons describes Kuwait as a town "dependant on Bussora".³ What he meant by "dependant" is not clear, yet one can gather that friendly relations must have been kept up between the Mutasallim and the Shaikh, for

"all the Turks and Arabs which were on board the pasha's ketches (in number about two hundred and thirty) embarked on board these two galliotes, and took their departure"

to Kuwait.⁴

In a letter to the Court of Directors in London, about three months later, the Basra factors stated that

"the two Turkish Galivats which were sent to Grain, were demanded from the Shaikh of that Place by the Chaub /Bani Ka'b/, and delivered up to him."⁵

¹Parsons, op.cit., p. 131.

²The naval forces, of which mention was made by Parsons, were two ketches of fourteen guns each, built at Bombay for the use of the Pasha, and two galliotes. The two ketches continued their journey to Masqat, where they were delivered to the Sultan on August 3rd, 1775. He was then preparing his war vessels for the rescue of Basra. Ibid., p. 206.

³Ibid., p. 181.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Moore, Latouche, Abraham, to the C. of D. 'Eagle Snow in Bushire Road',
(cont.)

The same letter added that the Shaikh sent, "though unwillingly", a party of two hundred men "to the assistance of Sadoo Caun" /Ṣādiq Khān7.

Though the position of the 'Utūb was vague in the Baṣra affair, yet it would not be difficult to explain their friendly attitude towards the forces of the Mutasallim at first, and their sending two hundred men to help Ṣādiq Khān three months later. The 'Utūb apparently not being sure of the winner had to appease both struggling parties. Yet on account of earlier prejudices against the Banī Ka'b, and owing to the new hostilities with the Arabs of Abū Shahr, the 'Utūb soon engaged in strife with the latter two, who were the allies of the Persians.

Effects of the Siege and Occupation of Baṣra on the 'Utūb States of Kuwait and Zubāra, 1775-1779.

The circumstances of the siege and occupation of Baṣra by the Persians had a far-reaching influence on Kuwait and Zubāra. In the first place, direct relations were established between Kuwait and the British East India Company's representatives in the Gulf. Kuwait became important as a centre for almost all the caravans carrying goods

(cont).

15.vii. 1775, in F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, dispatch No. 1089.

between Basra and Aleppo during the period 1775-1779. And because of the enmity that then persisted between the British and the Persians, goods coming from India, which could have been sent to Abū Shahr for conveyance to Aleppo via Basra, were unloaded at Zubāra and Kuwait.¹ This led to the accumulation of wealth at the two 'Utbī towns, and provoked the jealousy of other Arab sea powers, especially the Banī Ka'b and the Arabs of Abū Shahr, which grew fiercer than it had been before. But they were unable to prevent the establishment of 'Utbī-British relations.

Beginning of British relations with Kuwait, 1775.

"The recorded history of British relations with Kuwait", says Lorimer, "opens in 1775, when on the investment of Basrah by the Persians, the British desert mail from the Gulf to Aleppo began to be despatched from Kuwait instead of Zubair."²

And, although the latter town was occupied by the Persians,³ not at

¹Kuwait had always been referred to as Grain, Grane, Graine, while Zubāra was spelled Zeberra and Zebarra. This varied spelling occurs in the letters of the Basra Factory and the works of English travellers.

²Lorimer, op.cit., Vol. I, i, p. 1002.

³Zubair was attacked and devastated by the Persians early in 1778. When Colonel Capper, on his way from Aleppo to Basra, reached Zubair on December 17th 1778, he found it destroyed. James Capper, Observations on Passage to India through Egypt, and across the Great Desert; with Occasional Remarks on the Adjacent Countries, and also Sketches of the different Routes (London, 1784), pp. 81, 83.

the same time as Basra in 1776, but later, in 1778, the desert mail of the English East India Company was forwarded from Kuwait by the middle of the year 1775.¹

The desert route

To the English East India Company, this desert route was of special importance, not only for forwarding mail to and from India, but for trading purposes. It is for the first purpose that Kuwait gained importance in the eyes of the English Factory of Basra, and it was about four months after the Persian attack on Basra that despatches were received by the desert mail at Kuwait.² The Basra Factory used to send the "desert express" from Zubair, where messengers were hired for that purpose, but soon after the choice of Kuwait as a centre for that mail messengers were obtained there. Yet the mail does not seem to have worked satisfactorily from the start, most probably because the Factory had no representatives at Kuwait. To receive the mail arriving at Kuwait in time, and to arrange for the departure of other mail from the place, it was suggested that a civil officer of

¹The letter dated July 15th, 1775, sent by Moore, Latouche and Abraham to London, may be the first desert mail sent via Kuwait.

²For the desert route to Aleppo in the eighteenth century, see Chapter VI..

the Company should be stationed at that port. And as there was none available at Basra by July 1776, Mr. Latouche asked Lieutenant Twiss, the Captain of the "Terrible", to be responsible and arrangements were made at Kuwait.¹ The desert mail continued to be received and sent through Kuwait during the Persian occupation of Basra.²

For the commercial purposes of the English East India Company, Kuwait seems to have offered a solution to their difficulties in exporting Indian goods to the markets of the Middle East. In a letter to Mr. Latouche at Basra from the Consul at Aleppo dated June 11th 1776, much is revealed of the situation at Kuwait and of British trade. Mr. Latouche, quoting that letter to the Court of Directors, wrote on July 24th, 1776:

"The Consul at Aleppo, in a letter to us dated the 11th June, has inserted the following paragraph:

'India and Surat Goods continue in Demand at the Metropolis. I hear two merchant Ships arrived at Bushire from those Parts - If the Town of Grain is suffered to remain neuter, Caravans may be made no doubt to and from thence to this Place. for as a long War will probably be caused by the Loss of Bussora, that City will be deserted unless Merchants can find some Method of carrying on Trade

¹See Latouche to C. of D., 2.vii.1776, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1127.

²Lorimer, op.cit., Vol. I, i, p. 1002.

near it.¹ Grain seems to be well situated to serve as a Substitute to Zebere [Zubair], but that can only be whilst it remains independent for should the Persians take Possession of it, it will be dangerous for Merchants to bring Goods from thence, that will probably be prohibited by the Porte even to Europeans, therefore it is in the Interest of the Merchants Your way to represent the Necessity of Grain is remaining under Benechalid [Bani Khalid] Governors independent of the Persians."

Mr. Latouche adds to the Consul's letter:

"We are very sensible that the thus opening a Communication with Aleppo and even Bagdat by the Way of Grain, if practicable, would be a most desirable Circumstance, especially as it might afford an Opportunity of disposing of the very considerable Quantities of Bengal and Surat goods now lying at Bombay for the Bussora merchants. Grain still continues unmolested by the Persians. We do not think however that the Merchants would attempt to send any goods across the desert, before Affairs are somewhat relieved from the Confusion which they are in at present."²

¹The migration of merchants from Basra to Zubara, and may be other places in the area, took place soon after and during the Persian attack. See "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Arabs", etc., in Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, p. 363, where it is stated that a Shaikh from Kuwait migrated to Zubara with those merchants; see also Wahba, Jazirat al-'Arab fi al-Qarn al-'Ishrin, p. 96.

²Latouche, Basra, to Court of Directors, 24.vii. 1776, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1127. Mr. Latouche's letter should not imply that before 1775 there were no caravans travelling from Kuwait to Aleppo. In 1758, Ives contemplated travelling by such a caravan.

It was not long before the Consul's expectations became true, for Kuwait remained unmolested by the Persians and caravans carried trade from it to Baghdād and Aleppo. These desert caravans were not altogether safe in the desert, for sometimes they were attacked by Arab tribes on the orders of the Persian occupiers of Baṣra. An attack on caravans going from Kuwait to Baghdād was effected in April 1777 by Shaikh Thāmir of the Muntafiq tribe, after he had recognized Persian suzerainty and at Persian instigation. But the Banī Khālīd Arabs had to attack the Muntafiq, and so caravans went on as usual.¹ Caravans had sometimes to change their route across the desert from Baghdād to reach Kuwait in safety. By a large caravan from Kuwait "a large Sum of Goods which had been collecting for someTime from Bushire and Muscat" was conveyed to Baghdād.²

In the latter part of 1777, British trade in 'Irāq and Persia was suffering very much from the burdens imposed by the governments of Abū Shahr and Baṣra on the British Factories.

"At Bushire," says a letter from Latouche and Abraham, "we are almost as much exposed to Oppression as we are at Bussora. The Shaiks there interfere too much in the Trade of the Place; and the few Merchants with any Property who are there, are too much in a Com-

¹Latouche and Abraham, Baṣra, to Court of Directors, 10.iv.1777,

F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1138.

²Ibid.

ination to admit of our drawing any great Commercial Advantages from it wrethced indeed as is the Situation of Bussora at Present it is much superior in Point of Trade than Bushire."¹

The factors at Baṣra, therefore, thought of choosing another site for their factory. Kuwait suggested itself, but they were still afraid of having there "much the same Treatment" as at Abū Shahr and Baṣra, and besides they were afraid of being

"too much exposed to the Persians, who there is Reason to imagine would regard our settling there with a jealous eye and would throw all the Impediments of their power in our way."²

The only other safe place that they could think of was Khārij Island, where they thought they might be free from "these Inconveniences".³

However, soon after, on November 11th 1777, Kuwait was visited by the 'Eagle', the English Company's ship, to report on the place.⁴

The harbour was suitable for anchorage, and the town "has a slight Wall calculated for Musquetry", and

"however, it serves for the caravans for Aleppo and Bagdat to assemble with some security and free from Persian extortions."

¹Latouche and Abraham, Baṣra, 10.viii.1777, to C. of D., F.R.P.P.G.

Vol. 17, No. 1144.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Latouche and Abraham, Baṣra, 14.i.1778, to C. of D., F.R.P.P.G.

Vol. 17, No. 1152.

The Factors went on to say that

"In Future too it Kuwait might serve for Shipping bound to Bussora to take in Pilots for the River in case the Port of Bushire should at any Time be shut to them or the Shaiks their continue their present Impositions with Respect to the Pilots for Your Honours Cruizers; or/as we informed the honourable the President and Council in our Letter to them dated 24th December by the Eagle/ should they at any Time hence occasion to send us a Packet for Your Honours, the forwarding of which required particular Dispatch, by ordering the Vessel directly to Grain, and the Captain to dispatch the original overland from thence, particularly should the Wind be unfavourable for him, we might receive it many Days sooner than we otherwise should do."¹

Messengers used to cover the distance between Kuwait and Basra in three days, while the vessels, while the northwest winds prevailed, were sometimes twenty days if not more in their passage up the river.² In this way Kuwait was of great use to the desert mail, and it did help considerably in conveying Indian goods to the markets of Syria and other countries of the Middle East and Europe. Yet the establishment of a factory there by the British did not take place till about fifteen years later, in 1793, when the Basra Factory moved to Kuwait for causes that will be dealt with later in their places.

¹Latouche and Abraham, Basra, 14.1.1773, to C. of D., F.R.P.F.G., Vol. 17, No. 1152.

²Ibid.

Owing to the misfortunes of Basra and Zubair, and to the wise policy of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Al-Qabāh in maintaining Kuwait's neutrality, the town's prosperity continued to flourish and his relations with the major European trading power in the Gulf, the English East India Company, continued to be cordial. In fact, the Shaikh was one of the Arab Chiefs who were given presents by the Factory.¹ However, these relations underwent difficulties which might have broken them had it not been for the wise policy of the men of the Basra Factory.

Arrest of a French officer in Kuwait, 1778.

In consequence of intelligence received from Kuwait of the arrival there of a French officer,² Mr. Abraham "One of the Factors from Basra", proceeded to the place in the Company's cruiser, the 'Eagle', from Abū shahr, taking twenty hours. Captain de Bourc, the French officer, was residing there as a guest of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh

¹Personal relations between the Factory Residents and agents could solve arising problems. Later in 1789 the Resident was asked to intervene in the question arising from the Mutasallim's and Shaikh Thuwaynī's refuge at Kuwait. It was mainly because the Resident was a friend of the Factory.

²Brydges, in his Wahauby, pp. 171-174, gives a detailed account of the event. He is there quoting Captain Capper's version of the story. Captain Capper met M. de Bourc at Basqa when the latter was on his way back to France via Basra. See Capper's Observations, pp. 99-104. The same story is related by Mr. Abraham in detail. See Abraham to the C. of D., Grain, 7.xi.1778, F.R.P.F.G., Vol. 17, No. 1161.

Al-Ṣabāḥ. The French officer was carrying secret letters to the French in Pondicherry and Mauritius. He was travelling from Aleppo to the Persian Gulf when, in the desert, about fifteen days journey from Basra, a party of Bedouin Arabs threatened him, and he had committed the offence of shooting one of its members. Severely wounded by a sword cut on the head, he saved his life by throwing himself on the "protection" of the oldest of the attackers, and promising to pay a sum equal to £100 Eng. on condition of being conveyed to Kuwait in safety. On his arrival at Kuwait, he succeeded in borrowing the promised amount from an Armenian of the place,¹ after which he wrote to M. Rousseau, the French Consul at Basra, desiring to be supplied with the means of continuing his journey to Pondicherry. The French Consul having refused or hesitated to honour the draft of his fellow-countryman, it was carried by the Arab messenger to the British Factory at Basra,² of which the staff in this manner became aware of M. de Bourg's presence in Kuwait.³

¹Armenian merchants were strongly established in the ports of the Gulf and Masqat in the eighteenth century.

²Perhaps to get money for the information.

³See Brydges, p. 175.

A difficult question was thus raised, for a report having reached Basra of war having been declared between France and Britain,¹ the Factors conceived it to be the duty of British officials abroad to seize wandering French emissaries,² but, on the otherhand, the consequences to the British Resident, Mr. Latouche, were likely to be serious if he took action against M. de Bourg on information which subsequently proved to be incorrect. The chief obstacle to the execution of the Resident's orders to Mr. Abraham was the opposition of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Sabāh, who though a friend to the British, was strongly averse to the seizure of a person at the time enjoying his hospitality; his objections were, however, withdrawn, principally it would seem in consequence of an assertion that M. de Bourg was a "fraudulent debtor".³ M. de Bourg

¹M. de Bourg seems to have said something about the war after his arrival in Kuwait. See Abraham to the C. of D., Grain, 7.xi.1778. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17.

²Ibid.

³Mr. Abraham does not state clearly how he "gained the Shaikh to" his interest. See Ibid. See also Brydges, Mahauby, n. 176.

and his dispatches were conveyed to the 'Eagle'¹ and from Bagra he was sent captive to Bombay.

Mr. Latouche, feeling that these actions needed some justification, wrote, a few days later, to the Court of Directors:²

¹ The dispatches could not be deciphered because M. de Bourg succeeded in destroying the key to the cypher, yet his diaries and other letters disclosed much of the French plans. For a full text of Mr. Abraham's account of the capture of M. de Bourg and the details of his letters and diary, see Appendix, pp. 332-334.

² Sir Harford Jones Brydges's opinion of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāh is of interest. The Shaikh refused to hand his guest, M. de Bourg, to Mr. Abraham and refused the presents and the bribes the Factory offered him (The Wahauby, pp. 175-6). Brydges comments on the Shaikh's behaviour saying: "So that it was the old Shaik's love of justice and not his avarice, that induced him to act as he did." See Ibid, p. 176.

"We were well aware of the Risque we ran in attempting to intercept [the French dispatches] but we thought our Duty to our Country in General at such a critical Season exacted it from us. We doubt not but that it will be of the utmost Consequence to your Affairs in India, the having thus not only sent our Honourable Superiors such early Intelligence of the War¹ but perhaps at the same Time laid open to them the Intentions of the French Government with respect to India..."²

While Colonel James Capper was proceeding to India, via the Persian Gulf, he met Captain de Bourg en route to Europe at Muscat on January 24th, 1779. Captain de Bourg had been released by the Governor

¹ Mr. Latouche thought that the Basra Factory was the first to send the news of the declaration of war with the French after the seizure of M. de Bourg, but the news had arrived earlier via Suez and the Red Sea. See Holden Furber, "Overland Route to India", J.I.H., Vol. XXIX, part II, August 1951, p. 125.

² In the same letter Abraham and Latouche add:

"We cannot indeed sufficiently congratulate ourselves on the good Fortune that attended the prudent Measures pursued by Mr. Abraham for the obtaining of the Packets in Question. Had not particular Expedition been used by him, Monsieur de Bourg would have escaped. He had determined to leave Grain the Morning following the Night of Mr. Abraham's Arrival and had not Mr. Abraham taken the Sheik of Grain in a Manner of Surprise; had he given him the least Time for Deliberation, in all Probability, so strict are the Notions of the Arabs with Respect to Hospitality that no Consideration whatever would have induced the Sheik to suffer the Seizure."

(Latouche and Abraham to C. of D., November [undated] 1778, F.R.P.P.G. Vol. 17.)

of Bombay and authorised to return to France overland. Capper related the story of de Bourg with the gentlemen of the Basra Factory in his Observations.¹

'Utbi' sea power in the 1780's.

The war between France and England gave Kuwait and Zubāra in a way special importance for the French sent a strong fleet to the Persian Gulf to intercept the English-East India Company's mail and to attack their vessels. As a matter of fact the French attacked other ships in the Gulf for that purpose.² So it was still safer for the Company's mail to travel by the Arab vessels. Both Kuwait and Zubāra benefited from that conveyance of mail through the Persian Gulf and through the desert route from Masqat to Aleppo. They seem to have been used by messengers and passengers as stations.³

¹Capper, op.cit., pp. 99-104. Captain de Bourge arrived at Basra from Bombay on board the 'Success' after promising the authorities there not to return to India. A letter from Latouche and Abraham (Basra Factory) to the C. of D. dated Basra, 23.ii.1779. F.R.P.P.G. Vol. 17.No.1165.

²Mr. Latouche to the C. of D., Basra, 20.vii.1781. F.R.P.P.G. No. 1195.

³Latouche and Abraham to the C. of D., Basra, 31.x.1778, F.R.P.P.G. Vol. 17, No. 1161. A French Marquis de Calern arrived by a caravan from Aleppo at Kuwait at the end of September 1778, and he was planning to go to Zubāra, whence he hoped to make the journey by sea to Masqat. He seems to have been a French officer belonging to Pondicherry. See Ibid.

Enmity with the Banī Ka'b, Abū Shahr and Bandar Rīq.

This transfer of commercial activities to the eastern shore of the Gulf from the western could not please the western trading centres. It had already been seen that among the reasons for the Persian attack on Baṣra was the transfer of the English East India Company's activity to its Factory in the latter town in preference to Bandar Rīq, Abū Shahr or Bandar 'Abbās.¹ It had already been seen too that the Persians used to depend for their naval operation on the Arabs of the Persian shore.² With the death of Karīm Khān in 1779 and the absence of any other predominant political power in the Gulf the opportunity for the Arab chiefs to pursue their independent policies became great. And from that time "may be dated the decline of Persian influence in the Gulf".³ About the same time the Gulf gained increased importance "for orders were issued by the Porte prohibiting Christian vessels from trading to Suez".⁴ This gave the ports of the Gulf great importance, as the places from which the goods of India and the East could find their way to Aleppo and Constantinople. There can be little doubt that

¹See above, p. 165.

²See above, p. 166.

³Cf. Low, op.cit., Vol. II; footnote n. 171.

⁴See Danvers, op.cit., p. 44. See Chapter VI, p.

Kuwait benefitted from that restriction as well.

Position at Zubāra.

In the second 'Utbi settlement in the south, prosperity reached a state which made her neighbours jealous and ready to attack the town at any moment because they could not compete with it.¹ Thus Shaikh Naṣr of Abū Shahr who was at the same time ruler of Bahrain was planning an attack upon the town. Early disputes between the 'Utūb of Kuwait and the Banī Ka'b² seem to have revived. The Shaikh of Bandar Rīq, the ally of both the Banī Ka'b and Shaikh Naṣr, was ready to join hands with them in their meditated attack on the 'Utbi towns. But by the year 1779 the 'Utūb seem to have had an armed fleet that could stand against any aggression by those allies.³ In the year 1780 the 'Utūb, both at Kuwait and Zubāra, were at war with the Banī Ka'b.⁴ Though the circumstances of that war are not known,⁵ yet

¹See Bombay Selections. No. XXIV, p. 140 and p. 364.

²See above, pp. 155-6.

³In a letter from Latouche and Abraham to the Court of Directors, Baṣra, 21.x.1779, the Shaikh of Kuwait had been requested to send on board one of his gallivats two Englishmen coming from London to Masqaṭ, but he refused because he was expecting an attack from the Banī Ka'b. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1177.

⁴Lorimer, op.cit., I, i. p. 1003.

⁵Ibid.

one can say that enmity between the 'Utūb and the Banī Ka'b which started in the early 1760's continued to exist. And the 'Utūb were expected to join the side of the Pasha of Baghdād in his war against the Banī Ka'b later in 1780.¹ Yet that enmity with the Banī Ka'b was of less direct consequence to the success of the 'Utūb than the capture, by the French, of a "Mascat ship in 1781, the cargo of which is valued at 8 lacks of rupees", which was shared by the merchants of Baṣra, Qaṭīf and Zubāra.² The two French ships that were attacking other ships in the Gulf were endeavouring to intercept the English mail.³

However, the great threat to the 'Utūb did not come from the French but from the Banī Ka'b and their allies the Arabs of Abū Shahr and Bandar Rīq. There is no need to trace that threat earlier than 1780, but suffice it to say that the 'Utūb found that by that date they had to

¹See a letter from Latouche to the C. of D., Baṣra, 25.iv.1782,

F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1214.

²See a letter from Latouche to the C. of D., Baṣra, 12.x.1781,

F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1202.

³See a letter from Latouche to the C. of D., Baṣra, 20.vii.1781,

F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1195. The attack on the Masqaṭ and other ships was a clear indication that the French knew that the English mail was carried by other vessels than the English.

expect an attack from the Arabs of the Persian coast of the Gulf.

That expected threat made the 'Utūb of Kuwait and Zubāra keep their fleet near at hand for emergency. What helped to postpone an attack by the Banī Ka'b on the 'Utūb may have been the hostility that persisted at the same time between the Ottomans and the Banī Ka'b, most probably as a result of the Ka'b's help offered to the Persians during the attack on Baṣra in 1775. Thus the Banī Ka'b were on bad terms with the Mutasallim of Baṣra and the 'Utūb. The latter on the other hand were on good terms with the Mutasallim and were quite ready to join him in the battle against the Banī Ka'b if he really wanted such a battle, otherwise "they wait, they say, untill they see that the Bacha himself is really in earnest". They themselves were ready for the battle.¹

¹In a letter from Mr. Latouche to the C. of D. dated Baṣra, 25.iv.1782, he speaks of "two Turkish ketches at Kuwait" which were expected to be brought to Baṣra "under the protection of the Grain Gallivats". And since the Pasha was at war with the Banī Ka'b it can be concluded that the 'Utūb sea power of Kuwait was in a position to defy the Ka'b's by thus escorting three ketches to Baṣra. See the letter in the F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1214. Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāḥ by the 1780's was enlisted among the influential chiefs to whom the East India Company offered presents because those chiefs had it in their power to hinder the Company's trade and mail. See a list of Abstract of charges general - Baṣra Factory from 1st of May 1780 to the 31st of April 1782, in F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1216.

107.

Reasons for the emergence of the 'Utbi sea power.

This rise of the 'Utbi sea power seems to have been motivated by various factors. In the first place, the 'Utub were merchants and thus they added to their freight vessels whenever their trade grew, and there can be little doubt that their trade, though its volume is not certain, grew after the siege of Basra in 1775-1779. The increase in the number of trading vessels must have been accompanied by buying and building armed vessels so as to protect the trading fleet. This became a necessity after the death of Karim Khān in 1779, who could suppress any depredations the piratical vessels of the Rās-al-Khyma or Masqat might commit, or at least because of the awe in which the Arab pirates held him must have prevented them from making any depredations. For soon after the death of Karim Khān the Qawāsim and the Masqat Arabs were at war. Depredations on Arab vessels using the Gulf became frequent and the Arab maritime states started quarrels among themselves.¹ Thus

¹Of the activity of the Qawāsim after the death of Karim Khān, says

Warden:

"The Rasool-Khyma fleet, in consequence of the decline of the Persian ascendancy in the Gulf, being constantly on the cruise, roused almost every petty chief to fit out armed boats, manned by lawless crews, under no control, but who depended solely on plunder for their maintenance, which they indiscriminately practised. This state of affairs arose out of the war between Ras-ool-Khyma and Muskat."

See Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 301.

"Shaikh Abdoola of Ormus was at variance with Karrack [Kharij]; the Shaikh of al Haram with the Jamia people; and the Uttoobees of Zobara and Grane with the Chaab."¹

In the same way this absence of major power in the Persian Gulf gave the Arab maritime forces on both littorals of the Gulf, the Persian and the Arab, the chance to fight each other because of earlier grievances or on account of new ones.

Among these comes the traditional enmity of the 'Utūb with the Banī Ka'b.² But since the latter became the allies of the Arabs of Abū Shāhr and of Bandar Rīq during the siege of Baṣra in 1775, the struggle for power between the 'Utūb and those Arabs of the Persian littoral which became apparent after 1779³ found an expression in the Bahrain affair which ended by the establishment of the 'Utūb in the Islands and the collapse of the power of the Arabs of Abū Shāhr and consequently the authority of the Persian Shāhs.

The conquest of Bahrain by the 'Utūb, 1782/3.

The conquest of Bahrain by the 'Utūb comprises certain questions that need to be answered in view of the little light thrown upon the

¹ Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 301.

² See above, pp. 155-6.

³ See Lorimer, op.cit., Vol. I, i, p. 839. Lorimer states that Karīm Khān Zand commissioned Shaikh Naṣr of Abū Shāhr to reduce Zubāra in that year.

affair by both sources which were contemporary with the event and later ones. First comes the question whether the 'Utūb of Kuwait or the 'Utūb of Zubāra were the first to occupy the Islands. Secondly, there is the problem of fixing a date for that conquest. In addition there are the questions relating to the progress of the conquest and the reasons given for it.

On the first question contemporary documents and the local tradition clash. The local tradition kept by Āl-Khalīfa suggests that the 'Utūb of Zubāra namely Āl-Khalīfa and others, were the only 'Utbi element in the capture of Bahrain.¹ On the other hand some dispatches of the English Factory of Baṣra and others who drew on them state that the 'Utūb of Kuwait were the first to occupy the Islands.² There should be no doubt that the contemporary documents are right, for in addition

¹I was told of this by Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Khalīd Āl-Khalīfa in July 1959. Al-Nabhanī in his Al-Tuhfa, Ta'rikh al-Bahrain, pp. 123-125, mentions Āl-Khalīfa and the people of Zubāra as the only attackers of Bahrain; he does not mention the 'Utūb of Kuwait or even Āl-Jalāhima as sharers in the battle.

²See a letter from Mr. Latouche (Baṣra Resident) to the C. of D., 4.xi.1782, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1230. See also Lorimer, op.cit., Vol. I, i, pp. 839, 1003; and "Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee", in Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 364.

to stating that fact they give details about the conquest on which local tradition keeps silent.

As to the date of the conquest and occupation of Bahrain, available sources vary in giving the date, though generally they suggest the year 1783 for the occupation and the transfer of power in the Islands from Shaikh Naṣr of Abū Shahr to the Āl-Khalīfa of Zubāra. However, after the establishment of the Āl-Khalīfa at Zubāra in 1766, and with the rapid growth of the 'Utbī sea trade, Bahrain must have been a port of call for the 'Utbī trading the fishing vessels earlier than the conquest.¹ Lorimer, drawing on the Bombay Government records, gives the date as 1783.² But as Lorimer does not usually give precise reference to his sources he might, in selecting that year, have depended on Saldanha's Selections,³ or the Bombay Government Selections.⁴

¹In his attempt to legalise the Persian claim to Bahrain, Dr. Abbas Farouhy, in his book The Bahrain Islands (750/1951, New York, 1951, pp. 70-71) states that the "Āl-Khalīfa persuaded the Sheik of Bushir, who had authority over Bahrain, to lease them the island". This lease, if it had ever existed, must have taken place in the 1770's. Captain Taylor states that the 'Utūb reduced Bahrain in 1194/1779. See Bombay Selections, No. XXIV, p. 27.

²Lorimer, op.cit., Vol. I, i, p. 839.

³See J.A.Saldanha, Selections from the State Papers. The author gives a selection of 1780 and leaves 1782. No. cclxxix.

⁴See No. XXIV of the Selections, pp. 364-365.

Yet in the Factory Records of the East India Company there is a document dated November 4th, 1782, which clearly states that the 'Utūb had "lately taken and plundered Bahreen". This document leaves little doubt that the taking of Bahrain by the 'Utūb was effected before 1783.¹ It may be said that the event referred to might have been one of a series of attacks on Bahrain that started earlier than 1782, yet still the wording of the Resident, Mr. Latouche, is quite clear and decisive. In fact he goes on to say in the next paragraph that the Shaikh of Abū Shahr was trying to come to terms with the 'Utūb, though he was meanwhile preparing for a retaliatory expedition against their states at Kuwait and Zubāra.²

Reasons for the 'Utūb attack on Bahrain

It has already been seen how the 'Utūb were on bad terms with the Banī Ka'b, the Arabs of Bandar Rīq and the Arabs of Abū Shahr. Whether it was a question of rivalry for the conveyance of trade in the Gulf, or a feeling of contempt with which the 'Utūb regarded the Banī Ka'b and their allies because of their intermarriage with non-Arabs, or a question of Sunī and Shī'ī creeds, or a combination of them, the 'Utūb were always on the alert, especially after the Persian occupation of Baṣra in 1776, expecting an attack from the other shore of the Gulf.

¹

See the document in F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, dispatch No. 1230.

²Ibid.

However, the 'Utbī expansion in Bahrain should be considered as a natural phenomenon. The 'Utbī settlement at Zubāra which rapidly grew into a fortified and walled town¹ could not satisfy the needs of the 'Utbī community, whose population was increased by newcomers from Kuwait and Najd² and presumably hoped to share in the water and plantations of Bahrain. The 'Utūb could not think of expansion on the mainland because they were the allies and protégés of the Banī Khālīd and it would not be easy for them to fight against the Arabs on land. On the other hand, with the help of their sea vessels they could defy other maritime forces and thus protect an island such as Bahrain. Whether the 'Utūb were at that early period aware of the Wahhābī danger is another factor which might have driven them to the conquest. For it is related that Shaikh Khālīfa b. Muḥammad Āl-Khālīfa, the then Shaikh of Zubāra, had anti-Wahhābī sentiments.³ The pearl fishery and the rich palm groves of Bahrain might have been among the attractions of the new coveted territory.

¹See above, p. 129 ff.

²The siege of Baṣra obliged many merchants to migrate to Zubāra. This is clearly stated in contemporary writings. See Latouche to the C. of D., Baṣra, 7.xi.1782. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17. About the same time and later others migrated from Najd because of the Wahhābī threat.

³See Ta'rikh al-Bahrain, p. 122, where Nabhanī quotes two verses by Shaikh Khālīfa which show that he had no high opinion of Wahhābism.

However, by the 1780's circumstances on the Persian Gulf seem to have made an attack on Bahrain by the 'Utūb not only desirable but a necessity. The absence of a strong Persian Shāh gave the Arabs of the Persian coast the chance to behave almost independently of any supervision or advice from the Shāh. Thus the long-awaited attack of the Arabs of the Persian littoral became imminent and the war with them seemed to be inevitable.

Early aggression on the 'Utūb

As a matter of fact the reduction of Zubāra, after the diversion thither of much of the sea trade with India, became an object of importance to the Persian Government; and following their instruction several attempts, commencing in 1777, were made upon the place by the Shaikh of Abū Shahr, but without success.¹ In 1780, possibly in the same connection, but more probably in consequence of piracies committed by the Banī Kā'b, that tribe were at war with the 'Utūb both of Zubāra and Kuwait.²

According to a tradition kept by the Āl-Khālifa, which probably dates from about 1780, the people of Bahrain being Shī'as did not allow some of the Khalīfas' servants to buy palm tree trunks from Sitra, an

¹ Lorimer, op.cit., I, i, p. 783.

² Ibid.

Island of Bahrain, and as a result of the quarrel between them one of the servants was killed. The Zubāra inhabitants retaliated after some days by attacking Sitra and killing five of its inhabitants.¹ The Sitra people reported the matter to their Shaikh Naṣr, who started preparing for a retaliatory expedition against Zubāra.²

Whatever the reasons for the war might have been the conflicting parties were by 1782 ready for the decisive battle for Bahrain, and by that time it seems that each party sharing in the struggle had found allies in the different maritime Arab forces of the Gulf.

On the Abū Shahr side, there were the Shaikh of the Banī Ka'b, of Bandar Rīq, of Hurmuz and the Qawāsim. On the 'Utūb side, who took the defensive in the early stages of the fight, it is not possible to ascertain any allies. However, it is related that as early as 1779 the Sulṭān of 'Umān had sent a ship to Zubāra upon some friendly errand.³ It was expected that the Sulṭān of 'Umān should take the side of the 'Utūb

¹See Ta'rīkh al-Bahrain, pp. 123-124.

²Ibid. Persian rule over Bahrain was exercised through the medium of the Arab Shaikh of Abū Shahr who was by all means the lord of the Island, and his recognition of the authority of the Shāh of Persia over Bahrain and other parts of the Abū Shahr neighbourhood was only nominal.

³See Lorimer, op.cit., I, ii, p. 788.

as long as his traditional enemies, the Qawāsim, joined the other side; yet the Sultān was not said to have joined any party as far as the Bahrain affair was concerned in 1782. But the 'Utūb had found allies in the Arabs of the Qaṭar peninsula, as we shall see, in the defence of Zubāra against the aggressors as early as 1779.

Early skirmishes

Though the 'Utūb in the early stages of the fight for Bahrain were on the defensive, yet they were reported early in the year 1782 to have seized at the entrance of Shaṭṭ-al-'Arab "several boats belonging to Bushire and Bunderick".¹ Shaikh Naṣr of Abū Shahr was reported in return to have been

"collecting a marine, as well as a military force, at Bushire, Bunderick, and other Persian ports - he gives out that he intends to revenge these hostilities by attacking Zebarra";²

he was reported also to "have wrote (sic) for a supply of money to Aly Morat Caun" at Isfahan.³ Mr. Latouch commented on these preparations by:

"Notwithstanding this Show of Vigor, however, it is said, that he /Shaikh Naṣr/ has lately sent to Grain to request a Peace, but that the Shaik

¹ Latouche to Court of Directors, 4.xi.1782, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1230.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

had refused to grant it, unless Shaik Nassir pays him half the Revenues of Bahreen and a large annual Tribute also for Bushire."¹

Mr. Latouche goes on to say in the next paragraph:

"It is not many Years since Grain, was obliged to pay a large Tribute to the Chaub, and that the Name of Zebarra, was scarcely known. On the Persians attacking Bussora, one of the Shaiks of Grain, retired to Zebarra, with many of the principal People. Some of the Bussora Merchants also retired thither. A great Part of the Pearl and India Trade, by this means entered there and at Grain, during the Time that the Persians were in Possession of Bussora, and those Places have increased so much in Strength and Consequence, that they have for some Time past set the Chaub at Defiance, have gained very considerable Advantages against him, and is now under no Apprehensions from the Force Shaik Nassir threatens to collect against them."²

Shaikh Nasr besieges Zubāra.

However, Shaikh Nasr found it necessary to proceed against Zubāra to avenge those 'Utbī depredations, especially after the capture of a "Bushire Gallivat that had been sent to Bahreen to receive its annual tribute" by the 'Utbī vessels."³ He prepared an expedition for the destruction of his powerful rival, in which he was assisted by the Shaikhs of Bandar Rīq, Ganāvuaḥ, Dushistan and other places on

¹ Latouche to Court of Directors, 4.xi.1782, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1230.

² Ibid.

³ Bombay Selections, No. XXIV, p. 364.

the Persian coast. The fleet sailed from Abū Shahr with two thousand Arabs for Bahrain under the command of Shaikh Muḥammad, a nephew of Shaikh Naṣr.¹ This fleet

"though deemed sufficient to attack Zubāra, it appeared to be Shaikh Nassir's object to bring the Arabs to terms by blockading their port, for which purpose the Persian fleet kept constantly cruising between Zubara and Bahreen."²

The Shaikh of the Qawāsim as mediator.

Meanwhile Shaikh Rāshid b. Maṭar, the retired Shaikh of the Qawāsim,³ played the part of mediator, but his efforts failed because the most the 'Utūb agreed to concede was to return the plunder they had taken in Bahrain.⁴ These negotiations failing, the Abū Shahr troops landed at Zubāra with the aim of storming its fort, which they expected to reduce with little opposition. The attackers, however, had scarcely landed, when they were resolutely attacked by a force much greater than they expected, which sailed from the fort, and after an obstinate conflict, they threw down their arms, fled, and embarked on board their

¹ Al-Nabhanī states in his Ta'rikh al-Bahrain, p. 124, that Shaikh Naṣr was the Commander.

² Bombay Selections, No. XXIV, p. 364.

³ Shaikh Rāshid retired because of old age and his son Ṣaqr succeeded him. The Qawāsim were on the Persian side because the 'Utūb were said to have captured a boat belonging to the Qawāsim and put eighteen of the crew to death. See Lorimer, op.cit., I, i, p. 634.

⁴ Before Shaikh Rāshid, the Shaikh of Bandar Rīq tried to mediate but his efforts were not fruitful. See Bombay Selections, No. XXIV, p. 364.

boats. As a result of this battle Shaikh Muhammad, "some men of consequence belonging to the Shaikh of Hurmuz and a nephew of Shaikh Rāshid" were killed.¹

The role of Kuwait.

The 'Utūb of Kuwait do not seem to have joined in this battle, most probably because they were expecting the attack to fall first on them as they were nearer to the Banī Ka'b and the territory of the Abū Shahr. The news of the attack on Zubāra seems to have arrived there very late, for they were reported to have captured a vessel of Shaikh Naṣr which was conveying the news of his defeat at Zubāra and which ordered his son at Bahrain to do his best to defend the island until it became possible for his father to send him reinforcements. The Kuwaiti fleet intercepted that vessel and thus came to know about the state of affairs at Zubāra and Bahrain.²

¹See Bombay Selections, No. XXIV, p. 364. It is worthwhile noting in this context that the 'Utūb of Zubāra were helped in repelling the besiegers by most of the tribes inhabiting Qaṭar. A special mention of Al-Bin 'Alī of Furaiha town is made by Nabhānī. See Al-Nabhānī, Ta'rīkh al-Bahrain, p. 125. Lorimer mentions other tribes of Qaṭar who helped in the occupation of Bahrain. See Gazetteer, I, i, p. 840.

²See Bombay Selections, No. XXIV, p. 28. In his "Extracts" Captain Taylor suggests that Shaikh Naṣr was at the head of the besieging army and on his way back to Abū Shahr, he sent the news to his son whom he had left at Bahrain to look after the Island. See Ibid.

The attack on Bahrain

That 'Utūbī fleet seems to have consisted of six large vessels and a number of boats, which was sailing towards Zubāra as a relief¹ to the besieged town. The information intercepted in the Abū Shahr boat was valuable and led the Kuwaitī vessels to adopt a "prompt and decisive measure". They immediately sailed to Bahrain and seized the principal forts.²

It is not quite clear whether the 'Utūb of Zubāra joined their cousins of Kuwait in the early stages of the battle at Manāma in Bahrain.³ For though the Āl-Khalīfa tradition of the conquest attributes the achievement to Ahmad b. Khalīfa⁴ and the Arab tribes of Qaṭar, it

¹Lorimer, op.cit., I, i, p. 839.

²See Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 365. Lorimer, in recording the event, states that this Kuwaitī expedition ran to Manāma, the capital of Bahrain, seized and set fire to the town and shut the Persian garrison in the citadel. See Lorimer, op.cit., I, ii, p. 839. Lorimer speaks of the "Persian garrison", by which should be understood Shaikh Naṣr's garrisons who were most probably Arabs.

³Local tradition kept by the Āl-Khalīfa makes no mention of any sort of Kuwaitī help in that respect, though it asserts the great help the tribes of Qaṭar gave. Al-Nabhanī gives no mention of the 'Utūb of Kuwait in the Bahrain affair. He is most probably chronicling after the Āl-Khalīfa tradition.

⁴He was officiating as Shaikh on behalf of his father Khalīfa, the ruler of Zubāra, who was away on pilgrimage to Makka. See Ta'rīkh al-Bahrain, p. 122.

denies the part played by the 'Utūb of Kuwait.¹ Yet earlier accounts of the event by Mr. Warden and Captain Taylor state quite clearly that the Kuwaitī role was decisive.²

To turn to the conquest of Bahrain, the 'Utūb of Kuwait were joined there, as quickly as the available means of transport would admit, by the 'Utūb of Zubāra and Ruwais,³ and by contingents from various tribes of Qaṭar, among them Āl-Musallam from Huwaila, Āl-Bin 'Ālī from Fuwairāṭ, Sūdān from Doha, Āl-Bū 'Ainain from Wakrah, Kibīsa from Khōr Ḥasan, Ṣul-ūṭah from Doha, Mana'a from Abū Dhalūf and the Na'im Bedouins from the interior of the promontory.⁴ The attacking 'Utūb outnumbered the garrisons of the forts and did not seem to have met with difficulty in occupying the forts of Manāma and Muḥarraḡ, the two big towns of Bahrain. Other villages do not seem to have shown any signs of resistance, for the garrisons of the forts were the only fighting body.

¹Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Khālīd Al-Khalīfa is of the opinion of his family respecting this fact.

²See their "sketches" in Bombay Selections, pp. 28-29 and pp. 364-365.

³Āl-Jalāhima division of the 'Utūb had settled at the last place in Qaṭar to the north of Zubāra.

⁴See Lorimer, op.cit., I, i, pp. 839-840.

Dating the occupation

The occupation of the islands seems to have taken place a month after the return of Shaikh Naṣr to Abū Shahr from his lost battle against Zubāra. Shaikh Naṣr according to one report returned to Abū Shahr on the 12th June 1782, and on the 28th July of the same year, the garrisons of Bahrain capitulated to the 'Utūb, and on the 5th August 1782 they reached Abū Shahr on their way back from Bahrain.¹ Thus by the end of 1782 Bahrain was transformed from a Persian dependency² into an integral part of the 'Utūb states.

Shaikh Ahmad, the Conqueror.

Neither Shaikh Naṣr nor the Shāh could reconcile themselves to the loss of the islands, and, as it will be noticed later, efforts were made to reconquer Bahrain and to destroy the 'Utūb of Zubāra and Kuwait. At the same time, Shaikh Ahmad, surnamed the Conqueror by the 'Utūb³ of

¹ See Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 365. The same source gives that Shaikh Rashid of Rās al-Khayma accompanied the garrisons to Abū Shahr. Ibid.

² See below.

³ Local tradition plays upon the word "Khalīfa" and dates the conquest of Bahrain by the following sentence: Sāra Ahmad fī Awāl Khalīfa, meaning "Ahmad became the ruler of Awāl", i.e. Bahrain. The calculation of the letters in the Arabic sentence gives the year 1197/1782-3 as the time when the conquest was completed. I was told of this sentence by Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Khalīfa and it is given as well by Nabḥānī. See Ta'rikh al-Bahrain, p. 126.

Bahrain just after the accomplishment of the conquest, did not lose time in consolidating his power in the Islands. Shaikh Ahmad became in 1783 the first ruler of Bahrain and Zubāra, for in that year his father Khalīfa died at Makka where he was performing his pilgrimage.

While establishing his power over the Islands Shaikh Ahmad had to distribute some of the booty among those who shared the battle for Bahrain with the Āl-Khalīfa. It is not quite certain what each of the partners was allotted. However, Āl-Ṣabāḥ of Kuwait seem to have returned back to their town after the cessation of military operations. The other important division of the 'Utūb, Āl-Jalāhima, who seem to have given useful help in the occupation of Bahrain, expected to get a larger share of the booty, and they seem to have asked for a footing at the place.¹ Though what they really claimed was not definitely stated in any available source, their demands were not fulfilled and they indignantly departed from Bahrain and settled for some time at Khārij Island and at Abū Shāḥr.² The Āl-Jalāhima were then under the rule of four sons of Jābir. One of these sons, Rahma, perhaps after quarrelling

¹Formerly the Āl-Jalāhima had been humiliated by Āl-Khalīfa at Zubāra and driven out of that town to Ruwais.

²See Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 522.

with his brothers, usurped power, and one of his brothers, 'Abd Allāh b. Jābir, had to seek refuge at Masqat where he hoped to get help to fight Raḥma the usurper.¹ The Āl-Jalāhima do not seem to have stayed very long at Khārij and Abū Shahr,² for they were reported to have returned to Qaṭar to settle this time not at Ruwais but at Khōr Ḥasan to the north of Zubāra. With the ascendancy of Raḥma and his selection of piracy as a means of living for his tribe, he soon became "the scourge of the Āl-Khalīfa".³

Shaikh Aḥmad, however, does not seem to have transferred the seat of his government from Zubāra to Baḥrain immediately after the conquest. For he is reported to have returned to Zubāra, leaving one of his relatives, with his headquarters at the Dīwān fort of Manāma town, to rule the Islands and guard them against any Persian threat.⁴ Shaikh Aḥmad used to spend the summer at Baḥrain and the remaining part of the year at Zubāra until his death in 1796, and he was buried at Manāma.⁵

¹Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 522. Cf. also Lorimer, *op.cit.*, I, i, p. 840.

²

It is not clear why Āl-Jalāhima chose Abū Shahr for their temporary settlement after their expulsion from Baḥrain. Still it may have been because they thought Shaikh Naṣr might take Baḥrain again and thus enable them to settle in the Islands, a better place than Qaṭar.

³See Lorimer, *op.cit.*, I, i, p. 840.

⁴See Al-Nabḥānī, *Al-Tuḥfa, Ta'rikh al-Baḥrain*, p. 127.

Shaikh Ahmad was succeeded by his son Salman who chose al-Rafā' for his residence.¹

Consequences of the Conquest of Bahrain to the 'Utūb

Despite the fact that the Āl-Khalīfa continued to hold Zubāra as their headquarters and consequently as a centre for their mercantile activities, the acquisition of the Bahrain Islands had far-reaching consequences for the political and economic development of the 'Utūbī states. For the geographical position of the Bahrain Islands and their comparatively great wealth² would offer any enterprising and active merchant a chance of rapid and steady income. The 'Utūb seem to have been aware of this fact. And if we add to this the ramshackle condition of Baṣra and the unsettled state of affairs in Persia, it can be easily understood how the 'Utūb benefited from the newly acquired territory. The pearl trade of the Gulf which had always been centred in Bahrain was now theirs, many rich merchants who had large interests in the Indian trade were at Zubāra,³ and the 'Utūbī

¹ This choice may have been based on health grounds, for al-Rafā' lies on a hill, unlike Manāma, which is rather low, being situated on a plain. The Arabic word rafa' means to raise.

² The comparison is made with Qaṭar and other uncultivated areas of Eastern Arabia such as Kuwait itself.

³ See letter from Latouche to the Court of Directors, Baṣra, 4.xi.1782, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1230.

fleet was in a position to play a dominant role in the freight trade in the Persian Gulf.¹

Yet this commercial as well as political success brought with it rivalries that were not in existence before 1782. For in addition to the three enemies of the 'Utūb, namely the Banī Ka'b, the Arabs of Bandar Rīq and Abū Shahr, the conquest made Shaikh Rāshid of Rās al-Khayma, his son, and Shaikh 'Abd Allāh of Hurmuz become new enemies to the expanding 'Utūbī power. An even more dangerous threat to the 'Utūb at Bahraīn could be expected from the Sultān of Masqaṭ who had earlier claimed sovereignty over Bahraīn.² But the Sultān did not become a threat to the 'Utūb at Bahraīn till the closing years of the eighteenth century. He was reported to have "preserved strict neutrality" towards the struggle that ensued between the 'Utūb and their enemies at and after the time of the conquest.³ This attitude of the Sultān can be accounted for on the following grounds. Those who were struggling for supremacy in Bahraīn were the 'Utūb, who had so far no grievances against the Sultān, and the other Arabs of the Persian coast, including the Qawāsim, the

¹ See "Report on the Trade of Arabia", in Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

² See above, p. 69.

³ Bombay Selections, p. 171.

traditional enemies of Masqaṭ, were his enemies. If he were to join the 'Utūb, he would lose his claim to Bahrain as a former tributary to Masqaṭ,¹ and he would not join the others basically because they were his enemies. Ahmad b. Sa'īd, moreover, was by 1780 too old to start any war. His death on December 15th 1783 was followed by a struggle for the throne by his three sons.² Thus Masqaṭ was not in a position to interfere in Bahrain.

However, the abstention of the Sulṭān of Masqaṭ from intervening did not stop the Arabs of the Persian coast from planning a re-occupation of Bahrain, and the other 'Utbī land at Kuwait and Qaṭar. But it seems that the 'Utūb by the 1780's were possessed of a naval power that could withstand any such attack on their territories.

"During the latter part of the year 1783 preparations were on foot for an expedition on a large scale by the Shaikhs of Būshīr and Ḥormuz, assisted by Persian troops and by the Shaikh of the Qawāsim, against Zubarah and Kuwait; but no armament actually sailed."³

¹ See above, p. 69.

² See Miles, op.cit., II, p. 281.

³ See Bombay Selections, XXIV, p. 365, and Lorimer, op.cit., I, i, p. 840.

In a letter from Baṣra to the Secret Committee dated 17th December, 1783, Mr. Latouche speaks of the Banī Ka'b's preparations for an attack on Kuwait and Baṣra. He speaks as well of Shaikh Naṣr of Alū Shahr as an ally of the Banī Ka'b. See F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1262.

Preparations for that purpose were, however, renewed at the close of the following year, and on 12th February, 1785, Shaikh Naṣr proceeded by land to Kungūn, and the Abū Shahr and Bandar Rīq fleets sailed for that place on the 21st, where they were to be re-joined by the Shaikhs of Hurmuz and Rās al-Khayma. A small force from Shīrāz had already arrived at Kungūn to join the expedition.¹

"But the death of 'Alī Murād Khān of Shīrāz dispelled the danger which thus threatened the Al-Khalīfa of Bahrain during the next few years, while the Shīrāz Government laboured under domestic difficulties, the Shaikhs of Bahrain remained unmolested."²

This may also be attributed to the death of Shaikh Naṣr on 11th April 1789.³

Mustafā Agha, the Mutasallim of Baṣra, and Shaikh Thuwaynī of the Montafiq Tribe refugees at Kuwait.

But in Kuwait, on the other hand, the 'Utūb were experiencing some difficulties with Sulaymān Pasha of Baghdād. Sulaymān lost his control of Baṣra in 1787 when its Mutasallim Mustafā Agha tried to

¹See Bombay Selections, Vol. XXIV, pp. 365-366.

²Lorimer, on.cit., I, i, p. 840.

³Shaikh Naṣr's death is mentioned in a letter from Manesty and Jones to the Secret Committee, dated Baṣra, 29th June, 1789. See F.R.P.P.G. Vol. 18, No.1520.

govern the town independent of any orders from Baghdād. Sulaymān Pasha, who had been the Mutasallim of Baṣra before the Persian occupation of the town in 1776 still aspired to direct the affairs of the place after becoming Pasha of Baghdād in 1780. Thus Sulaymān started an expedition to reduce Baṣra when Thuwaynī, the Shaikh of the strongest Arab tribe near Baṣra, joined hands with the Mutasallim. Thuwaynī in 1787 established himself as governor of the town and sent the muftī of Baṣra to Constantinople to persuade the authorities to instal him as governor of Baṣra and its neighbourhood.

As a result of Sulaymān's expedition, Mustafa Agha, his brother Ma'rūf Agha, Thuwaynī and many others who took part in the insurrection against the Pasha of Baghdād, sought refuge at Kuwait with its Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Ṣabāḥ. The Pasha and his Kaya wanted him to deliver them but he refused. On the Shaikh's refusal the Pasha asked the Resident of the English Factory at Baṣra to intervene, but the latter refused to share in the expedition which the Pasha was planning against Kuwait.¹

¹ See a letter from Mr. S. Manesty, the Resident, and his Joint Factor, Mr. H. Jones, to the Secret Committee, 29.vi.1789, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, No. 1532. It is interesting to note that Mr. Manesty and Mr. Jones observe that the Kaya was not really in earnest in asking the Shaikh to deliver Mustafa Agha because he deemed him a great rival, if he was pardoned by the Pasha and if he stayed in Baghdād. See Ibid.

Mr. Manesty in a letter to the Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Ṣabāh dated 17th April 1789 informed the latter of the Pasha's expected march against Kuwait if he refused to deliver the refugees.¹ Shaikh 'Abd Allāh in his reply to Mr. Manesty said that he was ready to fight against the Pasha to protect his guests if war was otherwise inevitable.² In the meantime, Shaikh 'Abd Allāh assured the Resident and Sulaymān Pasha that they need not fear any attack on Baṣra as long as they remained in Kuwait under his protection.³

The fears of the Pasha were notwithstanding, for

"In the beginning of the month of July, Shaikh Twiney assembled a Force at Jarra [Jahra village], a Place in the Vicinity of the Town of Grain where he was joined by Mustafa Aga the late Mussaleem, and about one hundred and fifty Turkish Horsemen."

Their small united army advanced towards Baṣra and

"on the 10th July encamped at Saffwan [Safwan] a hill at about 30 miles distance from it."

They were met there by Ḥmūd b. Thāmīr, the new Shaikh of the Muntafiq, and the new Mutasallim of Baṣra. Thuwaynī and Mustafa Aghā were defeated and the first sought refuge with Shaikh Ghuthbān of the Banī Ka'b, while the latter, accompanied by his brother, and some other

¹Manesty to Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Ṣabāh, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, No. 1532.

²Shaikh 'Abd Allāh to Manesty, 30.iv.1789, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, No. 1532.

³See text of the above letters in the appendix, p.

Turks, fled to Kuwait. There they sold their horses and proceeded to Masqat "with the intention of repairing to Mecca".¹

The determined behaviour of the Shaikh of Kuwait shows plainly that the power he could exert against any meditated attack on his territory was strong enough to repel any aggressor. It has already been seen how he defied the Banī Ka'b and Shaikh Naṣr of Abū Shahr in 1782, and how his fleet led the attack on Bahrain at the end of the same year.² The established authority of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Ṣabāḥ and his "excellent character" gained him the respect of the English Factory at Baṣra. Mr. Manesty and Mr. Jones, on difficulties arising with the Mutasallim of that town and Sulaymān Pasha, thought that Kuwait could replace Baṣra as a centre for the English Factory.³ Friendship between the Factory and the Shaikh "has long subsisted".⁴

The position of the English in the struggle among the Arabs of the Gulf (1782-1790).

But before dealing with the English relations with Kuwait, let us examine their position and attitude towards the struggling Arab

¹ Manesty and Jones to Sir Robert Ainslie, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, Baṣra, 20.ix.1789. F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, No. 1537A. The story of Thuwaynī's insurrection is given in detail by Ibn Sanad in Maṭālī' al-Su'ūd, ff. 121-125.

² See above.

³ Manesty and Jones to the Secret Committee, Baṣra, 29.vi.1789, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, Nos. 1520, 1535.

⁴ Ibid.

forces in the Gulf.

That position was one of neutrality. This neutrality was mainly dictated by the orders from Bombay for what mattered to the English East India Company so far was that her trade with the Gulf should go unmolested and her ships should not interfere with any pirate ships as long as the British flag was respected. The Resident at Basra, after the Qāsimī attack on and their capture of an English vessel in 1778, was waiting for the moment when he could receive orders and vessels to destroy their power. And when that power was at hand, he could not do anything without "consent from Bombay".¹ However, the Company's directions to the Basra Factory in the 1780's were to continue on friendly terms with the "several powers" of the Gulf - with the Banī Ka'b,

"With the Bunderick, the Grain people, and other tribes of Arabs on the Persian and Arabian coasts, who have it in their power to annoy our trade... for the security of the Company's dispatches, of the English trade, and of English travellers, passing between Basra, Aleppo and Bagdat."

The Company found that

"timely presents are often of great use in preserving this good understanding."²

¹In a letter from Latouche to the Secret Committee, dated Basra, 17th December 1783, he expresses the Factory's hope of seizing, one day, the opportunity of destroying the Qāsimī fleet. He seems to have been a sympathiser with the 'Utūb against their adversaries. See that letter in F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17, No. 1262.

²Latouche to Manesty, Basra, 6.xi.1784; a letter from Manesty to the Secret Committee, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, No. 1299. For the full text of the letter see Appendix, p. 335.

Shaikh 'Abd Allāh's Relations with the English

As stated before, Shaikh 'Abd Allāh was on very good terms with the representatives of the English East India Company. In 1778 he had allowed the Basra Factory to seize the French officer, M. de Bourg. Those friendly relations persisted through the 1780's. This appears natural because of the mutual benefit. The Company had depended for some time past on Kuwait for her dispatches. The Shaikh derived substantial benefit from the traffic. As we have already seen in the case of M. de Bourg how these good relations were about to break down on the question of the "protection of the guest", they were again exposed to the same test when Mr. Manesty tried to intervene in the question of Shaikh Thuwaynī and Mustafa Aghā. However, friendship persisted and in 1790 Mr. Harford Jones (later Sir Harford Jones Brydges) on account of his ill health retired to Kuwait for some time for a change of air.¹ And whenever disputes became sharp between the Basra Factory and the Pasha of Baghdād, Kuwait was mentioned by the factors as a

¹Kuwait is known for its dry air among the towns of the Eastern coast of Arabia. In comparison to Basra it is far healthier because almost no mosquitoes can live there.

substitute for Basra.¹ These disputes dragged slowly from after 1780, when Sulaymān was appointed Pasha of Baghdād, till 1792, when a final and decisive step was taken by Manesty and Jones for the removal of the Factory from Basra to Kuwait.

But by this time the danger that threatened the 'Utūb both at Kuwait and Zubāra, and later at Bahrain, came neither from the Arabs of the Persian coast of the Gulf nor from the Pasha of Baghdād, but from Central Arabia, where a new overwhelming power was forcing its way to the Arabian coast of the Gulf. The Wahhābīs whose impact upon Eastern Arabia started in the early years of the 1780's deserve a separate chapter.

¹Mr. Jones was in Kuwait for the "change of air" on 7th March 1790.

See a letter from Manesty and Jones to the Court of Directors, 27.vi.1790, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, No. 1551. The preference was given to Kuwait as a substitute for Basra, when Khārij Island was thought of as a possible solution. See Manesty and Jones to Secret Committee, Basra, 29.vi.1789, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, No. 1520.

Chapter V

THE WAHHĀBĪS IN EASTERN ARABIA

- A. The Wahhābiyya and the Wahhābī relations with the Bani Khalid.
- B. Development in the 'Utbi' States (1790 - 1800).
- C. 'Utbi-Wahhābī relations, 1793-1800.

Chapter V

THE WAHHĀBĪS IN EASTERN ARABIA

Introduction

In dealing with the Wahhābīs in Eastern Arabia, I am proposing to make a brief historical study of a hitherto neglected people, the Banī Khālīd, one of the most influential tribes who lived on and controlled the Arabian coast of the Gulf from Qaṭar in the South to Baṣra in the north during the period covered by the present work. Every history of the Wahhābī movement in Arabia mentions the Banī Khālīd, but here too the Banī Khālīd are usually eclipsed by the treatment of the power of the Wahhābīs and therefore neglecting the Banī Khālīd.

The name Banī Khālīd was mentioned in many of the letters and reports of the representatives of the English East India Company in the Gulf during the eighteenth century, but no details of their rule in Eastern Arabia is found there. The two Wahhābī chroniclers, Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr, could not neglect the Banī Khālīd's power and their stubborn resistance to the Wahhābī expansion in Eastern Arabia. However, to the two, the Banī Khālīd represented a part of the associates/Mushrikīn who had to be brought under Wahhābī control. Yet much of the material to be traced respecting the Banī Khālīd before

the expansion of the Wahhābīs comes from Ibn Bishr's Sawābiq, /accounts of previous events/¹. When Ibn Bishr speaks of the Banī Khālīd's rulers before that period, this may be taken as an emphasis of their importance in the wars against the Wahhābīs that took place in Central and Eastern Arabia in the second half of the 18th century. So far there has been no attempt to draw a genealogical tree of the Banī Khālīd Shaikhhs.² An attempt will therefore be made in the present chapter to give a list of those rulers based on the writings of Ibn Ghannām, Ibn Bishr and the author of Lam' al-Shihāb. The study of the Wahhābī-Khālīdī relations will throw light on the position of the 'Utbī states during and after the struggle. A separate part of the chapter will be given to developments in the 'Utbī states after 1790; and their relations with the Wahhābīs in the same period will be studied in the light of Wahhābī and other contemporary writings. Arabic rather than European writings will be the main sources for the Wahhābī-Khālīdī struggle, while the Factory records and other European sources form the main authorities on the development of the 'Utbī states.

¹See above, p. 17.

²Oppenheim in his Die Beduinen gives genealogical trees for many Arab tribes, but although he describes the Banī Khālīd, he does not draw such a tree for them. See Vol. III, pp. 133-142.

A. The Wahhābiyya

A brief summary of the basic doctrines of the Wahhābiyya is here essential because the Wahhābī wars with the Banī Khālīd were to a large extent based on the Wahhābī's interpretation of Islām. In their wars with the Banī Khālīd the Wahhābīs were aware of the fact that they were not fighting against the petty chiefs of Najd. If it is remembered that the Wahhābīs could not carry war into the heart of al-Ḥasā till the late 1780's, it may be understood how they appreciated the power of the Banī Khālīd Shaikh. However, those tribes, who fought under the leadership of the Āl-Su'ūd, did so in large part through their zeal for the teachings of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb.

Basic Doctrines of Wahhābism.¹

Briefly speaking the Unitarianism of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb was founded on the concept of the unimpaired and inviolate Oneness of God. There was nothing original in Shaikh Muḥammad's creed, nor did he intend that there should be.² Shaikh Muḥammad, as a reformer, wanted

¹ The Wahhābīs used to refer to themselves as Muwahhīdīn/Unitarians.

They were given the first name by their enemies inside and outside Arabia. See the article "Wahhābiyya" by Margoliouth in E.I./1, p. 1048.

² European and Moslem writings contemporary to the Shaikh are very misleading. Their erroneous statements were criticised by later European writers like Burckhardt in his Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, p. 277. Another example can be traced in Shaikh Mansūr, the Italian physician and commander of the forces of Sayyid Sa'id, the Sultan of Musqat, in his History of Seyd Sa'id, p. 36.

to rid his people of the sinfulness that beset them when they parted from the laws laid down in the Qur'an and led a life that did in no way subscribe to the Moslem creed, as he interpreted it. He, therefore, wanted them to go back to the Word of God in the Qur'an and to put into practice the Words of the Prophet and his pious companions. This was in essence the aim of the preaching of Shaikh Muhammad.¹

¹For a short account of the teachings of Shaikh Muhammad see Lam' al-Shihab, pp. 263-277. The author, though not a Wahhābī himself, yet seems to understand fully the teachings of the Shaikh and his account does not differ from Ibn Ghannām's in his Rawdat al-Afkar. There were two doctrines condemned by the Wahhābīs with unceasing vehemence: Shirk and bida'. Shirk is the association of any being or thing with God, who in his Oneness can have no associate, nor can any have the powers and attributes that by right belong only to God. Bida' or innovations: Moslems should follow the example of the Prophet and his companions, for the innovations were, according to the Wahhābiyya, the outgrowth of ignorance. The Shaikh and his followers, the Muwahhidīn, believed that if they stamped out Shirk and bida', so that God was acknowledged throughout Islām as the One and only God and men trod the right way He had set for them, all Moslems would indeed become brothers, peace would prevail and the world would prosper. See an account on the Wahhābī doctrine in Rentz's Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, pp. 40-41.

On studying the life of Shaikh Muhammad, one can clearly see three distinct phases, the first, his early religious education by his father, Shaikh 'Abd al-Wahhāb¹ who was a Qāḍī at 'Uyayna in Najd and by other 'Ulamā' in Najd; the second, the period of his wide travels,² and the third beginning with his return to 'Uyayna³ where he started propagating Wahhābism which led to his expulsion from there and his final settlement at al-Dir'iyya. The man chiefly responsible for his expulsion was Sulaymān b. Muḥammad Āl-Ḥamīd of the Banī Khalīd.

¹Brydges wrongly calls Muḥammad by his father's name; The Wahauby, p. 7.

²Shaikh Muhammad started his travels when he was about 20 years old. He travelled to al-Ḥasā, Baṣra, Baghdād, Kurdistān, Hamdhān, Isfahān, Qumm, Aleppo, Damascus, Quds al-Khalīl (Jerusalem), Cairo, Suez, Yanbu', Makka, Burayda, whence he returned to 'Uyayna after an absence of about twenty years. His travels must have given him a good idea of the deteriorated conditions in the Islamic world. His stay at Damascus must have given him the opportunity to study the works of the great Hanbalī reformer, Ibn Taymiya. For the towns Shaikh Muhammad visited see Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 5 - 17.

³Others say Yamama in Najd. Lam' al-Shihāb gives both versions, see f. 17. Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr give 'Uyayna. See Kitāb al-Ghazwāt al-Bayāniyya, p. 30 and 'Unwān al-Majd, Vol. I, p. 6.

The Banī Khālīd's influence in Najd.

This was not the first instance of a Khālīdī intervention in Najdī affairs. The Shaikh of the Banī Khālīd had long been recognised by the inhabitants of Najd as their most powerful neighbouring chief whom they had to appease with gifts and homage.¹ This seems to have been the position in Najd in the seventeenth and early 18th centuries. If the chiefs of the Arabian tribes withheld their presents from the Banī Khālīd, the Shaikh of the Banī Khālīd would raid the towns of Najd and return with the booty to his quarters at al-Ḥasā.²

¹ Before the emergence of the Wahhābī power at al-Dir'īyya in the 1750's, the most powerful chief in Najd was Ibn Mu'ammār of 'Uyayna. See Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 41.

² Ibn Bishr's Sawābiq supply us with information regarding such raids in several years of the first half of the 18th century carried out by the consecutive rulers of the Banī Khālīd. In 1126/1714 Sa'dūn b. Muḥammad b. Ghurair raided al-Yamāma. He was accompanied by 'Abd Allāh b. Mu'ammār, the Shaikh of 'Uyayna. See Ibn Bishr, Vol. I, p. 183. In 1132/1719, accompanied by his artillery he attacked al-Dir'īyya. See Ibid, pp. 212-213. In 1140/1727 Muḥsin, the Sharīf of Makka attacked the al-Zafīr in al-Kharj and 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. Ghurair, the Shaikh of the Banī Khālīd joined Muḥsin in his attack. In the following year 'Alī, having as allies some of the 'Anaza tribe made war against the al-Zafīr and obliged their Shaikh Ibn Suwayt to flee to al-Riyāḍ.

Yet the authority of the Banī Khālīd in Najd did not go unchallenged even before the rise of the Wahhābīs. For in 1142/1729 Sulaymān b. Muḥammad b. Ghurair/chose as Amīr al-hajj (the prince of the pilgrims (of Qaṭar, Bahraīn and al-Ḥasā)) one of his relatives. Their caravan was attacked by the Muṭair tribe of Najd, who robbed the pilgrims of large amounts of money and killed a great number of the notables of al-Ḥasā, al-Qaṭīf and Bahraīn.¹ This attack might have been made on a Khālīdī protected caravan because the ruling family of Āl-Ḥamīd was divided after the death of Sa'dūn in 1135/1722 and its chiefs were struggling for the succession.²

Struggle for the Succession among the Banī Khālīd.

The rival parties were 'Alī and Sulaymān, the brothers of the deceased Sa'dūn against his two sons Dujaym and Munay'. The brothers

¹ See Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. II, f. 173, in the MS. copy.

² The following is a list of the Khālīdī rulers in the second half of the 17th century and the first half of the 18th. For a full table of the Banī Khālīd Shaikhs see appendix, p. 348.

1. Barrak b. Ghurair of the Āl-Ḥamīd (1669-1682).
2. Muḥammad b. Ghurair (1682-1691).
3. Sa'dūn b. Muḥammad b. Ghurair (1691-1722).
4. 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. Ghurair (1722-1736).
5. Sulaymān b. Muḥammad b. Ghurair (1736-1752).

were victorious initially against the sons of Sa'dūn who had sought the help of the al-Zafīr and the al-Muntafiq tribes.¹ Hostilities were renewed in 1136/1723 but Dujayn was again unsuccessful,² and so he turned again to the al-Zafīr and the al-Muntafiq in 1139/1726, who attacked al-Ḥasā but were defeated by 'Alī b. Muḥammad and returned to their own land.³ This internal strife among the Shaikhs of the Banī Khālīd was resumed with the death of 'Alī in 1736. Sulaymān, however, ruled in the Banī Khālīd from 1736 to 1752.

Sulaymān b. Muḥammad

It was during the reign of Sulaymān that the first clash with the Wahhābīs took place.⁴ For as a result of violent action by Shaikh Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb and his followers at 'Uyayna in which an adulterous woman was stoned to death, the enemies of the movement tried to suppress it before it spread to other parts of Najd. But

¹Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 218.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 235. The al-Zafīr were living in al-Kharī to the East of al-Ḥasā in the first half of the 18th century according to Ibn Bishr. Later in the century the al-Zafīr and the al-Muntafiq were inhabiting the territory near Baṣra.

⁴The Wahhābiyya is taken as a single continuous movement. i.e. it started with Shaikh Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb's propagation at 'Uyayna in 1745 before he was expelled to al-Dir'iyya.

because Shaikh Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb was under the protection of 'Uthmān b. Mu'ammār, the chief of 'Uyayna,¹ the chiefs of the weak neighbouring towns around him turned to the Shaikh of the Banī Khālīd, who had it in his power to command Ibn Mu'ammār to do whatever those chiefs wanted. Shaikh Sulaymān was so powerful that Ibn Mu'ammār complied instantly with his orders.² And thus Shaikh Muḥammad left 'Uyayna for al-Dir'iyya where he allied himself with its chief Muḥammad b. Su'ūd in 1153/1745.³ This new alliance of Shaikh Muḥammad was destined to bring about a clash between the rising Wahhābī power in Arabia and the already established power of the Banī Khālīd.

But there, unlike Shaikh Muḥammad's expulsion from 'Uyayna, there was more than the religious reason for the wars. In the Wahhābī-Khālīdī struggle for power in Eastern and Central Arabia one can detect religious, political, and economic factors. To the Banī Khālīd the Wahhābīs re-

¹Ibn Mu'ammār, by the virtue of being the chief of 'Uyayna, was the strongest among the chiefs of Najd. So no other chiefs could attack Shaikh Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb in 'Uyayna. See Lam' al-Shihāb, f.32.

²See Ibid, f.33. The influence of Shaikh Sulaymān, according to Lam' al-Shihāb, was felt not only in al-Ḥasā and its vicinity, but also in Arabia, especially in those areas bordering on 'Irāq, in Najd itself and also the outskirts of al-Shām, (Syria).

³Ibn Bishr gives this year for the emigration (hijra) of the Shaikh. See Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 15. Muḥammad b. Su'ūd and Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb made a compact by which the former became the political leader of the muwahhidīn and the latter the ostensible religious leader.

presented a potential danger which they should control before it covered more than al-Dir'iyya, but they were unable to take effective action because Sulaymān was always threatened by rivalry for leadership within his own family especially by Dujayn and Munay', sons of Sa'dūn, a rivalry that ended in 1752 by Sulaymān's expulsion from al-Ḥasā to al-Kharj where he died in the same year.¹

The rule of 'Uray'ir

'Uray'ir, the son of Dujayn, succeeded Sulaymān in 1166/1752.² His reign lasted over twenty years.

All through the reign of 'Uray'ir the Banī Khālīd waged war into Najd. The Wahhābīs were not yet powerful enough to start raiding al-Ḥasā.³ 'Uray'ir could not forget the rising Wahhābīs in Najd and in

(cont.)

Cf. Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 34-36, and see also Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 4, and Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 12. However, from what the author of Lam' al-Shihāb writes it appears that Shaikh Muḥammad b. Abd al-Wahhāb's role was supreme in all Wahhābī affairs, political and religious, through his life.

¹See Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 27.

²Ibn Bishr states that 'Uray'ir had a rival in a certain Ḥamāda of the Banī Khālīd and it took him some time before he established himself as Shaikh of the Banī Khālīd. See Ibid, p. 27.

³Only once during the reign of 'Uray'ir in 1176/1762 did the Wahhābīs manage to raid al-Ḥasā, led by 'Abd al-'Azīz and this raid was a very minor affair. See Ibn Ghannām, II, p. 72; and Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 46. The first gives fuller details than the second.

(cont.)

1171/1758 he started preparing for a campaign against al-Dir'iyya.¹ The effect of the news on the Wahhābīs was great for they started fortifying al-Dir'iyya and other Wahhābī towns.² In the following year he mobilised his forces from the Banī Khālīd and the people of al-Ḥasā and allied with certain Najdī towns. In this campaign 'Uray'ir did not reach al-Dir'iyya for his forces failed to occupy al-Jubayla, a fortified Wahhābī/stronghold.³ Six years later (1178/1764) the chief of Najrān, Ḥasan al-Makramī, attacked the Wahhābīs near al-Dir'iyya and routed their forces but they succeeded in concluding peace with

(cont.)

⁴Rentz thinks that 'Uray'ir "was not greatly concerned at first over the existence of the Unitarian community in neighbouring Najd". See Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, p. 104. He does not give an explanation for that opinion. In fact, 'Uray'ir was interested but perhaps he could not strike before establishing his authority over the different sections of the Banī Khālīd. All through his reign the Wahhābīs were held away from his territories and he fought more than one great battle with them. (See below.)

¹Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 61.

²Ibid.

³Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 42-43.

the attacking prince. Meanwhile 'Uray'ir made an agreement with the prince to attack al-Dir'iyya jointly; but the joint attack did not take place and 'Uray'ir tried to storm al-Dir'iyya alone but without success.¹

The failure of 'Uray'ir to take al-Dir'iyya and at Jubayla shows how strongly those towns were fortified and how weak the means of siege of 'Uray'ir were. However 'Uray'ir did not stop campaigning against the Wahhābīs for in 1188/1774 he captured Burayda on his way to al-Dir'iyya, but he died at al-Khābiya and never reached there.²

Sa'dūn b. 'Uray'ir, 1188/1774 - 1200/1785.

Buṭayn, the eldest son of 'Uray'ir took over the command of the Khālidi army and tried to carry on the projected attack, but did not find his tribe willing to do so. He therefore returned to al-Ḥasā where his brothers Dujayn and Sa'dūn strangled him. Sa'dūn soon poisoned

¹ Hasan al-Makranī was a Shī'ite, see Lam'al-Shihāb, ff. 44. Lam' states that 'Uray'ir tried by every means to persuade Hasan to join him in eradicating Wahhābism and he promised to pay him yearly one hundred thousand pieces of gold if he agreed "to break his oath" with the Wahhābīs, but the latter refused. See Ibid, p. 48. 'Uray'ir's arrival on the battle field took place after al-Makranī had concluded peace with the Wahhābīs.

² Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 101; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, pp. 61-62.

Dujayn and became the Shaikh of the Banī Khālīd in 1188/1774.¹

The chiefs of the Banī Khālīd did not all support Sa'dūn and so 'Abd al-Azīz, the Wahhābī chief was able to play the factions of the Banī Khālīd one against the other.² Since in 1773, before the death of 'Uray'ir, the Wahhābīs had brought al-Riyāḍ and its vicinity under their yoke³ and so had established a firm base for operations outside. They were by now in a position not only to interfere in the internal struggle among the Banī Khālīd chiefs, but also to carry war into al-Ḥasā itself.

Nevertheless Sa'dūn consolidated his power over al-Ḥasā in the same year, and he was in a position to check any Wahhābī aggression against his territories. During the twelve years of his reign⁴ Sa'dūn proved to be invincible, at least in al-Ḥasā and the Wahhābīs had to

¹Rentz in Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, p. 90, puts this event in 1189, most probably influenced by Ibn Ghannām's chronicling of 1189 where he says that Duḡayn offered the chief of Najrān help in his second war with the Wahhābīs. Ibn Bishr, who all through his work is careful to give dates for the Khālīdī rulers, puts the event under 1188.

²See Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 79-83.

³Dahhām b. Dawwās, the chief of al-Riyāḍ was the Wahhābīs' stubborn enemy. It took them about twenty eight years to get possession of his town.

⁴Rentz wrongly states that they were twenty; See his Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, p. 219. Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 80, correctly states that Sa'dūn ruled for twelve years, which tallies with Ibn Bishr's account.

meet him in Najd and not in al-Ḥasā. Many towns in Najd, when trying to overthrow the Wahhābī yoke, sought his help.¹ However, the Wahhābī rule in Najd by 1780 was strongly established and 'Abd al-Azīz Āl-Su'ūd who, being sure of his ability to repel any Khālidi attack, tried a new weapon in his struggle with the enemies in al-Ḥasā. It was clear, after the struggle for the shaikhship that ensued with the death of 'Uray'ir among the Banī Khālidi, that the latter's chiefs did not support Sa'dūn unanimously. So 'Abd al-'Azīz, according to Lam' al-Shihāb, resorted to bribery as another means to achieve his end, namely that of destroying the Khālidi power in Eastern Arabia. According to Lam' al-Shihāb also, 'Abd al-'Azīz wrote letters to the brothers of Sa'dūn and the other chiefs of their tribe in which he encouraged the first to rebel and occupy the seat of government "for Sa'dūn had no more right to rule" and the claimants should share the rule.²

So far the Banī Khālidi had settled their domestic affairs themselves without outside intervention. We see in 1752 after the expulsion of Sulaymān b. Muḥammad, 'Uray'ir established himself as Chief

¹In 1192/1778 Sa'dūn attacked the Wahhābīs in al-Kharj, in 1193/1779 in al-Mujamma'a. in 1195/1780 in al-Kharj, and in 1196/1781 in Burayda. See Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 70, 71, 74, and 75.

²Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 80. The Wahhābī chroniclers Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr in their works naturally would not refer to the use of guile and bribery by 'Abd al-'Azīz.

without foreign assistance for over twenty years. And on his death, Sa'dūn also restored order without any outside aid. But as time went on because of the Wahhābī intrigues and the weakness of the opposers of Sa'dūn their quarrels brought closer their final overthrow because they invited outside help.

So it was most probably due to the encouragement of the Wahhābīs that 'Abd al-Muhsin b. Sirdāh b. 'Abd Allāh of the Āl-Hamīd led the revolt against Sa'dūn in 1200/1785.¹ 'Abd al-Muhsin, feeling that his own and his nephews' supporters² among the Banī Khālīd could not defeat Sa'dūn, sought the help of Thuwaynī, the head of the Muntafiq,³ who joined forces with the insurgents and won the battle of Jaḍ'a⁴ against Sa'dūn, who fled to al-Dir'iyya to seek the protection of his bitter enemy, 'Abd al-'Azīz Āl-Su'ūd. The Wahhābīs were expecting this end to their intrigues and Ibn Ghannām when recording the arrival of Sa'dūn at al-Dir'iyya and the rise of Duwayhis into power rightly anticipated the imminent fall of the Khālīdī rule in Eastern Arabia.⁵

¹Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 81, states that Duwayhis and his brother Muḥammad were the first to revolt and that they asked the help of their maternal uncle 'Abd al-Muhsin after their failure to overthrow Sa'dūn.

²The nephews were Duwayhis and Muḥammad, the brothers of Sa'dūn.

³Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 81.

⁴Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 139.

⁵Ibid.

According to Lam' al-Shihāb, Sa'dūn asked 'Abd al-'Azīz Āl-Su'ūd for forces to enable him to recapture al-Ḥasā, but the latter wanted to continue his policy of playing the Banī Khālīd chiefs one against the other till he made sure that the time was ripe for a decisive attack on their territory.¹ For in 1198/1784, Su'ūd, the son of 'Abd al-'Azīz raided al-Ḥasā most probably to test their response to a Wahhabī attack, but that raid proved that the Banī Khālīd were still powerful. Now with sa'dūn in his hands, 'Abd al-'Azīz was sure that the Banī Khālīd lacked a leader; but still the whole power of the Banī Khālīd was massed on the side of 'Abd al-Muḥsin and Duwayḥis. However, soon the Wahhabīs started raiding the territory of the Banī Khālīd. For in 1202/1787 Sulaymān b. 'Ufayṣān, the Wahhabī general, raided some parts of Qaṭar and on his way back to al-Dir'iyya attacked al-'Uqair,² and earlier in the same year Su'ūd went to al-Dahnā desert with the purpose of spying on the Banī Khālīd.

The Reign of 'Abd al-Muḥsin and his nephews

Duwayḥis and Muḥammad, 1200/1785 - 1204/1789.

By the rise of 'Abd al-Muḥsin and his nephews into power in the Banī Khālīd, it became clear that their family strife would continue

¹See Lam', ff. 83-84.

²Ibn Ghannām, on.cit., II, p. 153, Ibn Bishr, on.cit., p. 82.

for 'Abd al-Muhsin of Āl-'Abd Allāh became the uncrowned prince of the Banī Khālīd and his nephews of the Āl-'Uray'ir only puppets. Sa'dūn died a year after his arrival at al-Dir'iyya during which time the Wahhābīs were doing their best to enlarge the split between the Banī Khālīd by asking them to overthrow 'Abd al-Muhsin and his nephews and re-install Sa'dūn. Their propaganda did not work and yet after the death of Sa'dūn they were asking his tribe to pay allegiance to another brother of Sa'dūn, Zayd b. 'Uray'ir.¹

The history of the accession of the Banī Khālīd rulers after the death of Sa'dūn becomes very complicated. The only contemporary sources where the accession could be chronologically traced are the chronicles of Ibn Ghannām, Ibn Bishr and Lam' al-Shihāb. These three sources are not decisive. In fact they sometimes clash,² and it becomes very difficult to form a clear picture of the Khālīdī ruling chiefs after 1204/1789.

¹ Zayd's presence at al-Dir'iyya is hard to explain. Philby suggests in Saudi Arabia, p. 78, that he was banished from the tribe with his followers after the revolt against Sa'dūn.

² Ibn Ghannām states that Duwayhīs and 'Abd al-Muhsin after their defeat in the battle of Ghuraymil in 1207 sought refuge with the Zubāra people while Ibn Bishr states that they sought it amongst the Muntafiq in the north. See Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 160, and Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 85.

Yet in spite of the fact that the chiefs of the Banī Khālīd were periodically liable to be overthrown by family and Wahhābī intrigues, there were certainly three clear reigns from 1785 to the close of the century. The first of Duwayhīs and Muḥammad with their uncle ‘Abd al-Muḥsin as regent which lasted till 1204/1789. This was followed by Zayd b. ‘Uray‘ir (1204/1789 - 1208/1793) and the next by Barrāk b. ‘Abd al-Muḥsin (1208/1793 - 1213/1796).

Successive Wahhābī attacks on the Banī Khālīd territory,
1200/1785 - 1208/1793

From 1200/1785 to 1208/1793 the Wahhābī raids on Eastern Arabia were characterised by their ferocity and terrorism as if the Wahhābīs wanted the inhabitants of the towns to revolt against their rulers.¹ But still, during the reign of ‘Abd al-Muḥsin and Duwayhīs, the Wahhābīs were unable to invade al-Ḥasā and reduce it to their control. The Wahhābī attacks in 1787 and 1788 were short and sharp raids.² It has already been stated that Thuwaynī of al-Muntafiq was an ally of ‘Abd al-Muḥsin and Duwayhīs. Thuwaynī had had an agreement with the Wahhābīs and thus he resented it when Sa’dūn was offered shelter at

¹Thus in the case of al-Fuḍūl village, the inhabitants were slaughtered like sheep. See Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 159.

²For the nature of those raids see Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, pp. 158-159 and Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, pp. 83, 84 and 85.

al-Dir'iyya. Thuwaynī consequently was inclined to assist the ruling chiefs of the Banī Khālīd. But unluckily for them Thuwaynī failed in his revolt against the Pasha of Baghdād when he tried to make himself the Mutasallim of Baṣra.¹ In 1787 Thuwaynī's forces were beaten by Sulaymān, the Pasha of Baghdād and Thuwaynī, with a few survivors encamped at al-Jahra village to the north of Kuweit. In the following year Su'ūd, the Wahhābī general, after hearing of Thuwaynī's defeat, attacked him at al-Jahra and annihilated his forces. Thus the Banī Khālīd in al-Ḥasā were left without Thuwaynī's help. Even so Su'ūd did not seem to have had the power to invade al-Ḥasā and face 'Abd al-Muḥsin and Duwayḥis in open battle; and therefore he went on raiding the Banī Khālīd territory in the north and in the south.²

In 1204/1789, however, Su'ūd, accompanied by Zayd b. 'Uray'ir and his followers of the Banī Khālīd felt strong enough to invade al-Ḥasā and made for al-Ḥasā oasis, the tribal centre of the Banī Khālīd. After three days of continuous combat, 'Abd al-Muḥsin and Duwayḥis³

¹ See above.

² In 1788 Su'ūd attacked al-Mubarrāz town in al-Ḥasā, and attacked the Muntafiq forces near Safwān. See Ibn Bishr, *op.cit.*, I, pp. 34-35.

³ Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 86 gives the name of Muḥammad b. 'Uray'ir, together with 'Abd al-Muḥsin and Duwayḥis, among those who sought refuge with the Muntafiq after their defeat.

fled from the battlefield¹ and sought refuge, according to Ibn Ghannām, at Zubāra with the 'Utūb² and according to Ibn Bishr and Lam' al-Shihāb, with the Muntafiq in the north of al-Ḥasā.³ Yet this Wahhābī victory over the Banī Khālīd was not decisive, for in the first place Su'ūd was unable to extend his attack to the fortified towns of al-Ḥasā such as al-Hufhūf, al-Mubarrāz, al-'Uqair, and al-Qaṭīf. And in the second place, the Shaikh he put up in place of 'Abd al-Muḥsin was not dependable. This was Zayd b. 'Uray'ir who became the ruler of the Banī Khālīd, but who does not appear to have paid tribute to the Wahhābīs. For as we shall see Zayd joined others of his tribe and waged war on the Wahhābīs.

Zayd b. 'Uray'ir (1204/1789 - 1208/1793)

The Banī Khālīd at this junction seem to have had two recognised Shaikhs for Zayd b. 'Uray'ir was the Shaikh at al-Ḥasā - with the towns from al-'Uqair in the south to al-Qaṭīf in the north under his control, and 'Abd al-Muḥsin was the Shaikh of the nomadic sections of the tribe in the northern regions of the Banī Khālīd territory.⁴

¹See Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 160 and Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 85.

²Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 161.

³Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 85. See also Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 86.

⁴For the borders of the Banī Khālīd territory see above, pp. 76-87.

It was not long after that 'Abd al-Muhsin was assassinated by Zayd in 1206/1791,¹ most probably on Wahhābī instigation. Meanwhile Su'ūd attacked the nomad Banī Khālīd, whose new chief was Barrāk b. 'Abd al-Muhsin, near al-Jahra and routed their Bedouin forces in 1207/1792.² It is apparent by now that the Banī Khālīd were divided into two main sections, the first including the nomads whose allegiance was to the family of 'Al-'Abd Allāh, of whom 'Abd al-Muhsin was the first Shaikh, and the second including the settlers in the various towns of al-Hasā and some nomadic sections who were now headed by Zayd b. 'Uray'ir. The hostility of these two sections to the Wahhābīs still persisted after the battle of Ghuraymil.³ For soon after the Wahhābī attack on

¹Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 88, states that Zayd invited 'Abd al-Muhsin to return from the north to al-Hasā oasis after granting him safe conduct.

²Ibid.

³I was told by one of their descendants, who is studying in London, that the Banī Khālīd still retain that prejudice against the Su'ūdī family and when the king goes hunting in the desert and camps near the Banī Khālīd encampment, nobody goes to his camp to ask for presents or to pay homage etc. while other tribes go to his camp, eat and take presents and pay homage. This may reflect how strong and bitter was the hostility between the Su'ūdīs and the Banī Khālīd.

the Banī Khālīd, near al-Jahra, there was unrest in al-Ḥasā. Su'ūd therefore directed his forces to the South, but Zayd b. 'Uray'ir seems to have pacified the area and to have persuaded Su'ūd to return to Najd. The texts in both Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr are not quite clear in respect to this unrest in al-Ḥasā. While Ibn Bishr gives the impression that Zayd was on the Wahhābī side, that he subdued the revolt and thus Su'ūd did not find any grounds for interference,¹ Ibn Ghannām gives the impression that Zayd was among the conspirators and that he was living at Kuwait for some time most probably to plan attacks on Najd.² However, from the statements of both chroniclers one can infer that by 1792, the Wahhābīs had not yet broken the Khālīdī power. In the years 1791 and 1792³ terrorist raids were inflicted on the different towns of al-Ḥasā. But until 1793 no real military campaign was sent against the Banī Khālīd and the towns of al-Ḥasā. In that year a great Wahhābī force attacked al-Ḥasā, drawing troops not only from al-Dir'iyya but also from the other Wahhābī towns. In this campaign against al-Ḥasā, Barrāk b. 'Abd al-Muhsin seems to have played an important role in serving the Wahhābīs in al-Ḥasā. He is reported to have acted as

¹See Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 93.

²See Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 136.

³For the damage done to these towns and cultivation of al-Ḥasā and for a description of the Wahhābī raids see Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, pp. 173, 182; and Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, pp. 88, 97-98, 100.

mediator between Su'ūd and the Banī Khālīd of al-Ḥasā.¹ Zayd b. 'Uray'ir who had formerly been supported by the Wahhābīs was at the head of the Banī Khālīd of the south who were still blocking the way to the East. Duwayhīs, Muḥammad and Mājid, the sons of 'Uray'ir returned from Zubāra² and were among other Banī Khālīd warriors (muqātila) staying at the Mubarrāz fort.³ From this one can infer that the four sons of 'Uray'ir, the brothers of Sa'dūn, found it very necessary to forget their enmity⁴ in the face of the impending danger. In order to keep the Banī Khālīd divided into two hostile sections, Su'ūd had this time secured Barrāk b. 'Abd al-Muḥsin on his side. Thus in the Wahhābī campaign of 1793, when the capture of the fortified towns of al-Hufhūf, al-Mubarrāz and al-Ḥatīf seemed impossible, Barrāk was able to enter al-Mubarrāz by a trick,⁵ the sons of 'Uray'ir

¹See Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, pp. 188-189.

²See above.

³Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 190.

⁴Zayd, see above, . , was in 1204/1789 supported by the Wahhābīs and he became the chief of the Banī Khālīd.

⁵Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 100 and Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, pp. 188-189.

The trick Barrāk played is not given by either of these two chroniclers.

departed and Barrāk became the Shaikh of the Banī Khālid.¹ So far the Wahhābīs had not succeeded in storming any fort of the Banī Khālid. It is true that they defeated their tribal forces near al-Jahra, but the towns near the coast of the Gulf were not yet conquered. Even the actual rule of the territory had so far been left to a Shaikh from the Banī Khālid. But Zayd b. 'Uray'ir did not succeed in ruling al-Hasā for the Wahhābīs.

Barrāk b. 'Abd al-Muhsin (1211/1796 - 1213/1798)

On the contrary, Barrāk turned to be a dangerous enemy and he joined hands with Duwayhis and Muhammad, in an attempt which aimed mainly at the re-establishment of the Khālidī power as the strongest in Eastern Arabia. With the overthrow of the sons of 'Uray'ir and the establishment of Āl-'Abd Allāh in the person of Barrāk b. Muhsin the Wahhābīs were still following their policy of keeping the different sections of the Banī Khālid opposing each other. At the same time, they knew that Barrāk was too weak to plot against them, because he had quite recently been defeated by them in the north.²

¹It is not quite clear where the sons of 'Uray'ir this time went. Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 100 says that they went to the north. Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 190 simply says that they ran away. Ibn al-Shihāb, f. 86, says that they sought refuge at Baghdād with Sulaymān Pasha.

²Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, pp. 97-98, says that Su'ūd in 1792 directed his attack on the northern part of the Banī Khālid territory because "the head of the serpent lay there", meaning that Barrāk was the most dangerous Khālidī chief.

As a matter of fact both Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr date the fall of the Banī Khālīd rule over al-Ḥasā by the fall of Zayd and the rise of Barrāk.¹ But the end of the Banī Khālīd power was not finally accomplished till 1795 when Barrāk and others attacked the Wahhābī teachers (mutawwifā) and troops who were stationed in some of the towns of al-Ḥasā after the wars of 1792-1793. Following this Su'ūd carried out savage attacks on all the tribes and towns of al-Ḥasā which had fought on the Khālīdī side.² The Wahhābīs were unable to send a large expedition to al-Ḥasā earlier than 1795 mainly because they were exposed to attacks from the West in 1790, 1791 and 1794 by the Sharīfs of Makka and they were afraid of expeditions sent from the north by the Pasha of Baghdad who could direct against them the tribal forces of al-Zafīr, 'Anaza and the Muntafiq. It is true that Thuwaynī's expedition of 1786 proved a failure, but expectations were realized in 1796 and 1798.

¹Barrāk is referred to by Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 101, as a governor, Wālī, of al-Ḥasā put in office by 'Abd al-'Azīz Āl-Su'ūd. Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 197, puts it thus, "Barrāk Wālī al-Ḥasa min taht Imām al-Muslimīn", meaning by the Imām 'Abd al-'Azīz.

²Barrāk escaped to the northern territory of the Banī Khālīd where he found shelter with the Muntafiq. Later, in 1796, he took part in Thuwaynī's second expedition against the Wahhābīs. He is reported to have repented and joined the Wahhābī troops and was killed in one of their raids on Suq al-Shuyūkh and Samāwa in 'Irāq in 1212/1797. See Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, 112.

Stages in the conquest of the Banī Khālīd

The Banī Khālīd were completely overpowered by the Wahhābīs and in 1795 the first non-Khālīdī ruler of al-Ḥasā was appointed by 'Abd al-'Azīz Āl-Su'ūd. This was a certain Nājīm, a man of no distinguished family.¹ With the choice of Nājīm as Walī ends the final stage of the humiliation of the Banī Khālīd. Earlier stages could be briefly summarized in three distinct steps. The first, through most of the 1780's, began by the usual Wahhābī raids² aimed principally at frightening the towns and tribes that were loyal to the Banī Khālīd. The second stage was that of playing the Khālīdī ruling chiefs one against the other and thus weakening the allegiance of the different Khālīdī families to their chiefs, and the third was that of the conquest of the towns of al-Ḥasā and the destruction of their walls, towers and fortresses and the building of new Wahhābī forts in or near

¹Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 106, describes him as "one of the populace of al-Ḥasā", Wahwa min 'ammati ahl al-Ḥasā. The Wahhābī attitude towards the conquered tribes or towns was to select a new chief from the same ruling family or to keep the old one. It is clear that they tried to establish Zayd and Barrāk at various times, but neither proved to be faithful to the Wahhābī cause.

²Burckhardt gives the best description of the Wahhābī warfare in his Notes on the Bedouins, pp. 311-320.

those towns.¹ Towers like these were built outside al-Mubarraz town and al-Hufūf, and they played an important role in the fight against the expedition of Alī Pasha al-Kurjī, the Kaya of Baghdad in 1798/99.

'Abd allāh b. Sulaymān al-Mahshūrī al-Khālidi

The last among the Khālidi chiefs who resisted stubbornly the Wahhābī attacks on the last stronghold of the Banī Khālidi at al-Qaṭīf, Sīhāt² and Tārūt Island was 'Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān of the Mahashīr section of the Banī Khālidi. Lam' al-Shihāb, the only source of detailed information on the capture of al-Qaṭīf states that

"when 'Abd al-'Azīz conquered the whole territory of the Banī Khālidi, the settlers and the nomads, he sent an army against al-Qaṭīf, one of the strongest positions of Banī Khālidi."³

The town was walled and defended by towers. 'Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān was in the beginning supported by the settlers' chief, Ahmad b. Ghānim

¹There can be little doubt that by the choice of the site of the family homes of Banī Khālidi at al-Ḥasā oasis, and the demolition of those houses and building a qaṣr, fort, for the Wahhābī soldiers, was only meant the humiliation of the Banī Khālidi. This event took place in 1792 after one of the Wahhābī raids and is recorded by Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 183.

²A fortified village lying to the south of al-Qaṭīf. See Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 87.

³Ibid.

al-Qaṭīfī. The attacking army, led by Ibrāhīm b. 'Ufaysān captured Sīhāt, a fortified village three farsakhs to the south of al-Qaṭīf. Hearing of the fall of Sīhāt, 'Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān left al-Qaṭīf, marched against Ibn 'Ufaysān and forced him to retire. However, the Wahhābīs, still led by Ibn 'Ufaysān, continued to raid the neighbouring villages of al-Qaṭīf. 'Abd Allāh did not have enough troops to withstand the Wahhābīs who returned to besiege the town. After his defeat by Ibn 'Ufaysān in the suburbs of al-Qaṭīf, he returned to the town which finally capitulated to Ibn 'Ufaysān, probably due to the treachery of Ibn Ghānim.¹ 'Abd Allāh, therefore, retired to Tārūt Island, the last place of the Banī Khālīd to be occupied by Ibn 'Ufaysān.² This island also fell to the Wahhābīs by treachery³ and 'Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān escaped capture and sought refuge, like other chiefs of the Banī Khālīd, with the Muntafiq Arabs in the north.⁴

¹ Lam' al-Shihāb commenting on the fall of al-Qaṭīf says that it fell "because the people of al-Qaṭīf, similar to the people of Bahrain, are without zeal and fervour". See Lam', f. 89. بدنية ودية

² This island is separated from the land by shallow water through which men and animals could wade at low tide.

³ Lam', f. 92.

⁴ See Ibid. For the capture of al-Qaṭīf. See also Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, pp. 172-173. To avoid the plunder of their port, the inhabitants of al-Qaṭīf paid the Wahhābīs according to Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 173, the amount of 3000 zar, and according to Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 88, only 500 ahmar. Zar and ahmar are gold coins.

Consequences of the Fall of the Banī Khālid.

The Wahhābīs, by their conquest of the Banī Khālid, won more than a military victory - for the consequences of the fight resulted in political, religious and economic gains. At the same time their expansion was in itself one of the reasons for the overthrow of the Wahhābī power not only in Eastern Arabia but even in Najd itself, by provoking the Ottoman expeditions sent against them.¹

Politically, the Wahhābī influence was established in Eastern Arabia in a way that made other forces who had interests in the area feel the Wahhābī impact and try either to appease them or to think of a way to eliminate them. To the first group belong the English East India Company, whose interests in Eastern Arabia were merely commercial. Consequently, they avoided any clash with the Wahhābīs. The British did not care what was happening in the area so long as their desert mail remained unmolested,² and they made sure of this by allotting the

¹ The first expedition that was sent against the Wahhābīs on Ottoman investigation was that of Thuwaynī in 1787. Thuwaynī's second expedition about ten years later, ended by his assassination at the hands of a Wahhābī fanatic, Tu'ayyis by name. Tu'ayyis was a slave of Barrāk b. Muḥsin of the Banī Khālid. Ibn Ghannām, *op.cit.*, II, pp. 266-271, in a poem of 88 verses expressed his and the Wahhābī joy and blessings at the death of Thuwaynī.

² See Brydges' *The Wahabys*, p. 15.

Wahhābī chief certain presents. Other forces among the Arabs had to expect the same fate as had been met by the Banī Khālīd or succumb to the Wahhābī teachings. But since we are not concerned here with all the forces that were working in Eastern Arabia, we will confine ourselves to the Qawāsīm who became adherents of Wahhābism and the 'Utūb who did not. The Ottomans on the other hand, who were in occupation of al-Ḥasā before the Banī Khālīd and who had religious interests in Arabia were shocked by the spread of the Wahhābī influence to the borders of Baṣra.

As for the religious gain, the Wahhābīs imposed their tenets on Eastern Arabia and, according to their policy of eradicating what they considered shirk, they devastated the monuments in the towns of al-Ḥasā and installed their propagators and instructors in the mosques.¹ It would have been easier for the Wahhābīs to propagate and inculcate their teachings in al-Ḥasā, had it not been for the fact that most of the population of some towns, especially al-Qaṭīf were Shī'ites. This was a point of weakness in the Wahhābī domination and control in al-Ḥasā. It gave them considerable trouble as we saw soon after their occupation of parts of that country in 1792 and later.²

¹See Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, pp. 197-209, and Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, pp. 98 and 106, Ibn Bishr, I, 88, speaks of the damage done to the mosques which he calls churches and the burning of religious treatises.

²See above.

Economically, the Wahhābīs must have gained much from bordering on territory richer than their own. Musil may be right in assuming that the Wahhābīs in their rush to the East were aiming at acquiring an outlet to the sea.¹ But this is not the main economic outcome of the acquisition of al-Ḥasā. For by conquering a wealthy territory and not only dividing the booty among the warriors but also adding much of the previously Khālidī owned territory to themselves, the Wahhābī rulers, the house of al-Su'ūd, acquired fabulous wealth. The farms of al-Ḥasā were known for their rich produce and its harbours had for a long time been supplying Najd and inner Arabia with Indian and European goods.² The only places of consequence that withstood the Wahhābī attacks were in the 'Utbī territory to the north and the south of al-Ḥasā. But before studying the relations of the 'Utūb with the Wahhābīs it is necessary first to study developments in the 'Utbī states from the point where we left them in the previous chapter, in 1790, to the close of the century.

¹ See Northern Najd, p. 260.

² See above, pp. 95-6 for the agricultural wealth of al-Ḥasā and see below, p. 317 for the commerce of al-Qaṭīf and al-'Uqair.

B. Development in the 'Utbi States (1790 - 1800)¹

In Kuwait the long peaceful rule of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Sabāh still continued. In the south at Zubāra and Bahrain Shaikh Ahmad Āl-Khalīfa ruled till his death in 1796 and was succeeded by his son, Salīmān, whose reign covered the remaining four years of the century and extended till 1825.

During the 1790's the prosperity of the 'Utūb of the north continued. They were also lucky in escaping subjugation by the Wahhābīs who were the real danger to every force in Eastern Arabia. It is true that though the Wahhābī impact on Eastern Arabia was felt very strongly at Kuwait, various factors contributed to keep Kuwait out of danger.

¹The major source of information, on the development of the 'Utbi states in the 1790's, and which also throws some light on their history is the Factory Records of the East India Company. Contemporary Arabic sources especially the Wahhābī writings are very meagre on the subject of the 'Utūb. Ibn Ghannām and Ibn Bishr merely record two Wahhābī attacks on Kuwait and others on Zubāra but no details are given about other activities in the 'Utbi states. Lam' al-Shihāb is invaluable for the siege of Zubāra by the Wahhābīs in 1798, but this work also does not give any other information on the development of the 'Utbi towns. The Records themselves do not give such information on the southern part of the 'Utbi states in Qatār and Bahrain.

The temporary establishment of the Basra English Factory
at Kuwait, 1793 - 1795.

It has already been seen how the 'Utūb benefited from the misfortunes of other ports and states in the Gulf,¹ and especially during the Persian siege and occupation of Basra, 1775-1779. In the early years of the 1790's because of difficulties with Ottoman officials,² the Staff of the British Factory at Basra withdrew from that place on the 30th of April, 1793³ and established themselves at Kuwait⁴ until the 27th August 1795⁵. The head of the Factory was

¹See above, pp. 171-173.

²Detailed accounts of those difficulties are given in the letters of Manesty and Jones to the Court of Directors in London and the British ambassador, Sir Robert Ainslee, at Constantinople. See F.R.P.P.G. in numerous dispatches of the year 1792.

³Early in 1792 Manesty and Jones left Basra for Ma'qil, a place about five miles to the north of Basra, where the Company had built a resort for its men. From there most of the letters of the Factory were sent and thus Ma'qil or Maghil, as it was called by Manesty, was the place from which they retired to Kuwait. Their stay at Ma'qil was a preliminary threat to the Pasha of Baghdād of their intention of going farther to Kuwait or Kārij if he did not come to terms with them.

⁴The departure took place by vessels from Ma'qil on the 30th of April and they arrived at Kuwait on the 5th of May. See Manesty and Jones to the S. Com., Grain, 18.vii, 1793, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 19, No. 1652.

Samuel Manesty who was assisted by Harford Jones, the Joint Factor, and John Lewis Reinaud.

The selection of Kuwait¹ as a place of retreat from the Ottomans, implies that it must have been in no sense an Ottoman dependency.² Various reasons dictated this choice. First of all Kuwait had served very well as a centre for the East India Company's dispatches in the period of the Persian occupation of Basra, 1775-1779, and thus one of the two main purposes behind maintaining the Basra Factory would not be affected by the removal of its activities to Kuwait. Moreover, Manesty could safely assert "that the Charges for a Factory at Grain would be more moderate than those of the Hon'able Company's Factory here [at Basra]".³ Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāḥ was on good terms with

(cont.)

⁵Mr. Manesty and his companions departed from Kuwait on board a Turkish vessel. See Manesty to Mr. Robert Liston (British ambassador at Constantinople), Basra, 13.ix.1795, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 19, No. 1762.

¹Mr. Manesty in a letter to the C. of D. dated Maghil near Basra, 22.xi. 1792, F.R.P.P.G., 18, No. 1636, speaks of two places that can replace Basra, the first was Kuwait and the second Kharij Island.

²Cf. Lorimer, op.cit., I, i, p. 1004. Buckingham writing in 1816 in his Travels in Assyria, pp. 462-3:

"The next port above El Kateef of any note on this coast is that of Graine, as it is called in our English Charts, though known among the Arabs by the name of Koete only.... It seems always to have pre-

(cont.)

the British and it is reported that he received them with great hospitality on their arrival.¹ The town was known to Harford Jones who had spent some time there in 1790 when he was suffering from bad health.² Manesty may have taken into consideration the fact that Kuwait's harbour was suitable for the Company's vessels and that therefore goods could be unloaded there (although this belief, if it existed, was disappointed). Apart from these advantages, Manesty had virtually nowhere else to go when his threat to the Pasha of Baghdad failed. He was compelled to leave Basra or withdraw his threat.³

Manesty had already made his intentions known to the Bombay Governor, the British Ambassador at Constantinople and the Company's headquarters in London. Thus, the India mail was dispatched from Constantinople to Kuwait on 19th March 1793 before the Factors' de-

(cont.)

served its independence too..... and they still bear the reputation of being the freest and the bravest people throughout the Gulf."

³Manesty to the Sec. Comit., Maghil near Basra, 22.xi.1792, F.R.P.P.G. 18, No. 1636.

¹See Manesty to the Sec. Committee, Grain, 18.vii.1793, F.R.P.P.G. Vol. 19, No. 1652.

²See above, ,

³Manesty to the Sec. Committee, Magil near Basra, 22.xi.1792, F.R.P.P.G. Vol. 18, No. 1636.

parture to Kuwait and arrived at Kuwait before the staff.¹ The withdrawal of Manesty and the staff from Basra did not mean the closing down of the Factory there, for an agent was retained at Basra to look after the Company's commercial interests. At the same time Manesty was careful to inform the Captains of the English ships that when possible they should call at Kuwait instead of Basra and unload their goods there. Letters to this effect were sent to the Mutasallim of Basra, and to Mr. Nicholas Hankey Smith, Resident at Abū Shahr.² But because Kuwait's harbour was unknown to the Company's captains they were at first unwilling to undertake the risk of anchoring there³

¹They arrived on May the 5th 1793, as given in a letter from Manesty to the Sec. Committee from Grain dated 18.vii.1793, No. 1652. The first letter sent from Grain was addressed to Harford Jones and it is dated 7th May, 1793, No. 1654. In this letter Mr. Manesty asks Mr. Jones to proceed to Abū Shahr carrying important dispatches which arrived at Grain from the British Ambassador and they were addressed to the Bombay Government.

²See letters from Manesty to the Mutasallim and to Mr. Smith, Grain, 6.xii.1793, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1683.

³Captain Gay Hamilton of the Begum Shah refused to obey the instructions of Mr. Manesty (because of his responsibility for the preservation of the ship, cargo and lives on board) as he knew nothing of the port of Grain. See a letter from Captain Hamilton to Manesty dated 27.v.1793. F.R.P.P.G. 19, No. 1658, the place of the dispatch was Begum Shah, at the mouth of the Basra river.

but later some ships did call at Kuwait,¹ and unload there. Negotiations between the Pasha and Manesty continued for the re-establishment of the Factory at Basra and Manesty does not seem to have insisted on the carrying out of his orders for English ships to unload at Kuwait throughout the establishment of the Factory there.

However, a year after the establishment of the new Factory, Manesty seems to have recognised that his calculations about the facilities Kuwait could offer as a substitute for Basra were not entirely correct. Firstly, Kuwait was menaced by the Wahhābīs, who attacked the place more than once during the period from 1793-1795. Secondly, Shaikh 'Abd Allāh was growing too old for the responsibilities of his position.²

Consequences of the temporary British stay in Kuwait.

It became clear to Manesty that Kuwait could not replace Basra and negotiations with the Pasha resulted in the return of the Factory to the latter place in August, 1795, after two years and four months residence at Kuwait. Mr. Manesty in a letter dated 8th of July, 1795

¹The earliest example is that of the ship 'Laurel' whose Captain, Alexander Foggo arrived at Failaka Island and sent a message to Mr. Manesty enquiring about further instructions. See the letter dated 18th July, 1793, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1659.

²See a letter from Manesty to the C. of D., dated Grain, 15.vii.1794, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1700.

to the Court of Directors, showed his delight at the re-establishment of the Factory "in the most Honourable Manner" at Basra.¹ On the 27th August, 1795, he embarked at Grain on board an Ottoman vessel which was accompanied by other Ottoman vessels and the Viper of the East India Company. The vessels arrived at Basra on 2nd September, and on the 4th September he made his public entry to Basra.² From Manesty's point of view the stay in Kuwait had had the desired effect of bringing the Pasha round to the English terms. From the Shaikh's point of view, the stay of the British Factory was of great importance to the prestige and finance of Kuwait. Though nothing is stated in local tradition about the British Factory at Kuwait and though Arabic chronicles do not even mention this stay, its importance can be gathered from events related in the English dispatches from Kuwait and from the information related by Brydges and Dr. Seetzen

¹Manesty to the C. of D., Grain, 13.ix.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1753.

This letter is a duplicate of a previous letter dated 23 August and a triplicate of a letter dated 8th July of the same year. I could not trace the last two letters which may have been lost.

²A description which shows the vanity of Manesty is given in two of his letters dated Basra, 13th September, 1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, Nos. 1752 and 1762. The first was addressed to the C. of D., and the second to Mr. Robert Liston, the British Consul at Constantinople.

the first in his Mahauby and the latter in Monatliche Correspondenz.¹

In the first place the town profited greatly from ships' cargoes that were unloaded there. Though no exact estimates can be given concerning the amount of that cargo, yet however small it might have been it would be considerably bigger than that which formerly used to come to the town.²

Kuwait must also have derived some profit from the Company's mail, which was usually transmitted by the Arab desert express, recruited from

¹In a letter from Burckhardt, the traveller, to Sir Joseph Banks, the secretary of the Association for promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa, dated Malta, April, 22, 1809, he gives the following about Dr. Seetzen:

"Dr. Seetzen is a German physician, who was sent five or six years ago by the Duke of Saxe-Gotha into the Levant, to collect manuscripts and Eastern curiosities. He has resided for a considerable length of time at Constantinople for the last eighteen months at Cairo, from whence his letter to Mr. Barker (the brother of the English Consul at Malta) is dated on the 9th February last. After sending from Cairo to Gotha a collection of fifteen hundred manuscripts and three thousand different objects of antiquity he planned to travel to Suez and the eastern coast of the Red Sea and enter Africa to explore its interior.

See Burckhardt, Travels in Nubia, London (1822), p. vi. Burckhardt also speaks of Dr. Seetzen's travels in Syria and the Holy Land in his work Travels in Syria and the Holy Land (London, 1822), p. v.

²For some figures and details see the next Chapter, p. 321.

camel riders who were chosen from the Arabs inhabiting the town or who had to inhabit the town because of the nature of this work.¹ Manesty's personal contacts with the Shaikh must have become stronger. These contacts may have extended to other Kuwaiti merchants whose boats were used sometimes by the Basra Factory for carrying dispatches to India in order to avoid the interception of British vessels by the French fleet in the late 1790's. The Shaikh also allowed the British factors to intercept French emissaries and dispatches that were carried on board Kuwaiti boats.²

Intercepting French dispatches and emissaries

The 1790's saw noticeable French activities in the Persian Gulf area. For with the declaration of the 1793 Anglo-French war, the French stepped up their activities in India and the Indian Ocean, and made increased use of the overland route via the Syrian desert and the Gulf to India. French emissaries and dispatches were liable to interception by the staff of the British Factors in the Gulf.

To discuss fully and in detail the Anglo-French rivalry in the Persian Gulf would be beyond the scope of the present work. Yet that rivalry was not without its repercussions in Eastern Arabia, and the 'Utūb became involved in it.

In their struggle against the British in India, the French tried to make the Persian Gulf route useless to the British while at the same time

¹For the desert mail see also the next Chapter.

²Several examples of this interception of French activities can be located in the Basra Factory dispatches of the years 1794, 1795, 1796, 1797 and 1798. There were earlier French activities such as the mission of M. de Bourc in 1778.

they made use of it in the conveying of their own dispatches to India.

To achieve this end French emissaries were sent to the various states bordering on the Gulf¹ to try to gain them to their side;² and a French fleet was sent to police the Indian Sea and the Gulf.³ At the same time the French sent several dispatches by the overland route eastwards to Basra and they tried to convey others to India in Arab boats.

It was in this latter side of the French activities in the Gulf that the 'Utub of the north became involved. The friendship that was cultivated between Mr. Manesty and Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāḥ was employed in curbing French plans to use 'Utbī vessels as a means for both conveying their emissaries and dispatches. The main reason for using Arab boats for those purposes lay in the fact that neither

¹See a letter from William Wickham, British minister and plenipotentiary to the Helvetic Confederacy, dated Bern, 30.vi.1796, F.R.P.P.G., 1^o, No. 1802.

²Sir Richard Worsley, Minister Resident at Venice to the Principal Factor or Agent at Basra, Venice, 15.iii.1796, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1803.

³See two letters to this effect from Manesty to the Sec. Comit., the first dated Grain, 23.viii.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1763. The second dated Basra, 20.xi.1796, No. 1798. Another letter addressed by Manesty to Mr. W. Wickham, dated Basra, 25.xi.1796, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1803.

the French nor the English had any regular mail service in the Gulf and it was most necessary to keep the dispatch of important information as secret as possible. That secrecy could be secured through Arab dhows or gallivats, whose nokhadhas (captains) seem to have been notable for their honesty.¹

Sometimes to avoid interception by each others vessels, they preferred to use Arab boats. It has already been stated that British influence in the Gulf was predominant in the second half of the 18th century, but the sending of dispatches was not limited to the Persian Gulf British Factories. Most of the mail was travelling to India, and the Indian Ocean was always made dangerous by the presence of French vessels during any crises with the British, whether in Europe or elsewhere.² It may be argued that both the French and English would intercept Arab boats as well but this does not seem to have taken place except in cases where emissaries or dispatches were reported to

¹Shaikh Ibrāhīm b. Ghānim on whose vessel two Frenchmen were travelling from Mosqat to Basra is an example of this. He refused to allow these two men to be captured by the English though he was offered a large amount of money as a bribe. He finally agreed because he was shown a letter signed by the Shaikh of Kuwait telling him to deliver the Frenchmen to the English. See the details of this event in Manesty to Reinaud, Grain, 10.vii.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1754.

²French warships were reported to have arrived in the Gulf in July, 1793, and it was said they represented a great threat to British dispatches. See Manesty to the Sec. Comit., Grain, 13.vii.1793, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1652.

have been travelling by a known boat; and it would have been a difficult and impracticable task for either fleet to stop every Arab vessel and they might have run into difficulties with the Arab Shaikhs who would not have allowed it. The Arab vessels of the time were well equipped with armour which might render their interception more difficult.¹

The position of the 'Utūb

The position of the 'Utūb in this business of interception was not easy for although the British Factory rendered Kuwait invaluable services² by its establishment there in 1793, and the Shaikh was well disposed to the British, yet he did not like their attitude towards Kuwaiti ships carrying French dispatches and citizens. At least this was the position in January, 1795, when Manesty directed Reinaud to seize Signor Gulielmo Vicerzo Visette, son of the Venetian Pro-Consul

¹Mr. Manesty speaks of the substantial armament of Arab ships in general in a letter from Grain, 23.viii.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1763, sent to the Sec. Comit. and thinks that they will be a great danger to the British trade in the Gulf. In another from Grain, 17.i.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1723, to the Sec. Comit. he speaks of Kuwaiti vessels being highly equipped for war.

²See below, pp. 232-91 for the Factory's attitude towards the Wahhabis who raided Kuwait during the sojourn of the Factory there.

at Aleppo, in a Kuwaitī gallivat at Kuwait.¹ It is worthwhile noticing that Manesty, who was not sure of intercepting Visette at Kuwait, gave Reinaud letters to the Shaikh of Bahrain and Ibn Khalfān, the Governor of Masqat², to facilitate Reinaud's call. What the response of both might have been to the letters remains unknown because Visette was seized earlier at Kuwait. Yet the fact of writing to Shaikh Ahmad Āl-Khalīfa of Bahrain suggests that he may have been well disposed towards the British.

However, later in the same year, the behaviour of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh towards the interception of the French dispatches changed to some extent for, on the 10th of July, intelligence reached the British Factory at Grain that a Kuwaitī vessel sailing from Masqat to Basra had on board two Frenchmen who might be carrying dispatches from Mauritius. Shaikh 'Abd Allāh was requested by Manesty to write a letter to the Kuwaitī Nakhadha asking that Reinaud confiscate the

¹ Manesty to Reinaud, Grain, 17.i.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 10, No. 1723.

The reference to the indignation of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāh is reported in another letter, Manesty to the Sec. Comit. 13.i.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1722. Signor Visette did not have any French dispatches and he continued his travel to India.

² Manesty to Reinaud, Grain, 17.i.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1723.

dispatches. Though this order was not carried into effect because Reinaud fell ill soon after his departure from Kuwait, yet it is interesting to notice that though the Shaikh wrote the desired letter he did it unwillingly.¹

But three months later and in similar circumstances the Shaikh's attitude changed considerably. What made the change cannot be ascertained. "or on the 25th of October Manesty, after receiving intelligence that a Monsieur Guirard had left Basra on his way to Surat in a Kuwaiti dhow owned by Shaikh Ibrāhīm b. Ghānim,² directed Reinaud to capture the French dispatches which Guirard was carrying. Manesty gave Reinaud a letter to Shaikh 'Abd Allāh asking him to write a letter to Ibrāhīm to allow Reinaud to capture the dispatches. Shaikh 'Abd Allāh wrote that letter, but the question remained would Ibrāhīm, the Nōkhadhā, allow the seizure? To ensure this Reinaud carried 4000 piastres to be given to Ibrāhīm as a reward if he agreed to the seizure.³ Ibrāhīm did not object to the seizure after he had seen the

¹Manesty to Reinaud, Grain, 10.vii.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1754.

²Al-Ghānim family in Kuwait is now one of the richest trading families in Kuwait.

³Manesty to Reinaud, Basra, 25.x.1795, F.R.P.P.G., 19, No. 1773. It should be remembered that the British Factory returned to Basra on 27th August, 1795. For the local and foreign currency in the Gulf in the second half of the eighteenth century, the best information can be traced in an anonymous pamphlet in the British Museum, An Account of the Monies, Weights and Measures, etc. (London, 1769).

letter of Shaikh 'Abd Allāh.¹

By the 13th November of the same year Shaikh 'Abd Allāh had granted the British Resident at Basra the right to inspect every 'Utbi vessel that called at that port in search of foreign dispatches and emissaries.² It is worthwhile noting that in the last two events the vessels belonged to Shaikh Ibrāhīm b. Ghānim.³ This grant must have been of very great value to the British for they found it easier to intercept the dispatches before the carriers landed and contacted the French Consul at Basra. Otherwise it was more difficult for the British to carry out their activities on Ottoman territory.

¹ Ibrāhīm must have known Reynaud from the first stay at Kuwait as a member of the Factory.

² This grant came after a request from Manesty to the Shaikh which Reynaud carried with him on his last mission. See Reynaud to Manesty, Basra, 13.xi.1795, F.R.P.P.C., 19, No. 1772. In this letter Reynaud gives interesting details concerning his mission and how Ibrāhīm was at first reluctant and how he finally helped in the seizure of the dispatches.

³ Two more names are given in another letter (Manesty to Reynaud, Grain, 17.i.1795, No. 1723) of Kuwaitis who owned and were the Nōkhadhas of their vessels. The first was Muḥammad b. Bakr al-Dawsarī, of a family that still lives in Kuwait, though not rich as the Āl-Ghānim, and Shaikh Alī b. Sulaymān. Their vessels were said to have been well equipped for war, see Ibid.

The French apparently became aware of the British effectiveness in capturing the dispatches and thus no more was heard about the 'Utbī boats carrying French agents, emissaries or dispatches in the last four years of the century. Another reason may have been the agreement that had been made between Reinaud and the Tartar Aghāsī¹ to deliver to him all French dispatches sent to M. Rousseau, the French Consul at Baghdād.² It should be stated in this place that the French diplomatic manouvres at Constantinople, Baghdād, Persia and Masqaṭ during the period 1793-1798 did not include the 'Utbī states. One therefore can infer that with the establishment of the British Factory at Kuwait from 1793 to 1795 and the favourable policy of the Shaikh towards the British as formerly discussed, the French could not contact the Shaikh in order to win his support.³ However

¹ Dispatches from Kuwait and Basra to Aleppo were usually carried by the Arab express while those coming from Constantinople were carried by Tartars. The Tartars were the imperial Ottoman couriers, referred to as Ulak.

² According to this agreement Reinaud was able to send from Baghdād, to Manesty at Basra, the French dispatches sealed. Reinaud, Baghdād, to Manesty, Basra, 25.viii.1798, F.R.P.F.G., 19, No. 1906.

³ When M. Beauchamp and other French emissaries arrived at Aleppo from Turkey on their proposed journey to Masqaṭ, Robert Abbot, the British Agent at Aleppo, wrote to Manesty at Basra, telling him that they might travel through Persia to Masqaṭ and not through Kuwait, al-Ḥasā and Zubāra. See Abbot to Manesty, Aleppo, 27.i.1798, and 1.ii.1798, F.R.P.F.G., 19, No. 1371.

with the French occupation of Egypt in 1798, and with the British diplomatic success at Masqat in the same year and in the court of Persia, there remained no place in the Persian Gulf for the French dispatches and emissaries.

However, besides this European activity there is another side of the 'Utbī episode that has so far remained unnoticed and has hardly ever been dealt with by any historian. It is their relations with the Wahhābīs.

C. 'Utbī-Wahhābī relations, 1793-1800.

Against the background of this general state of affairs in Eastern Arabia and of the 'Utbī states in particular which have been treated in Sections A and B of the present chapter we can proceed to study the 'Utbī-Wahhābī relations. This may be divided into three parts, the first deals with the position in the 'Utbī states and how it invited a Wahhābī action against them. The second will be the actual military operations and the third shows how and why the 'Utbī were able to stay free of Wahhābī control until the close of the eighteenth century.

It must be remembered here that the 'Utbī states, which formed part of Eastern Arabia, started as small towns under the protection of

the Shaikhs of the Banī Khālid;¹ and that when those towns grew in importance and when a new territory was conquered in Bahrain, no change was ever reported in the attitude of the Banī Khālid Shaikhs towards the 'Utbi-chiefs of both Kuwait and Bahrain. Friendly relations persisted and the 'Utūb at certain critical periods in the history of the Banī Khālid offered help. An example of this can be traced in the temporary stay of Zayd b. 'Uray'ir at Kuwait in 1793 when he could not withstand the Wahhābī attack on his territory of al-Ḥasā² and that of Barrāk b. 'Abd al-Muḥsin in 1795, when he fled from al-Ḥasā for the same reason.³ As a matter of fact many inhabitants of al-Ḥasā who fled from the Wahhābīs found shelter in the fortified 'Utbi town of Zubāra.⁴ It appears that Bedouin tribes of the Banī Khālid, whenever defeated by the Wahhābīs, used to travel northwards to the neighbourhood of Kuwait, while the settlers took to their

¹See the rise of Kuwait, p. and the establishment of Zubāra, p.

²See above. . .

³See above. . .

⁴Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 205, states that many of the inhabitants of the towns of al-Ḥasā were allowed to leave their forts safely on condition that they would leave the country, which they did and after taking boats in the harbour of al-'Uqair, they sought refuge with the Zubāra people and told them about the situation in al-Ḥasā.

boats and settled at Zubāra and similar places on some of the coastal islands which the Wahhābīs had not yet conquered.¹ The 'Utūb in this case were following the duty of protection while at the same time increasing their fighting strength because those refugees must have told them what to expect in their turn. By accepting them, the 'Utūb quite clearly showed the Wahhābīs that there was no alternative but to bring the 'Utbi states under their control.

This question of offering shelter to people fleeing from the Wahhābī yoke is not the only reason for the 'Utbi-Wahhābī struggle. In their main teachings the Wahhābīs said that they would carry war to wherever existed shirk and bida'. The 'Utbi territory therefore could not be excluded from such lands because the 'Utūb were, like other non-Wahhābī Moslems, practising Islām in a way the Wahhābīs could not accept. Moreover, Bahrain was one of the territories clearly stated by

¹The Wahhābīs were efficient warriors on land, but not at sea, for they dared not attack the islands which belonged to the Banī Khālīd. Even in the first one that they conquered, al-'Amāyir, the island was near the shore and people could reach it by swimming or wading out to it. Even then the Wahhābīs were helped by al-Mahāshīr, a division of the Banī Khālīd, Cf. Ibn Ghannām, on.cit., II, pp. 225-226.

the Wahhābīs as a land of shirk and rafāḍa, Shī'ites,¹ and the reduction of such lands was a necessity in the upholding of essential Wahhābī doctrines.

Also it seems likely that the Wahhābīs were attracted by the substantial wealth the 'Utūb towns seemed to have possessed, which they had accumulated in their trading. Whatever the Wahhābī motive in attacking Eastern Arabia was, they would have done their cause no harm by seizing the property of the 'Utūb who were classified, in the Wahhābī teachings, as mushrikīn.²

Military operations

The actual clash of arms between the 'Utūb and the Wahhābīs, however, did not take place till 1208/1793, when the latter had almost annihilated the strength of the Banī Khālīd in several raids on the various towns of al-Ḥasā. The 'Utūb do not seem to have formed a unified front in their fight against the raiders for while the Āl-Sabāḥ in Kuwait had to face the earlier Wahhābī raids in 1793, it was not till 1795 that the Āl-Khalīfa were exposed to direct Wahhābī

¹See Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., I, p. 15. Shī'as form a large part of the present population of Kuwait and Bahrain. In Bahrain Shī'ism dates from the days of the Qaramathians.

²Lam' al-Shihāb in treating the Wahhābī attacks on Zubāra says that it was one of the richest ports and included some of the wealthiest Arab merchants, such as Ibn Rizq, Bakr Lūlū and others of Āl-Khalīfa. See f. 95.

attacks on Zubāra and its vicinity. Even if the Āl-Khālifa or their cousins the Āl-Ṣabāḥ knew of any meditated Wahhābī attack, the long distance between Kuwait, and Bahrain and Zubāra would make it impracticable for 'Utbī forces to go to their aid, both by land and sea. In addition to that the nature of the Wahhābī warfare of rapid raids and withdrawals did not allow it. ¹ The Wahhābīs in their attacks used to depend on their great mobility. ¹ The Wahhābī chroniclers give accounts of two such raids that had been directed against Kuwait. ² The first took place in 1208/1793 and the Wahhābīs were led by Ibrāhīm b. 'Ufayṣān, who had already won some battles against the Banī Khālīd in al-Ḥasā. ³ The army of Ibn 'Ufayṣān was composed of Najdī Arabs from al-Kharj, al-'Arid and Sudayr and no mention was made in this raid of al-Ḥasā Arabs by either Ibn Ghannām or Ibn Bishr. ⁴ The subsequent raid that took place in the year 1212/1797, on the other hand, included among the invaders people from al-Ḥasā. It is important to notice in this first Wahhābī attack that the Wahhābī chroniclers state that the people of Kuwait went to face the Wahhābīs outside the town and that among the booty the Wahhābīs won were "famous and precious

¹See Notes on the Bedouins, pp. 311-32, also The Wahaby, pp. 10-11.

²Cf. Ibn Ghannām, on.cit., II, pp. 191 and 273; Ibn Bishr, on.cit., I, pp. 102 and 111.

³See above, p. 245.

⁴Cf. Ibn Ghannām, on.cit., II, p. 191 and Ibn Bishr, on.cit., I, p. 102.

weapons".¹ Ibn 'Ufaysān and his men returned with their booty to their towns after killing thirty of the inhabitants of Kuwait.²

The second Wahhābī raid on Kuwait according to those chroniclers took place in 1212/1797³ but it can be inferred from a Basra Factory dispatch⁴ and Brydges Wahauhy⁵ that Wahhābī attacks on Kuwait did not cease and were frequent throughout the period of the Factory's stay at Kuwait. Brydges gave an interesting description of one of the more serious Wahhābī raids where he showed how Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Sabah "and his brave townsmen" repelled that attack.⁶ This must have taken place before his departure to Bagdad in 1794 and from there to Constantinople and England. From both sources, the two Wahhābī chroniclers and these English sources, it is difficult to believe that the 'Utūb were ever on the offensive. The only reference to an 'Utūbī attack on the Wahhābīs can be traced in Ibn Ghannām⁷ who, when chronicling the various events of 1212/1797, says that a certain Masharī b. 'Abd Allāh al-Husayn attacked a Wahhābī party

¹ Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 191.

² Ibid.

³ Cf. Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 273 and Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 111.

⁴ See Manesty and Jones to the C. of D. Grain, 15.vii.1794, F.R.P.P.G. 19, No. 1700.

⁵ See Brydges, The Wahauhy, pp. 11-12.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 13-15.

⁷ Ibn Bishr does not refer to this attack in his chronicle.

that was near Kuwait. The attacking party consisted of twenty camels and others among the 'Utūb were mounted. Maṣḥarī was killed in this battle.¹

Earlier in the same year the Wahhābīs led by Mannā' Abū Rijlayn, attacked Kuwait. The 'Utūb met the enemies outside their town, but they withdrew from the battlefield leaving behind an amount of armour and twenty of their men dead.²

By these attacks on Kuwait the Wahhābīs may have intended to indicate to the 'Utūb that any one who helped the Banī Khālīd or other enemies of the Wahhābīs in any way, would be liable to a Wahhābī attack. The survival of the 'Utūb of Kuwait seems to have been due largely to Wahhābī preoccupation elsewhere, and particularly with Ottoman intention, either indirectly by Thuwaynī's, or directly by Alī Pasha's expedition. The 'Utūb appear to have played some part in supporting the Ottomans. In 1211/1796 Thuwaynī's forces, before and after his assassination by a Wahhābī fanatic in al-Ḥasā, on their

¹ Ibn Ghannām, op.cit., II, p. 274.

² Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 111, says that this attack on Kuwait was carried out by order of 'Abd al-'Azīz Āl-Su'ūd. The fact that the attackers were from al-Ḥasā may indicate that 'Abd al-'Azīz wanted to test the fidelity of those people whose land he had finally subjugated two years ago in 1795.

withdrawal to 'Irāq spent about three months at al-Jahra in the neighbourhood of Kuwait, and it was later in 1795 after the failure of what the Wahhābī chroniclers called the "Conspiracy against the Wahhābīs in al-Ḥasā", that many of the Banī Khālīd and the inhabitants of al-Ḥasā escaped to Baṣra and Baghdād where they induced Sulaymān Pasha to send Thuwaynī against the Wahhābīs who would soon be attacking his territory in Baṣra. Although the role of the 'Utūb in Thuwaynī's expedition is not clear because the reference is always made to the Banī Khālīd and their supporters, yet they must have been on Thuwaynī's side because they were suffering from continuous Wahhābī threats all the time and they were supporters of the Banī Khālīd.

The reduction of Zubāra, 1798.

However, this support led the Wahhābī commander, Ibrāhīm b. 'Ufayṣān, who was chosen by Su'ūd as Governor of al-Ḥasā after its reduction in 1795, to write to 'Abd al-'Azīz Āl-Su'ūd seeking permission to reduce the 'Utūbī settlement of Zubāra and its neighbourhood.¹ Zubāra was used as a shelter for the refugees who were fleeing from the Wahhābī occupation² and who continued to intrigue against the new regime

¹It is odd that the Wahhābī chroniclers do not mention the reduction of Zubāra in their works. The only source of information is Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 94-96 and 101-103.

²See above, p. 240.

in al-Hasā. It is not quite clear from the text of Lam' al-Shihāb why Ibn 'Ufaysān made his demand from 'Abd al-'Azīz in a very secret form,¹ and it is also not clear why he did not start a war against the town as soon as he received 'Abd al-'Azīz's sanction to attack it. Ibrāhīm, however, commenced his attacks on the place by sending raiders to the vicinity of Zubāra and instructed them to cut off the town on the land side and to prevent its inhabitants from obtaining water and wood. The town of Zubāra depended for its water on wells which lay about one and a half farsakhs (c. 7 miles) from the town. These wells were protected by a citadel and between the citadel and the town were a number of fortresses (kūts), which enabled the Wahhābīs to reach the water under protection.² It seems clear that Ibrāhīm hoped to capture the town without an assault. But because of its strength,³ the position, its water supplies, his hopes proved in vain, and it was necessary therefore to take it by force. He attacked first the citadel which fell after the Wahhābīs had lost heavily in men, but the fortresses (Kūts), did not.⁴ But Shaikh

¹See Lam', f. 94.

²Ibid., f. 95.

³See above.

⁴Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 96, states that the building of the citadel and the fortresses was effected after Ahmad Al-Khalīfa had gathered a council of the rich merchants of the town and consulted them when he saw the approaching Wahhābī danger.

Salman Al-Khalifa, the ruler of Zubara, ordered his men to leave the Kūts after rendering them useless. Thus Zubara was cut off from the mainland and its siege began. The 'Utūb thought that the besiegers would tire of a fruitless siege and depart, but this did not happen. In fact the Wahhābīs were in the meanwhile conquering other towns in Qaṭar such as Furayḥa, al-Ḥuwayla, al-Yūsufiyya, al-Ruwayḍa. Because the latter towns had boats, they were directed by the Wahhābīs against the 'Utūb boats. It is reported in Lam' al-Shihāb that the 'Utūb of Zubara attacked the above mentioned towns and scattered their forces, but the 'Utūb were unable to meet the Wahhābīs in an open land battle. Thus when Ibrāhīm came to the rescue of the other towns and maintained a strong siege of Zubara, the inhabitants, under the rule of Shaikh Salmān b. Aḥmad Al-Khalifa,¹ thought they could force the Wahhābīs to leave their town by their mass migration to Bahrain.² In Bahrain they chose to settle at al-Jaw, on high ground in the south of the largest island, where they

¹Aḥmad died in 1796 and Salmān his son was chosen as his successor.

²According to Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 103, the 'Utūb thought that the Wahhābī Government would not last for ever, and then it would be possible to return to their homes. Traditionally it was the practice of the inhabitants of regions on the Gulf to abandon their settlements entirely if threatened by an overwhelming force and take to the sea. With no inhabitants and no trade the invaders were usually forced to abandon the settlements and the inhabitants could return. Cf. the evacuation of Bahrain by the Huwāla Arabs in 1741 after the Persian occupation of the island (see above, p. 70.).

built a citadel and homes for the immigrants.¹

The date of the departure of the 'Utūb from Zubāra is uncertain and there is no evidence as to whether the Wahhābīs, on finding Zubāra abandoned, asked the 'Utūb to return. All that is given by Lam' al-Shihāb amounts to that Ibn 'Ufayṣān, after entering the deserted town, felt sorry for what he had done.² The cause of that sorrow may, however have resulted from the fact that he had occupied a town known to be wealthy but he had not won any booty, Ghanā'im, to distribute among his soldiers or to enrich the State treasury of al-Dir'iyya.

'Alī Pasha's expedition, 1798.

Soon after the failure of Thuwaynīs expedition, Su'ūd led the Wahhābī forces northwards and attacked the outskirts of 'Irāq³. With the Wahhābī danger at his door, Sulaymān Pasha had to fit an expedition against the Wahhābīs. This expedition was sent under the leadership of his Kaya, 'Alī Pasha, who was a Georgian slave. The cavalry marched by land to al-Ḥasā and the infantry, artillery and ammunition were transported by water to Bahrain and other ports at al-Ḥasā where they

¹ Lam', f. 103.

² Ibid.

³ The attack was directed against al-Sāmāwa and Sūq al-Shuyūkh; see Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 112..

were welcomed.¹ Since this is not the place for enumerating the details of this expedition which mostly belongs to Ottoman and Wahhābī history, we shall only deal with it in the light it throws on the history of the 'Utūb. Lam' al-Shihāb tells that the artillery and provisions were transported to Bahrain and landed at al-Ḥasā ports by vessels of which two hundred were hired from the 'Utūb of Kuwait.² The landing of the provisions at Bahrain indicates that Āl-Khalīfa were also on the side of the Ottomans.³

'Utbi independence continues till the close of the century.

One last point which should be raised in the 'Utbi-Wahhābī relations in the last decade of the eighteenth century is how the 'Utūb

¹Details of the equipment of this expedition, its march against the Wahhābīs to al-Ḥasā instead of al-Dir'īyya, reasons for its failure, can be traced in the writings of three contemporaries and eyewitnesses; the first is Brydges in his Mahabiy, pp. 19-24 and the second is the anonymous work of Lam' al-Shihāb, ff. 173-184. The third is Ibn Sanad who gives a detailed account in his Matali' al-Su'ūd, ff. 170-175.

²See Lam' al-Shihāb, f. 176. The man who arranged this was 'Abd Allāh Aghā, the Mutasallim of Baṣra, who seems to have been on good relations with the 'Utūb because he himself, when hearing of the approach of 'Alī Pasha and because of earlier animosity with him, took to one of the 'Utbi vessels and was going to Kuwait; but 'Alī Pasha promised not to allow previous grievances to affect him and so he returned to Baṣra.

See Ibid, f. 175.

³It is stated in Bombay Selections, n. 429, that the Arabs of Kuwait

could maintain their independence of the Wahhābīs through those crucial years when most of Eastern Arabia fell to the Wahhābī arms.

In answering this problem it is advisable to separate consideration of the two domains of the 'Utbī states, one lying in the north and the other in the south, and to try to see how each resisted the Wahhābī aggression on its territory.

The Banī Khālīd resistance.

However, both parts shared the same geographical situation. They lay on the coast of the Gulf, to their east lay the Banī Khālīd lands. The Banī Khālīd were the first barrier that kept the Wahhābī influence from those maritime 'Utbī states. But with the decline of the Banī Khālīd the subjugation of the 'Utūb after 1792/3 seemed more than probable. However, with the rise of Zayd b. 'Uray'ir to power in 1789 and the rise of Barrāk b. 'Abd al-Muhsin after in 1793, the establishment of direct Wahhābī rule over Eastern Arabia was postponed for some years.

(cont.)

were supposed to take part in the expedition together with the Arabs of Basra and the Muntafiq, but no details are given there of the manner in which the 'Utūb participated. It appears that it was marine help that they offered.

The fall of Barrāk in 1795 marked the beginning of the end of the Khālidī rule in Eastern Arabia; and with that the difficulties which the 'Utūb were expected to meet became greater. But even before the fall of Barrāk, Kuwait, as related in the military operations with the Wahhābīs, was attacked frequently by them but they could not capture the town from what we know about the development of the town in the 1730's and the 1790's.

Reference had already been made to the growing power of the 'Utūb sea fleet and its high standard of equipment in arms.¹ These weapons could be used in defending the town if necessary and it must have become so one day by 1793 and afterwards. The 'Utūb who were among the Arab traders trading with India were able to arm themselves with better weapons than the Wahhābīs and this could explain Ibn Ghannām's comment on the "famous weapons" which the Wahhābīs won from the 'Utūb after their attack on Kuwait in 1793.² The presence of the British Factory at Kuwait from 1793 to 1795 may have been another strong reason for the safety of Kuwait and its escape from the Wahhābī yoke.

¹See above, p. 189.

²See above, pp. 268-270.

The role of the British Factory

There is no evidence in the Factory records of Basra to show that the Factory upheld the 'Utūb in their stand against the Wahhābī raids. On the contrary, Brydges, the Joint Factor at Kuwait, in his Wahauby¹ gives the impression that Kuwait was defended by its own people who were courageous and had full confidence in Shaikh 'Abd Allāh b. Sabāh, a venerable old man, of commanding appearance, whom they regarded more as a father than a governor,² and that the Factory did not intervene between the two combatants because these were the orders of the Company and because the Factory did not want the Wahhābīs to intercept the Company's mail in the desert.³

But it is not easy to reconcile this with what Mr. Reinaud, a remarkable figure of the Factory, wrote to Dr. Seetzen from Aleppo in 1805.⁴ For while Brydges represented the grand attack of the Wahhābīs

¹See pp. 12-16.

²See The Wahauby, p. 12.

³According to Corancez, p. 50, the Wahhābī Amīr undertook to protect the British mail only so long as he should be at peace with the Pasha of Baghdād, and once put a man to death for tampering with it.

⁴See Monatliche Correspondenz, pp. 234-235.

as having been made by 500 men, who were driven off by a single shot from an old gun that had been brought ashore by the Shaikh from one of his vessels,¹ Mr. Reinaud, on the other hand, places the strength of the enemy at 2000 camels each carrying two men, the front rider armed with a gun and the other with a lance to protect his companion while reloading; and he alleges that, under Manesty's orders, two guns were landed from the British cruiser which was used as a guard to the Factory, and that the sepoy guard of the Factory took part in repelling the attack, and that the Wah-hābīs lost heavily in their flight along the beach from the fire of the cruiser herself.² Reinaud adds that the resentment of the Wah-hābīs at this interference expressed in depredations upon the Company's desert mail, was the cause of his own mission to al-Dir'iyya.³

Though no fixed date is given to that attack by both authorities except that it took place during the sojourn of the Factory at Kuwait, it seems most probable that Mr. Reinaud's version of the Factory's role cannot be a fiction. There is much evidence to prove it for in

¹See The Wahauby, p. 12 ff.

²See Monatliche Correspondenz, pp. 234-235.

³He gained by that mission fame as the first European to have visited that town, see Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, I, i, p. 1004.

the first place the Factory was responsible for the Company's goods of which there were always quantities at Kuwait. The Wahhābīs would presumably not have spared the infidels if the town had been taken. In addition to this it seems unlikely that Manesty would have been so ungrateful as to refuse the giving of help to the people of Kuwait who had received him with hospitality so soon before. But at the same time Manesty could not explain in his letters to his superiors the role he played against the Wahhābīs for the policy of the Company has so far been one of neutrality towards the powers of the Gulf. It is noteworthy that in the despatches from Kuwait there is no mention of any Wahhābī attack, although it is indisputable that these took place.

It is noteworthy that Kuwait stayed out of the Wahhābī sphere of influence after the reduction of Zubāra. This may be explained on the ground that the Wahhābīs after 1796 were busy in repelling attacks by the Sharīfs of Makka on the one hand, Thuwaynī of the Muntafiq in 1797 and Ali Pasha in 1798/9 on the other. Moreover the 'Utūb did not possess an army that could represent any threat to the strongly established Wahhābī regime in Eastern Arabia for they could at that time put 50,000 men mounted on camels in the field.¹ In this manner the re-

¹Sec. extract of a letter from Brydges to Jacob Bosanguet, Chairman of the Court of Directors; dated Baghdād, 1.xii.1798, in F.R.P.P.G.

duction of the 'Utūb seemed to have been postponed.

However, in 1799, the Imām of Masqaṭ, on the plea that the 'Utbi ships were refusing to pay a tribute for passing the Straits of Hurmuz, attacked Bahrain but failed to capture its capital, Manāma, and returned to Masqaṭ.¹ In 1800 the Imām's expedition against Bahrain succeeded in occupying the Islands and 26 'Utbi families were carried as hostages to Masqaṭ while many others fled to their deserted homes at Zubāra. From there they sought the help of the Wahhābīs who readily gave it.² The 'Utūb re-occupied Bahrain in 1801, but the influence of the Wahhābīs was established in their islands.

It is not clear how much Wahhābī influence was in Kuwait. According to Lieutenant Kemball, the British Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Wahhābī influence was established throughout the whole coast of the Persian Gulf from Baṣra in the north to the territories of the Qawāsim in the south by 1800-2;³ this means that the 'Utūb of Kuwait must have recognized the Wahhābī suzerainty.⁴

¹See al-Sira al-Jaliyya, f.51 and also al-Fath al-Mubīn, ff. 193-194.

²Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 121.

³Bombay Selections, p. 152.

⁴Mr. Warden in his historical sketch on the rise of Masqaṭ, Bombay Selections, p. 174, states that on the conquest of Bahrain in 1801 by the Sulṭān of Masqaṭ, the latter demanded of the Shaikh of Kuwait that he would personally pay him homage, which, according to Warden, the Shaikh must have complied with, as the Imām shortly after dismissed

Before we bring the history of the 'Utub in the second half of the 18th century to a close, it remains for us to try to give an appropriate picture of their trading activities in the same period.

(cont.)

all his troops. However, there is no reference to Kuwait in the Wahhābī chroniclers who refer only to Bahrain and give the name of Shāikh Salman Al-Khalifa as "Amīr 'Abd al-'Azīz 'alā al-Bahrain wal-Zubara". Cf. Ibn Bishr, op.cit., I, p. 129.

Chapter VI

THE 'UTBI STATES AND THE TRADE OF
THE PERSIAN GULF AND EASTERN ARABIA

1750 - 1800

Chapter VI

THE 'UTBĪ STATES AND THE TRADE OF

THE PERSIAN GULF AND EASTERN ARABIA

1750 - 1800

It is necessary in this place to recall some of the important factors which contributed to the development of the 'Utbi States in Eastern Arabia along the coast of the Gulf. First there is the geographical situation which placed them on the important trade route of the Persian Gulf. From this follows naturally the interest in sharing in the trade itself by every possible means. As a matter of fact the 'Utūb proved, all through the second half of the eighteenth century, to be active merchants who knew how to benefit from the state of affairs in the Gulf to build their prosperity.

The role of Geography

With their lands controlling trade from Qaṭar in the south to Kuwait in the north, they were at an advantage in the carrying of merchandise to various parts in central and northern Arabia. They had commercial relations with the Persian coast and with Masqaṭ and Baṣra. The position of Kuwait at the extreme north-western corner of the Gulf gave them the opportunity of sharing in the commerce conveyed by caravans between the Gulf and Aleppo.

So in the present Chapter an attempt will be made to study the trade routes to and from the 'Utbi domains, the merchandise itself and finally to discover what trade and how much went through the 'Utbi channels.

Trade routes - sea and desert.

Trade to and from the 'Utbi states must have followed the two old routes in the area, namely the Gulf sea route and the caravan tracks. As to the former the 'Utbi vessels, together with other ships owned by the Arabs of Masqat¹, almost monopolised the conveyance of goods in the Gulf. Ships owned by the 'Utbi merchants of Kuwait, Zubāra and Bahrain used to call with their cargoes at Masqat, Baṣra, Abū Shahr² and changing ports of consequence in the

¹ With the exception of the vessels of Abū Shahr, it can be said that there were no other Arab cargo vessels in the Gulf in the second half of the 18th century. The merchants of Baṣra do not seem to have owned their own vessels at that time.

² "Since the Capture of the Island of Bahreen by the Arabs of the Tribes of Bengattaba, an Enmity, rather however of an inactive and negative Kind, has uniformly subsisted between that Tribe and the Persians and has totally destroyed the commercial Interouse, which previous to that Period, was advantageously cultivated by both Parties."

See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

Gulf.¹ Later in the eighteenth century and after the 'Utbī vessels were capable of trading with India, they ceased calling at Masqat and sailed directly from India to the 'Utbī ports so as to avoid paying any duties to the Sultān.² There is no evidence as to whether the 'Utbī vessels called at Mucha in the Yaman to share in the conveyance of coffee to the Gulf.³ In short, the 'Utbī fleet had a large share in the sea-borne trade of the Gulf and in fact it came second only to that of Masqat in that respect. By the end of

(cont.)

Elsewhere in this report, p. 423, Manesty and Jones added that "little Intercourse has subsisted between the Inhabitants of the Opposite Shores of the Gulph" after the occupation of Bahrain.

¹When the Dutch established their Factory at Khārij Island from 1754-1765 the 'Utūb seem to have benefitted from that and although there is no clear evidence to how much use the 'Utūb, especially those of Kuwait, made of that establishment, yet from Ives' account of the relation between the Shaikh of Kuwait and Baron Kniphausen it becomes clear that the 'Utūb did have commercial intercourse with Khārij, see above, .

²See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 408.

³The conveyance of the annual crop of Coffee seems to have been a monopoly for what was called the Masqat Coffee fleet which used to carry it to Baṣra and the various ports of the Gulf. See Parsons, op.cit., p. 157 and also Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 418.

"their ('Utūb) Galliot's and Boats are numerous and large and they have engrossed the whole of the freight Trade carried on between Muscat and the Parts of the Arabian Shore, of the Persian Gulph, and a Principal Part of the freight Trade, carried on between Muscat and Bussora."¹

It is very unfortunate that we do not possess an adequate description of all those different vessels. Thus Baghla, trankey, Galivat, dhow and dinghy remain as terms without much indication of what they were especially after the disappearance of eighteenth century types.²

¹ See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

² Captain Jenour, The Route to India through France etc. (London, 1791)

p. 36., gives this brief description of a dinghy:

"These Dingees have no deck except just abaft, which covers the man at the helm below which there is a place to put goods that might suffer materially by rain; the stern is much higher than any other part, and are altogether, most clumsy, inconvenient, unmanageable things."

He concludes his talk by advising the European traveller not to sail on board those dinghies.

Mr. J. A. Stocqueler made the journey from Bombay to Kuwait in 1831 in a Kuwaitī Baghla. He gives the following interesting and informative report of the vessel itself and the Kuwaitī seafaring character:

"Buggales are large boats averaging from one to two hundred tons burthen; they have high sterns and pointed prows, one large cabin on a somewhat inclined plane, galleries and stern windows; they usually carry two large latteen sails, and occasionally a jib; are generally built at Cochin and other places on the Malabar coast, and are employed by the Arab and Hindoo merchants

The desert caravans

While boats formed one means of conveyance, it was left to the desert caravans to carry the merchandise from the 'Utbi, as well as other Gulf ports, into the countries surrounding the Gulf and to other remote areas.

(cont.)

on the trade between Arabia, Persia, and the Indian coast. The Nasserie, on which I engaged a passage for the sum of one hundred and fifty rupees, was manned by about forty or fifty natives of Grane, or Koete, on the western side of the Persian Gulph, and commanded by a handsome Nacquodah in the prime of manhood. The sailors acknowledged a kind of paternal authority on the part of this commander, and mixed with their ready obedience to his mandates a familiarity quite foreign to English notions of respect, and the due maintenance of subordination. The Nacquodah took no share in the navigation of the vessel while it was crossing to Muscat, this duty being entrusted to an old Arab who understood the use of the sextant, and who was so correct in his observations that we made Ras-el-Lad within an hour of the time he had predicted we should."

Stocqueler, Fifteen Months Pilgrimage,
Vol. I, pp. 1 - 3.

The baghla, according to Low, was a vessel of great size, sometimes of 200 or 300 tons burden, and carrying several guns. Baghlas were long-lived and one of them which had been built in 1750 was still sailing in 1837. See Low, History of the Indian Navy, I, p.169.

"The Arab dhow is a vessel of about 150 to 250 tons burthen by measurement, and sometimes larger... Dhows may be distinguished from baghlahs by a long gallery projecting from the stern, which is their peculiar characteristic." See Ibid. About 1876 the dhows disappeared from the Gulf. Ibid.

The importance of the 'Great Desert Caravan Route' in transporting goods between Asia and Europe in the 18th century has so far passed unnoticed. No serious study has been made of that subject,¹ in spite of the fact that the desert caravans were still used for commercial purposes between the Gulf and the Mediterranean. It is worthwhile our noticing in this place and giving briefly some data on those caravans because they concern the 'Utūb of Qaṭar and Kuwait'.² The 'Utūb as a people of rising importance in Eastern Arabia and as

¹Two distinguished scholars wrote papers on "The Overland Route to India" in the period under our consideration: Hoskins "The Overland Route to India" in History, Vol. IX, 1924-5, pp. 302-318, and Furber, "The Overland Route to India in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" in J.I.H., Vol. 29, 1951, pp. 106-133. Both papers speak of the usage of both the Red Sea route and the Persian Gulf route for purposes of sending the Eng. East Ind. Company's dispatches. In neither of them one can trace mention of goods conveyed by means of caravans; but both are extremely valuable for their information relative to the Company's mail.

²Information in respect of the desert route and caravans in the second half of the eighteenth century comes from the Journals of the European travellers who used those caravans in journeying from Aleppo to

tribes interested in commercial activity, went on using the usual

(cont.)

the Persian Gulf, or vice versa. It may be worth noticing that most of these Journals were written by men who were in the Eng. East India Company's service. Among those who crossed that desert in the 1750's and whose journeys were published are Bartholomew Plaisted; his work is Narrative of a Journey from Basra to Aleppo in 1750 and John Carmichael, his work is Narrative of a Journey from Aleppo to Basra in 1751. These Journeys are published by D. Carruthers in his work The Desert Route to India, London, 1929. They were followed by Ives in 1758. The story of the caravan route subsequent to that, as told by Western travellers, is brief. In 1765 Niebuhr recorded an itinerary of this same caravan route, from information gathered from a Bedouin who had made the journey more than twenty times, and from a merchant of Basra (Voyage en Arabie, Vol. II, p. 193 ff); while in 1771 General, afterwards Sir Eyre, Coote crossed the desert from Basra to Aleppo (see an account of that journey in the Geog. Journal, Vol. XXX, p. 198 ff). In 1774 A. Parsons set out from Alexandretta on 'his voyage of commercial speculation' to Baghdad and Basra. In 1778 Colonel Capper went overland to India. In 1781, Mr. Irwin, of the Madras Establishment, "entrusted with dispatches too important to admit of delay", rode from Aleppo to Baghdad, Basra and India. In 1785-6 we have Julius

(cont.)

caravan routes that passed through their territories. Thus goods that were unloaded at the ports of Eastern Arabia found their way into the inner parts of the peninsular through the traditional caravan routes from al-'Uqair, Zubāra and al-Qatīf.¹ There is no clear evidence of caravans carrying goods from Masqat northwards along the Eastern shore of the Gulf to Baṣra. Yet the fact that the 'desert express'² was dispatched from Masqat by the East India Company's agent there to Baṣra to announce the arrival of the Company's ships at Masqat seems to suggest that the ancient caravan route was still in operation.³ However, there is clear evidence that the desert caravans used to load at Kuwait and to carry goods from there to Baghdād and Aleppo. The earliest reference to such caravans can be traced in Ives'

(cont.)

Griffiths' account of the same journey from Aleppo.

In 1789, Major John Taylor, 'of the Bombay Establishment' went out to India by the same desert route and recorded his journey with great detail. Earlier in 1785 Captain Matthew Jenour made the same journey and also from Aleppo. In 1797, Oliver, followed over the northern section of the route, on his way from Aleppo to 'Iraq.

¹See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 408.

²Arab messengers most probably riding camels.

³For the dispatching of these messengers see Parsons, op.cit., p. 203.

Voyage¹ which dates 1758. This seems to have continued till 1781 when for unknown or unspecified reasons the caravans stopped calling at Kuwait till 1789 and perhaps for some time later.²

The Composition of a Caravan.

Concerning those desert caravans a few notes should be made to give an idea of the amount of trade they were capable of conveying.

Caravans³ were usually composed of merchants who hired a number of camels, mules and donkeys from shaikhs who made this their business and who used to accompany those caravans from their starting point till they reached their destination. These shaikhs used to charge the merchants usually fixed amounts of money for the services they offered them during the journey. These included the payment of

¹See Ives, op.cit., p. 222-225.

²See Saldana, Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

³Because most of the journeys that described those caravans come from people who were in the service of the Eng. East India Company, they give almost the same details of the procedure followed by the Company's representatives at Basra and Aleppo for securing them a speedy and safe arrival at their destination. Cf. Capper, op.cit., pp. 55-58; Irwin, op.cit., pp. 290-292; Jenour, op.cit., p. 34.

duties¹ to some chiefs of the Arab tribes on the caravan route and the hire of Arab guards or rafiqs² besides the hire of the camels. Although the question of the cost of a camel was a matter of bargain, yet it can be said that during the second half of the 18th century it ranged between thirty-five and fifty piastres for a loaded beast from Basra or Kuwait to Aleppo.³ This variance may be attributed to the type of goods carried by a camel. For "in Arabia" say Majesty and Jones in their report of the trade of Arabia bordering on the Gulf,

"the usual load of a Camel is in Weight about seven hundred English Pounds, and the Shaiks of the Caravans will in all times by Customary Agreement, engage to convey from Grain to Aleppo and to pay the Arab the Jewaise or Duties thereon, that Weight of Piece Goods for a Sum of Money equal to Bombay RS. 130, and that Weight of Gruff Goods for a Sum of Money equal to Bombay RS. 90".⁴

¹What was called juwaiza, allowance for free passage, see Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

²These men usually belonged to the tribes through whose territories the caravan would pass and this was the only way to guarantee unmolested passage through their quarters. See Griffiths, op.cit., p. 351 and Parsons, op.cit., p. 103.

³Ives, in 1758, gives it 35 piastres for a camel from Kuwait to Aleppo, see his Journey, op.cit., p. 223. Parsons in 1774, op.cit. p. 112, paid forty piastres "for the hire of each camel" and five piastres for the desert duty on each camel as well.

⁴See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 409. Though this estimation looks too high, yet Majesty and Jones may be considered, after their long stay at Basra, reliable.

The Shaikh of the caravan performed the duties of guide and his authority in the caravan was absolute.¹ Such caravans used to cover the distance from Bagra or Kuwait to Aleppo in about seventy days.²

¹Jenour, op.cit., pp. 25-26, writing to advise the travellers on the best way to accomplish that journey, mentions the caravans, and gives this interesting report:

"As to the preparations for the journey, it depends on the manner you propose going, whether with expedition, ease, or at moderate expense. To accomplish the first method, you must engage four or six Arabs to conduct you to Bassora, carry very little baggage, and as soon as you quit Aleppo, leave every thing to the management of the escort, they knowing what is most proper to be done, and the best track to pursue.... As to the next mode, where ease is solely considered, it will be necessary to purchase mules.... Tents, provisions... camels to convey them; and this show of wealth will demand a large escort... to guard it... The third method, which is by far the cheapest and most common, is, with the caravan. A caravan is a number of merchants, and other travellers, assembled together, some on horse back, but mostly on camels, to any number, escorted by a very strong guard; the whole under the direction of a Shaik or Chief... The only objections against this mode are, the length of time it takes, and the uncertainty of their departure."

²Jenour, op.cit., p. 27, allows sixty to seventy days, while Manesty and Jones, Selections from State Papers, p. 409, estimate about eighty days.

It is worth noticing that those desert caravans used sometimes to break their journey at Baghdād and sometimes to travel direct between the Gulf and Aleppo; and that their numbers used to grow when other caravans joined them from stations on the route.¹ As to the number of the camels conveying goods² it varied from one caravan to another and the increase or the decrease depended on the status of commerce in Aleppo, Basra, Baghdād and other commercial centres in the area. Plaisted estimated that the caravan with which he travelled from Basra to Aleppo was made up, at the start of 2000 camels in all, and about 150 'Musqueteers'. These camels did not make a laden caravan, but were being taken to market.³ Half way they were joined by the Baghdād caravan of 3000 camels, bringing the total to 5000 camels and 1000 men; of the former 400 laden.⁴ Carmichael's caravan consisted of 50 horses, 30 mules and 1200 camels, '600 of which were laden with

¹See Plaisted's account of his journey in Carruthers, p. 80.

²It is necessary to state in this place that not all the camels in the caravan were carriers, especially when the caravan was travelling northwards to Aleppo. Then many camels accompanied the caravan without loads for the purpose of being sold at Aleppo for the use of merchants who wanted to convey their merchandise southward. This was necessitated by the lack of camels in Syria.

³See his Narrative of a Journey in Carruthers, pp. 68-69 and 93.

⁴Ibid, p. 80.

merchandise valuing £300,000'. It was guarded by an escort of 240 Arab soldiers.¹ The caravan by which Ives and his colleagues were trying to travel from Kuwait to Aleppo in 1758 amounted to 5000 camels accompanied by 1000 men.² Parsons' caravan had 800 laden camels besides several mules, donkeys and horses; and there were four European and twelve Turkish merchants. They had 105 Arab guards.³ Griffiths'

¹Carruthers, op.cit., p. xxxiii.

²From the context it appears that the caravan was coming to Kuwait from the south because Ives and his companions were going to hire camels at Kuwait to join that caravan. This might have been the same caravan that used to be dispatched by the Shaikh of the Banī Khālid annually from al-Hasā. It is described by Plaisted, p. 93, as "the caravan of light camels" contrasting it with the merchants' laden camels. It used to be made up of young camels sent to Aleppo for sale. It had a guard of 150 men mounted on dromedaries, "which is a lighter and swifter sort of camel". Many merchants used to wait for its arrival on their stations to join it with their merchandise and thus they used to double or triple the original number setting out. Those merchants were Greeks, Armenians, Europeans and sometimes Turks [Arabs?].

³Parsons, op.cit., pp. 75-76. The caravan left Aleppo on March the 14th, 1774.

caravan which was composed originally of eight camels and a guard of 30 to 40 men, reached, before their departure from Aleppo on 8 June 1786, 200 camels.¹

The merchant caravans and the desert caravan.

This difference in the number of camels variously used is related to the fact that there were three types of caravans that used to make the desert journey. The first was the light camel caravan coming from the south to Aleppo used for supplying that town with animals that would carry goods for one of the two other caravans. The first of these two was the caravans of merchants who wanted to carry their goods from Aleppo southwards without waiting for the arrival or departure of the largest caravan known as the Aleppo or Basra caravan according to the place of departure. This last caravan used to travel twice a year between Aleppo and Basra.²

The travellers' caravans

In addition to those three caravans there was a fourth which might be called the travellers' caravan. English travellers sometimes, for instance, hired a complete outfit, including both riding and baggage

¹Griffiths, op.cit., pp. 350-353.

²Latouche stated in one of his letters to the Court of Directors that such a caravan spent eight months in performing this operation. See Latouche to the Court of Directors, Basra, 31.x.1778, F.R.P.P.G., 17, No. 1160.

camels, as well as a small force of armed guards.¹ Captain Taylor recommended travelling in comfort, by hiring a caravan at a cost from £500 to £600, engaging 40 to 60 armed men, and 20 camels for water, tents, provisions, etc.² The procedure of hiring and equipping these caravans for men who usually were in the service of the Eng. East India Company was left to the English Consul at Aleppo and the members of the Basra Factory.³

As regards the time occupied on the road between Aleppo and Basra or Kuwait, both the size of the caravan and the method of travel have to be taken into account. While large caravans went slowly, 7 hours a day, and took from 45 to 70 days, small caravans did it in 25 days. Plaisted was 24½ days in a rather large caravan. Carmichael, averaging about 7 hours a day took 318 hours or 45 days. Capper took 310 hours.⁴ The 'desert express' used to cover the same distance in about 13½-20 days.⁵

¹See Irwin, op.cit., II, p. 291.

²See Carruthers, op.cit., p. xxxiv.

³See Irwin, op.cit., II, p. 291 and Capper, p. 54.

⁴See Carruthers, op.cit., p. xxiv.

⁵See Latouche to Manesty, Basra, 6.xi.1784, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, No. 1299; Jenour, op.cit., p. 26, allows the Express Messengers 14 days.

Commercial activities in the Gulf.

This activity of the desert route had had no doubt its effect on the 'Utbī trade and in fact, together with the sea-borne cargoes, it had been a factor of great importance in building up the 'Utūb as a power in the area. It might have been one of the factors that made the 'Utūb in the south and north form one political entity. The other phase of the commercial activities of the 'Utūb would be a brief study of the conditions of commerce in the 'Utbī domains. As a brief introduction to this study, it may be worthwhile discussing the commercial activities on the western side of Arabia where there had always been a rival trade route to the Persian Gulf in the Red Sea.

The Red Sea route.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Red Sea did not prove to be a great rival of the Persian Gulf in the conveyance of Indian goods to the markets of the Ottoman provinces in Syria and Turkey. It is true that European vessels used to call at Suez carrying Indian goods to Egypt and other neighbouring countries until the 1770's, but the last decades saw a great decline in that trade. This was mainly due to the Firman which in 1778 prohibited Christian vessels from trading with Suez.¹ Though these orders were against the

¹See Hoskins, loc.cit., p. 315.

interests of the Mameluke Beys, the actual rulers of Egypt who would naturally try to neutralize its effect, yet the attacks of the Arabs of the desert on caravans which carried articles for European merchants represented another danger to their trade. Until 1786 the Court of Directors of the East India Company preferred the Cape route to that of Egypt in conveying the India goods to Europe, and "they were, therefore, quite willing to support the point of view of the Turkish Government in opposing the navigation of the Red Sea by European vessels".¹

Yet with the French commercial rivalry and the conclusion of a treaty between the Chevalier de Troquet for France and by Murād Bey for the Mamelukes of Egypt at Cairo on 7 February 1785 British interests in the Red Sea route revived and the British diplomacy continued to prevail at the Porte who in 1787 sent a successful Ottoman campaign

¹See Hoskins, loc.cit., p. 307. In 1775 the English had signed a treaty with the Beys of Egypt to facilitate their commercial activities, but the Sultān and his advisers at Constantinople were against this treaty because they were more than apprehensive that in time the governors of Egypt might find it to their advantage to throw off the Turkish yoke entirely, perhaps with English aid. See loc.cit., p. 306.

against the Mamelukes. Yet the English success did not mean that the Red Sea route was preferred to the Cape route or that of the Persian Gulf for all the three routes remained in use after that, both for trade and mail purposes until the occupation of Egypt by Bonaparte in 1798.¹

But if the French were able to compete in the markets of Egypt, they do not seem to have been so successful in the markets of the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless the 'Utūb were not affected in their commercial enterprises by the Anglo-French rivalry nor did they rely on goods carried only by English or other European vessels. They had by the 1780's their own fleet that used to sail to India bringing back the India goods to the 'Utbī ports and Baṣra. Masqaṭ was the emporium of trade in Arabia in the second half of the 18th century,² and the 'Utbī fleet with the Masqaṭ fleet were the monopolisers of the freight from Masqaṭ and India to the Gulf.³

¹See loc.cit., pp. 315-317.

²Parsons, op.cit., p. 207.

"Muscat is a place of very great trade, being possessed of a large number of ships, which trade to Surat, Bombay, Goa, along the whole coast of Malabar, and to Mocha and Jedda in the Red Sea. It is the great magazine or deposit for the goods which they bring from those parts; it is resorted to by vessels from every port in Persia, from Bussora, and the ports of Arabia within the gulph, and from the coast of Caramaina without the gulph, as far as the river Indus, and many places adjacent to that river."

³See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

The 'Utūb share the Persian Gulf trade.

But just how much trade was conveyed in the 'Utbi vessels and how much went through Kuwait and Zubāra from that Gulf trade is a question to which there seems to be no satisfactory answer. It is possible, however, to try to form a hypothesis, after looking into the kinds of goods that were brought to the 'Utbi and other ports in the Gulf by the various vessels that traded with them.

Manesty and Jones began their report on the trade of Arabia bordering on the Persian Gulf, etc.¹ by showing how difficult it was for them to report on that trade mainly because of the lack of information that could be obtained from the people of the Arabian coast.²

'Utbi Trading centres.

Still one can detect that the 'Utūb were conducting almost continual commercial activity all through the period lying within the scope of this work. Their activity was centralized at three places: Manāma in Bahrain,³ Zubāra in Qaṭar and Kuwait. These places shared in the sea-borne as well as the desert trade. And it seems more convenient to deal with each separately and to try to detect what goods

¹This report covers the period from 1763 to 1789.

²The merchants in those parts did not normally keep registers of their trade. This practice is still continued by many merchants of Kuwait.

³The name of Manāma does not occur often but the whole Island is mentioned.

were imported to each place, and from where, also what goods were exported and their destinations.

Bahrain's trade before the 'Utbi occupation of the islands in 1782-3 was not considerable except in pearls.¹ The Island's trade after their arrival seems to have been of two sorts, the first was fishery and marketing pearls and the second the sea trade with India, Masqat and the ports of the Persian Gulf.

Pearl fishery

With respect to the pearl fishery, the 'Utūb do not seem to have made any changes in the customary practice of pearl fishing which was "engaging the Attention of many rich Arabian Merchants resident at Bahreen" and which gave "Employments to many industrious People of the lower Arabs belonging to that Place."²

¹See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 405.

²See Ibid., p. 405. The principal fishery was carried on during the months of May, June, July, August and September, when the water is warm. The yearly catch was estimated at 500,000 Bombay rupees which was divided in proportions settled by agreement between the merchants who were the proprietors of the vessels employed in the fishery, the people who navigated them and the divers. For a detailed description of pearl fishing see Buckingham's Travels in Assyria, pp. 454-457, and Wellsted, Travels in Arabia, Vol. I, pp. 264-265 and his Travels

With the acquisition of large vessels from India the 'Utūb of Bahrain in the 1780's and after started to sail to the Indian ports to bring back India goods that were necessary for the daily use of their people and for export to the markets of Baghdad and Aleppo. These goods found their way to their markets partly via Basra and partly by way of Kuwait.¹ It is really interesting to

(cont.)

to the City of the Caliphs, pp. 115-123. Al-Rashīd in his Ta'rikh al-Kuwait, Vol. I, pp. 47-65, gives a detailed account of the present way of pearl fishing which has not changed through the ages.

¹See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 408. Manesty and Jones speak of those Indian goods as well as other European mercantile articles which were carried in the 'Utbi vessels to Bahrain.

"Those Articles, in the present Times (1789) are however first conveyed in a direct Manner from Surat to Bahreen and from thence to Zebarra and Catiffe. The Importations made from Surat to Bahreen for the Consumption of that Island, principally consist of small Quantities of Surat Blue and other Piece Goods, Guzerat Piece Goods and Chintz, Cambay, Chandlers, Shawls, Bamboos, Tin, Lead and Iron." Ibid.

notice that the owners of those vessels were merchants who carried with them goods for their own profit and it is this part of Surat goods that was transported to Baghḍād and Aleppo.¹ Besides there was the trade with Masqaṭ whence those vessels imported to Bahrain the Mucha Coffe, "partly intended for the Bussora Market", and a quantity of Sugar, pepper, spices of Bengal ghee and rice. Parts of these imports were in their turn exported to Baṣra.² On their way back from Baṣra, these vessels conveyed to Bahrain dates and grain that were necessary for the local population and other articles for the market of Surat.³ Though we are not in a position to give the exact amount of the imports at Bahrain during the 1780's, we are better able to do this at the end of the century where those imports "of Indian Goods" amounted annually to the value of ten lacks of rupees and we learn also that these were "balanced by an export of pearls to an equal amount".⁴

¹These Surat articles that were on demand at Baghḍād and Aleppo were described as "Sundry Gruff Articles of Commerce... Cotton, Yarn, Shawls, Surat Blue and other Piece Goods and Guzerat Piece Goods and Chintz". See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 408.

²Ibid.

³These other articles which were "proper for the Surat Market" were:

"Copper, Arsenic, Galls, Lamette, Ora Contarino, Venetian false Corals, and Bead of different Kinds, Cochineal and Saffron". see Ibid.

⁴See Malcolm's "Report" in Saldanha, Selections from the State Papers, p. 445.

The commerce of Zubāra.

The second centre of commerce in the 'Utbī States was Zubāra. This port by virtue of its geographical situation was bound to play its role in conveying part of the above mentioned 'Utbī cargoes from Bahrain to Eastern and Central Arabia. Before the occupation of Bahrain by the 'Utūb, Zubāra was the centre of the commercial activities of the Al-Khalīfa and the other 'Utbī families. There is no evidence of the amount or the kind of trade that was there before the 1780's. As a port on the pearl coast¹ it must have shared in the pearl fishery, but even that share seems to have been very small.² After the 'Utūb of Bahrain had bought their large vessels which traded with India, Zubāra served as a centre, together with al-Qaṭīf, for distributing those goods among the tribes of the Banī Khalīd and caravans carried the Mocha coffee and sundry goods to al-Dir'iyya, the Wahhābī capital and to many places in the Wahhābī domains.³ The occupation of Bahrain

¹The rich pearl coast extended from the neighbourhood of Qaṭīf to Rās al-Khayma on the Arabian coast of the Gulf.

²See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 408.

³See Ibid., pp. 405-408. These importations which were made at Zubāra were the same as those imported at Bahrain. Dates and grain were always on demand by the Arabs of the Banī Khalīd and the Wahhābīs. Ibid.

must have inevitably reduced the importance of Zubāra as regards the Āl-Khalīfa's commercial centre.

The commercial position at Kuwait.

The conquest of Bahrain on the other hand does not seem to have reduced the commercial importance of Kuwait. For the ruling 'Utbī family at this place was faced by the rivalry of the Banī Ka'b and other Arabs from the Persian littoral, a fact which made the Āl-Ṣabāḥ¹ determined to possess a strong fleet, and this they obtained. It has already been seen that Kuwait in the 1770's served as a centre for the Eng. East India Company's mail. In addition to this its geographical situation was advantageous to the town both as a sea port and as a station for the Aleppo and Baghdād caravans. With the establishment of the East India Company's Factory at Kuwait in 1793 for over two years, the town kept a position which equalled that of Bahrain.

Therefore Kuwait's commercial success seems to have been largely dependent on transit trade. With the growth of the 'Utbī trade as a result of the occupation of Bahrain, importations were made from Bahrain and Zubāra to Kuwait. These belonged to merchants, from Bahrain and Baṣra, who wanted to send those goods either to Aleppo or Baghdād by desert caravans, mainly to avoid the heavy duties levied on them

¹ See above, p. 189.

at Baṣra.¹ Dates and grain were imported from Baṣra for local consumption and that of the immediate vicinity.² It is worthwhile noticing too that the conveyance of property from Kuwait to Baḡhdād or Aleppo by the desert caravans was not attended with any consequent danger for the Shaikhs of the caravans were careful in selecting the rafiqs, and allotting the tribal shaikhs the necessary presents.³ Griffiths, writing in 1785-6, even adds that the tribal shaikhs did their best to keep those caravans running regularly without any molestation because this way they were sure of their reward.⁴

¹ See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p.409. Some of those importations from Bahrain, al-Qaṭīf, Zubāra and Masqaṭ were for "the local Consumption of Kuwait and its immediate Vicinity". These consisted of "small Quantities of Surat Blue Goods, Bengal Coarse white Goods, Bengal Soosies, Coffee, Sugar, Pepper & ca. Spices, Iron and Lead"... "and of more considerable Quantities of Bengal Piece Goods, Surat Piece Goods, Cotton yarn, Camby, Chandlers, Coffee, Pepper for the Bagdad and Aleppo merchants". Ibid. For the duties collected on those goods both at Baṣra and Baḡhdād, see above, Chapter III, pp.

² Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See Griffiths, op.cit., p. 351. It took the caravan, according to Manesty and Jones, about 80 days from Kuwait to Aleppo and about 30 to Baḡhdād. See Selections from State Papers, p. 409.

The trade of Kuwait does not seem to have benefitted much from the stay of the English Factory there. For the Captains of the English ships refused in the beginning to unload at Kuwait goods that were destined for Baṣra, and as it had already been pointed out in the previous chapter¹ Manesty did not insist on his orders being carried out that English vessels must not unload at Baṣra. The gain from the English stay was mostly political and not economic.²

Baṣra and Maṣqaṭ.

Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to say that the principal entrepôts for the trade of the Persian Gulf in this period were Maṣqaṭ and Baṣra. The first was described by Parsons as a large store for European and Indian goods³ which were conveyed to Baṣra and the 'Utbī ports by the Maṣqaṭ fleet and that of the 'Utūb. Baṣra was the centre of the English East India Company's trade with the Gulf during most of the years from 1763-1800.⁴

¹See above, p. 254.

²The Wahhābī threat to Kuwait was averted.

³See Parsons, op.cit., p. 207.

⁴The devastating plague of 1773 and the Persian siege and occupation of the town (1775-1779) had noticeable effect on its trade, but it soon recovered. Griffiths, visiting the town in 1785, wrote: "Bassorah is the emporium of this quarter of the World. It is here that richly laden ships, from every part of India pour in their valuable cargoes..." op.cit., p. 389.

Although we do not have any statistics of the trade of the Arabian side of the Gulf apart from those of the English trade with the area, that trade can only be described as prosperous. The Indian trade, according to Malcolm, to Arabia amounted to 40 Lacks of rupees of which 30 were with Basra and 10 went to Bahrain and its neighbourhood.¹

"These great Imports" says Malcolm, "are answered by exports from Bussora of Dates, the Native Product, by Pearls (received from Bahrain and other neighbouring Ports in exchange for grain) and Gold and Silver Lace brought from Europe by the Aleppo caravans and Copper from the mines of Diarbakr. Most of those exports pass through Muscat in their Way to India."²

Griffiths said that the

"returns are made chiefly in specie or jewels; and a certain number of highly bred Arab horses."³

Conclusion

The share of the 'Utūb in this prosperous trade was great for they participated in its conveyance both by sea and by caravan. They seem to have done all that they could to benefit from that flow of trade both by legal and illegal means. They did not hesitate to play

¹See Saldanha, Selections from State Papers, p. 445.

²Ibid.

³Griffiths, op.cit., p. 389.

their part in smuggling goods from Kuwait to the markets of Bagh-
dād and Aleppo to avoid the Baṣra customs. Their mercantile acti-
vities increased enormously after their conquest of Bahrain.

CONCLUSIONS.

CONCLUSIONS

Social position and domestic affairs

The 'Utūb were originally Arab families who came from al-Aflāj in Najd. Their first settlement was Kuwait where they lived under the protection of the Shaikh of the Banī Khālīd until 1752, but on the death of Sulaymān Āl-Ḥamīd, the Khālīdī Shaikh, they became independent and Ṣabāḥ b. Jābir, the ancestor of the present Shaikh of Kuwait, was chosen as the first known 'Utbī Shaikh. In 1766 the second 'Utbī settlement of Zubāra was established by the Āl-Khalīfa, the second most influential 'Utbī family. In 1782/3 Bahrain was conquered jointly by the Āl-Ṣabāḥ and Āl-Khalīfa which put the 'Utūb in a delicate political situation for Bahrain had always been coveted by its neighbours.

The government in both the ruling families was hereditary and no member of other 'Utbī families could become Shaikh. The tribal authority of the Shaikhs was strong but because of the commercial nature of the 'Utbī States, the Shaikhs were less despotic than might otherwise be expected. Besides the influence of the merchants in the 'Utbī towns, there was the power of the Qadī, who saw to the application of the Sharī'a law.

The boundaries of the 'Utbī territories cannot be ascertained except in the case of Bahrain Island. In Kuwait in the north Failaka

Island belonged to Kuwait. Yet the fact that both Kuwait and Zubāra grew up in unoccupied desert territory made it possible for the 'Utūb to have free exits by land and sea. In Qaṭar, for example, the Āl-Jalāhima settled at Khor Ḥasan to the north of Zubāra, and later, in the early 19th century, they settled at al-Dammām, near al-Qaṭīf, without any opposition. However, all the 'Utūb territory except Bahraīn and the neighbouring islands was within the Khālīdī sphere of influence.

The 'Utūb did not turn to piracy like other Arabian maritime tribes. The sole exception is Raḥma b. Jābir, of the Āl-Jalāhima section, and even in his case, he only turned pirate after he had been refused by the Āl-Khālīfa a proper share in the pearl trade of Zubāra and the booty from the conquest of Bahraīn.

In spite of the fact that circumstances forced the Āl-Khālīfa to leave Kuwait in the 1760's and make their homes in the south, yet cordial relations existed between the two 'Utūb ruling families of the Āl-Ṣabāḥ and Āl-Khālīfa. Two examples bear witness to this, the first is that the 'Utūb of the north joined their cousins in fighting against Shaikh Nāṣir of Abū Shahr in the 1770's and in conquering Bahraīn in 1782/3. The second is that the Āl-Khālīfa at Bahraīn and Zubāra sent their merchandise to Kuwait rather than to Baḡra on its way to Aleppo.

There is evidence that the 'Utbi states towards the end of the eighteenth century were united to form one political entity with Shaikh 'Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāh at its head. This can be explained by the Arab custom which gives power to the eldest. Thus 'Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāh, eldest among the 'Utbi rulers, was their chief and his authority, according to Malcolm, extended over all the 'Utbi territories, both north and south.

Foreign affairs.

As regards the 'Utbi relations with other powers which had interests in Eastern Arabia, it is clear that the 'Utūb did their best to keep on good terms with them all. Our study reveals the following facts about those powers in the second half of the eighteenth century. First there was no Ottoman ruler in Eastern Arabia, in fact Ottoman rule was not even nominally acknowledged. Their attempts in 1786 through the campaign of Thuwaynī and, in 1798 through 'Alī Pasha's expedition against the Wahhābīs, to restore their lost position in al-Ḥasā were unsuccessful. At Kuwait, the nearest point of the 'Utbi domains to the Ottoman Mutasallimīyya of Baṣra, the Shaikh was not under any form of Ottoman control. The aim of 'Utbi external policy was to keep friendly relations with all the forces working in the Gulf, and to avoid direct clashes with them.

Thus, though the 'Utūb of Kuwait appeared to be on the side of the Pasha of Baghdād in the early stages of the Persian siege of Baṣra in 1775, when the Persian occupation became almost certain, the 'Utūb's policy was reversed and aid sent to the besieging army. In spite of this, Persian influence, expressed through the medium of the Arab Shaikhs of the Persian littoral, was not felt in Eastern Arabia during the period under consideration. In fact, the 'Utūb eradicated Persian influence from its nearest centre to the Arabian littoral, by occupying Bahrain. Because Kuwait was not a dependency of Baṣra the Persian occupation of Baṣra (1775-1779) did not affect Kuwait.

There were friendly relations between the 'Utūb and two European nations, the Dutch and the English. Relations with the Dutch were the outcome of their establishment at Khārij Island which lies in the north eastern corner of the Persian Gulf, almost opposite to Kuwait. Stronger and closer relations existed between the 'Utūb and the English. The recorded history of these relations starts in 1775 at the time when the Persians were besieging Baṣra. The intercepting of French emissaries and dispatches in the Persian Gulf, the earliest example of which is that of Captain Borel de Bourg in 1778, and the choice of Kuwait in 1793 as a place of refuge for the Baṣra Factory for about two and a half year, reflect the accomodating disposition of the Shāikh towards the English. The aid which the Factory apparently gave to Kuwait in

repelling the Wahhābī aggressors during its stay there is another testimony to the existence of these strong and friendly relations.

The hostile 'Utbi attitude towards the Wahhābīs was dictated by their allegiance to their benefactors, the Banī Khālīd, who were the Wahhābīs' bitter enemies. So, as long as the Banī Khālīd were able to withstand the Wahhābīs, the 'Utūb, in their turn, escaped Wahhābī domination. Once the Khālīdī power was annihilated by the Wahhābīs in 1795, the 'Utūb gradually came under Wahhābī dominance.

Commercial Status.

Turning finally to commercial enterprise, we find that the 'Utūb were here most successful. They made use of their geographical position to enrich themselves by trade, carried by sea and desert. Our study reveals clearly for the first time that the Eastern Arabian coast shared the Indian and European trade. The Banī Khālīd's rule was favourable to trade, but the 'Utūb were able to surpass the Banī Khālīd by becoming themselves the traders of Eastern Arabia. Their sea fleet was the strongest in the Gulf and in fewer than sixteen years after the establishment of Zubāra in 1766 they defied all the Arab maritime forces in the Gulf. Thus not the ships of Abū Shahr, nor Bandar Rīq, nor the Banī Ka'b could compete with them. Their fleet was next in importance to that of Masqat. Their large ships made non-stop journeys from the Persian Gulf to India.

The 'Utūb in the second half of the eighteenth century did not see any great threat from the European trading nations. On the contrary, the Arab traders were the monopolisers of the sea-freight in the Gulf. But for this fact, and the satisfactory working of the desert caravan routes, the 'Utūb could not have achieved success, nor could their early settlements at Kuwait and Zubārah have flourished for they were built on the bare desert. The 'Utūb made great use of these two channels along which trade passed between Asia and Europe, on one hand, and the internal trade of Arabia on the other.

The occupation of Bahrain in 1782/3 was of great importance to the 'Utūb trade because it put in their possession the richest pearl producing area and a centre of substantial commercial activity. The merit of the 'Utūb here lies in the fact that they knew how to use their newly conquered island.

Our study of the 'Utūb commercial activities makes it apparent that the cargoes carried by Arab vessels of Musqat and 'Utūb ports were as large or more probably larger than those carried by European vessels. Although we do not know the actual amount of trade, yet we have the report of Manesty and Jones about it. This leaves no doubt that it was enormous. The Arab boats, of which the 'Utūb's fleet was the greatest, monopolised the trade of the Gulf during most of the last fifty years of the eighteenth century.

Finally, we see that the second half of the eighteenth century was the time when the foundations of the present ruling houses of the Āl-Ṣabāḥ and the Āl-Khalīfa were laid. These were steadily protected by the wisdom and perseverance of Shaikh ‘Abd Allāh Āl-Ṣabāḥ, the second ‘Utbi ruler of Kuwait and Ahmad Āl-Khalīfa of Zubāra.

On the sea these two rulers and their followers proved to be invincible, but on land their position was weaker. They were sure that their resistance to the Wahhābīs could not last too long after the defeat of the Banī Khālīd and events proved this to be the case.

APPENDIX

THE AFFAIR OF M. BOREL DE BOURG.¹

In consequence of intelligence received from Grain of the arrival there of a French Officer having in charge a packet of importance for Pondicherry, it was determined by your Honours Factors at Bussora to endeavour to get possession of it, a measure which appeared to them the more necessary from an unguarded declaration made at Grain by the officer in question that war was absolutely declared between France and England.

I was in consequence, ordered immediately to repair to Grain to use my utmost endeavours towards getting possession not only of the packet but of the bearer also. I departed from Bussora the 1st at night on board your Honours Cruizer the Eagle; and finding the wind unfavourable and a great probability of being detained so long perhaps as to afford an opportunity to the bearer of the packet to escape to Muscat, I procured a boat in the river which I was convinced would convey me to Grain by some days sooner than I could expect to reach it in the Eagle whose presence too I judged might alarm the Prey I had in view and give him an opportunity, if not of avoiding

¹Abraham to the C. of D., Grain, 7.xi, 1778, F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 17.

me entirely, at least of destroying his packet. I therefore left the Eagle in the river, and in about twenty hours arrived at Grain at 10 o'clock at night; I immediately proceeded to the Sheik and having gained him to my interest so far as not to interfere in the business I had in hand, I proceeded directly to the house where the messenger lodged, and informed him who I was, seized him together with his packet, and conveyed him instantly on board my boat - this was all effected without the least disturbance.

I arrived on board the Eagle in about twelve hours, where having examined the packet, I find it contains sundry advices in cypher from Monsieur de Sartine, Minister for the Marine Department in France directed to Monsieur de Bellecombe, Commander-in-Chief at Pondicherry, and to Monsieur de Briancourt, the French consul at Surat, together with a declaration of War between France and England, and sundry private letters from all which I can only gather that the bearer of the packet is Captain Borel du Bourgo that the advices he bears are of the utmost consequence, and that he is directed to fix a Resident at Muscat in order to convey all French packets with the utmost expedition by way of Aleppo, and that, the King of France having acknowledged the Independency of the United States of America, all vessels belonging to them are to be received into the port belonging to the King of France and to be paid the same honors as are

paid to the United States of Holland. From a Journal of Captain du Bourg, I find he left Marseilles the 14 of August, and arrived here from Aleppo in 21 days.

Before I left Bussora, it was determined should I find the packet in question to be of any consequence immediately to despatch it to India by the Eagle. The Declaration of War alone therefore I have judged to be of sufficient consequence to warrant her despatch. I have in consequence ordered Captain Sheriff, the Commander, immediately to proceed to Bombay without touching at Bushire or Muscat and to deliver Monsieur du Bourg together with his packet to the Honorable the Governor and Council.

A letter from William Digges Latouche (Basra Fact.) to Mr. Manesty
(Basra Fact.)¹

There are several other Powers [besides the Banī Ka'b] with whom it is the Company's Interest to continue on friendly Terms - with the Bunderick, the Grain People, and other Tribes of Arabs on the Persian and Arabian Coasts, who have it in their Power to annoy our Trade - with the Shaikhs of the Montificks, of the Benechalids, of the Anisas, of the Gheesaals for the Security of the Company's Dispatches, of the English Trade, and of English Travellers passing between Bussora, Aleppo and Baghdad.

Timely Presents are often of great Use in preserving this good Understanding. Those on the changes of the Mussalems here are fixed, and should not be increased though Attempts under various Pretences haven been, and will be probably made for that Purpose. The Others must be regulated by your own Prudence and according to Circumstances - they should be made with Caution. If they are too frequent and too large they will increase Expectations of future Ones. If on the other hand they do not in some Measure answer the Expectation of the Person to whom they are given, the giving them will be worse than not giving any. They are too often in this country considered as a kind of Tribute and therefore as a Right. When I have found this to be the Case,

¹F.R.P.P.G., Vol. 18, dispatch No. 1299.

I have deferred them until they appeared as made from my own Inclination, and rather as a Return for Favours received, than as given through for or in Expectation of future Services.

Basra 6th Nov. 1784

Signed Latouche

The Capture of Bahrain by the 'Utūb

A Letter from Mr. Latouche (Basra Resid.) to the Court of Dir., London, dated 4th Nov.. 1782.¹

The Zebara, and the Grain People, have lately taken and plundered Bahreen, and have likewise seized at the Entrance of this River, several Boats belonging to Bushire and Bunderick. Shaikh Nassir of Bushire, in return is collecting a Marine, as well as a Military Force, at Bushire, Bunderick, and other Persian Ports - he gives out that he intends to revenge these Hostilities by attacking Zebarra, and has wrote for a Supply of Money to Aly Morat Caum at Isphahan. Notwithstanding this show of Vigor, however, it is said, that he has lately sent to Grain to request a Peace, but that the Shaikh had refused to grant it, unless Shaikh Nassir pays him half the Revenues of Bahreen, and a large Annual Tribute also for Bushire.

It is not many years since Grain, was obliged to pay a large tribute to the Chaub, and that the name of Zebarra, was scarcely known. On the Persians attacking Bussora, one of the Shaiks of Grain, retired to Zebarra, with many of the principal People. Some of the Bussora Merchants also retired thither. A great Part of the Pearl and India

¹F.R.P.P.G., Vol.17, dispatch No.1230.

Trade, by this means entered there, and at Grain, during the Time that the Persians were in possession of Bussora, and those Places have increased so much in Strength and Consequence, that they have for some time past set the Chaub at defiance, have gained very considerable Advantages against him, and now under no Apprehensions from the Force, which Shaik Nassir threatens to collect against them.

Bagra 4th Nov. 1782

Signed Latouche

Translate of a Letter from the Resident to
Abdulla ibn Subbah Shaik of Grain dated the
17th April 1789¹

I am induced by the Consideration of the Friendship which has long subsisted between us, to write to You in the present Hour.

I have lately paid a Visit to the Bacha of Bagdat in his Camp. In the Course of our Conversations the Bacha mentioned Your Name. He said that an ancient Friendship had subsisted between the People of Grain and of Bussora, he expressed great Surprise & anger at Your Conduct in giving Protection to People, who had been in Rebellion against him, and who had fled to avoid the Punishment due to their Guilt, he said that unless You delivered them up to him, or ordered them to quit the Town of Grain, he should consider You, as his Enemy, and proceed on an Expedition against You. He said that he would march with his Army to Grain and order his Fleet, to repair thither to co-operate with it. He said that he would write a letter to the Governor of Bombay, requesting the early Assistance of a Marine force and he desired that I would also write a Letter to the Governor of Bombay to the same Purport.

Friendship has urged me thus to make known to you the Sentiments of the Bacha of Bagdat.

¹This letter and the following one come from Volume 18 of the Factory Records, Persia and Persian Gulf. Their serial number in that volume is 1532.

Translate of a Letter from Shaik Abdulla

ibn Subbah to the Resident received the

30th April 1789.

After Compliments,

I have received Your Letter and understand its Contents. You mention that a friendship has always subsisted between the English and myself, I pray God, it may continue so to the End of time.

I am obliged to You for the Information You have given me in Regard to the Intentions of Soliman Bacha, whom I am sorry to observe is displeased at my Conduct towards Mustapha Aga.

The Town of Grain belongs to the Bacha, the Inhabitants of it are his Servants but You Yourself thank God are well enough acquainted with our Customs, to know, that if any Person whatsoever falls upon Us for Protection we cannot refuse to afford it to him and that after having afforded it, it is the extreme of Infamy to desert him or to deliver him into the hands of his Enemies.

You know the Bacha knows, the whole World knows that I receive no Advantage from Mustapha Aga's Residence at Grain but to turn him out is wrong, to deliver him up is Infamy.

I depend upon Your Friendship to stop this Matter to the Bacha in its proper Light.

May Your Years be long and happy

Bussora the 29th June 1789.

True Translates

(signed) Samuel Manesty

Translation of a contract with the Sheick Suliman for an
 escort of Arabs across the Great Desert from Aleppo
¹
 to Bassora.

"THIS writing is to certify, that we the under-written of the tribe of Arabs Nigadi, have for our own free will agreed to accompany and conduct the bearer of this contract, Colonel Capper, an Englishman, and those of his company: and that we oblige ourselves to take with us seventy guards of the tribes of Arabs Nigadi, and Agalli and Benni Khaled, who are all to be armed with muskets; we the under-written are included in the number, excepting Sheick Haggy Suliman Eben Adeyah. - And we do promise also to carry with us nine refeeks with their muskets, two of whom of the two different tribes called Edgelass, two of the two tribes Il Fedaan, one of the tribe of Welled Aly, one of the tribe of Benni Waheb, one of the tribe of Lacruti, one of the tribe of Baigee, and one of the tribe of Sarhaani, making in all nine refeeks, as above-mentioned.

AND it is agreed, that we the underwritten are to bring with us our own provisions, and the provisions for the guards and refeeks above-mentioned, and the same provisions are to be loaded upon our camels, the hire of which camels is to be paid by us; and we likewise agree to buy ourselves thirteen rotolas of gunpowder, and

¹Capper, Observations on the Passage to India, pp. 55-58.

twenty-six rotolas of balls, the cost of all the aforesaid things are to be paid by us, and not by Colonel Capper.

AND we also oblige ourselves to provide for him and his people nineteen camels, for the use of himself and his company, to carry their tents and baggage, water and provisions for themselves and for their horses, besides those nineteen camels above-mentioned; we also oblige ourselves to provide them two other strong camels to carry the mohafa, in order that they may change very day one camel, and to provide a person to lead the camel that carries the mohafa from Aleppo to Graine, and moreover we will appoint him a person to take care of his horses.

WE the underwritten do promise Colonel Capper, by our own free will and consent, and oblige ourselves to pay all kafars and giawayez (that is to say duties) to all the Arabs, and to the Sheick Tamur, the Sheick Tiveini, and all the Sheicks of the tribe of Beni Khaled, and to all other tribes of Arabs whatever; and we make ourselves responsible for all what is above-written, and further when we approach the tribe of Arabs called Il Aslam, and Shammar and any other tribes, we oblige ourselves to take from them a refeek to walk with us till we have passed their confines.

WE agree to carry no goods, or even letters from any other person or persons, excepting the goods from Khwaja Rubens, which are

thirty-one loads, for the hire of the said goods from Khwaja Rubens we have received in full, that is, the hire, the inamalumi, the re-seeks, the giawayez, figmaniah, and all other expences to Graine; we have received of him in full, according to the receipt in the hands of the said Khwaja Rubens: moreover we have agreed with our free will to provide for the said thirty-one loads, for every load two camels, in order to keep up with the above-mentioned Colonel Capper, and never separate from his company till our arrival at Graine; and we also oblige ourselves to pay the dolleels (scouts) the maadeb, the birakdar, and the chaous (officers of the guards) all the said persons we are to pay ourselves, and not Colonel Capper. We have agreed also with our free will, with the said Colonel Capper, to carry him and his company safe in thirty-six days to Graine, from the day we depart from the village of Nayreb; but in case the said Colonel Capper should be desirous of staying to rest a day or more the said delay is not to be reckoned in the aforesaid thirty-six days. And we the underwritten also engage three days before our arrival at Graine, to dispatch a messenger from our parts with Colonel Capper's letter to the agent of the British nation in Graine. And by this instrument it is stipulated and agreed between the said Colonel Capper and us the underwritten persons, that he pays us for all the services above-mentioned dollars nine hundred forty-one and one fourth in Aleppo,


which sum we have received in full; besides which the said Colonel Capper does oblige himself to give us on the road dollars five hundred; and moreover at our safe arrival at Graine, on our having fulfilled this our agreement with him, he the said Colonel Capper obliges himself to pay us dollars eight hundred rumi, and in case we should fail in performing any part of our agreement with him, we then are to forfeit the last-mentioned eight hundred dollars, and all we the underwritten are responsible one for the other, for the performance of the promises as above agreed between the contracting parties. In witness whereof, we have signed with our fingers this the sixteenth day of the moon called Shewal, in the year of the Hegina, one thousand one hundred and ninety-two.

Suliman Ebben Adeyah - Mohamed il Bisshir - Ally Ebben
Faddil - Haggy Isa Ebben Hameidan - Nasseh Ebn Resheidan - Suliman
Ebben Gaddib - Mohamed Ebn Nidghem - Suliman Ebben Naaisay.


The witnesses to the agreement are.

Il Haggi Omar Ulleed - Ismael Estracy - Il Haggi Mahomed
Firous - Il Haggi Ibrahim Ulbed - Il Haggi Mahomed Emin il Takrity -
Il Haggi Fathu Ebn il Haggi Usuph Maadaraloy - Ismael Ebben Achmed
Tecrity.


Genealogical Table of the
Āl-Ṣabāḥ, rulers of Kuwait
in the 18th and early 19th centuries




Genealogical Table of the Āl-Khalīfa
rulers of Zubāra and Bahrain
in the 18th Century



Genealogical Table of the
Āl-Su'ūd rulers of
Su'ūdī Arabia



Geneology of the Banī Khālīd Shaikhs
in the 17th and 18th centuries



BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE CHIEF

WORKS CITED IN THE THESIS

A. India Office Records, Factory Records Persia and the Persian Gulf.

The following volumes have been consulted:

- Vol. 14 (1703 - 1727)
- Vol. 15 (1729 - 1752)
- Vol. 16 (1753 - 1773)
- Vol. 17 (1774 - 1783)
- Vol. 18 (1784 - 1792)
- Vol. 19 (1792 - 1799)
- Vol. 21 (Misc. 1764 - 1799)
- Vol. 23 (1798 - 1801)

B. Arabic and European books.

An Account of the Monies, Weights, and Measures in General Use in Persia, Arabia, East India and China. London, 1789.

Admiralty, War Office, Intelligence Division,

A Handbook of Arabia, Vol. I, London, May 1916.
Vol. II, London, May 1917.

Alūsī, Muḥmūd Shukrī al-,

Ta'rīkh Na'id. Edited with notes by Muḥammad Bahjat al-Atharī,
Cairo, 1343/1924.

'Aqqād, Salāḥ al-,

Le Premier eta Sa'ūdite (1744-1813) Essai sur son Histoire
Politique et Religieuse. Thèse pour Le Doctorat d'Etat,
Université de Paris, Faculté de Lettres, 1956.

Ashkenazi, T.,

"The Anazah" Tribes", Southwestern Journal of Anthropology,
New Mexico, 1948, 222-39.

'Azzawī, 'Abbaa al-,

Ta'rikh al-'Irāq bayn Ihtilālayn, Vol. 6, Baghdād, 1373/1954.

'Asha'ir al-'Irāq, Vol. I, Baghdād, 1365/1947.
Vol. II, Baghdād, 1366/1948.

Badger, G.P.,

History of the Imams and Seyyids of 'Omān by Salīl ibn Razīk,
from A.D. 661-1856, translated from the original
Arabic and edited with notes, appendices and in-
troduction containing the history down to 1870.
Hakluyt Society, No. 43, London, 1871.

Bassām, Muḥammad al-,

Al-Durar al-Mafakhir fī Akbār al-'Arab al-Awakhir, British Museum
M.S. Add. 7358.

Batrik, Abdel Ḥamid, M. El-,

Turkish and Egyptian Rule in Arabia, (1810-1841), Ph. D. Thesis,
London University, 1947.

Brockelmann, Carl,

Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, Erster Band, Leiden, 1943.
Zweiter Band, Leiden, 1944.

Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, Erster Supplementband, Leiden, 1937.
Zweiter Supplementband, Leiden, 1938.
Dritter Supplementband, Leiden, 1942.

Brucks, Captain George Barnes,

"Memoir descriptive of the Navigation of the Gulf of Persia; with
brief notices of the manners, customs, religion, commerce, and re-
sources of the people inhabiting its shores and islands." in Bombay
Selections, Vol. XXIV. Bombay, 1856.

Brydges, Harford Jones,

An Account of the Transactions of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia in the Years 1810-1811, to which is appended a brief History of the Wahaby, Two Vols. London, 1834.

Buckingham, J.S.,

Travels in Assyria, Media, and Persia, including a Journey from Bagdad by Mount Zagros, to Hamadan, the Ancient Ecbatana, researches in Ispahan and the Ruins of Persepolis, and Journey from thence by Shiraz, Bushire, Bahrein, Ormuz, and Muscat. Narrative of an Expedition against the Pirates of the Persian Gulf, with Illustrations of the Voyage of Nearchus, and Passage by the Arabian Sea to Bombay. London, 1829.

Burckhardt, John Lewis,

Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, London, 1830.

Travels in Syria and the Holy Land, London, 1822.

Travels in Nubia, Second edit., London, 1822.

Capper, James

Observations on the Passage to India, through Egypt and across the Great Desert: with occasional Remarks on the Adjacent Countries, and also sketches of the different Routes, London, 1784.

Carmichael, J.

"A Narrative of a Journey from Aleppo to Basra in 1751" published in Carruthers' The Desert Route to India etc. Hakluyt Society, Second Series No. LXIII, London, 1929.

Carruthers, Douglas,

The Desert Route to India, being the Journals of Four Travellers by the Great Desert Caravan Route between Aleppo and Basra, 1745-1751. Hakluyt Society, No. LXIII, London, 1929.

Corancez, L.A.,

Histoire des Wahabis depuis leur origine jusqu'a la fin de 1809. Paris, 1810.

Curzon, G. N.,

Persia and the Persian Question, Two vols, London, 1938.

Danvers, F.C.,

Report on the India Office Records Relating to Persia and the Persian Gulf. London. N.D.

Dayrānī, Ibrāhīm b. Khalīl al-,

Kitāb Miṣbāḥ al-Sarī wa Muḥat al-Qārī, Bayrūt, 1272/1855.

Dickson, H. R. P.,

The Arab of the Desert, a Glimpse into Bedawin Life in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. London, 1949.

Kuwait and her Neighbours, London, 1956.

Dujaylī, Kāzīm al-,

"Al-Shaikh 'Uthmān b. Saḥād al-Baṣrī" in Lughat al-'Arāb, III, 180-186. Baghdad, 1331/1913.

Encyclopaedia of Islam, I and II

Farouqhy, 'Abbās,

The Bahrain Islands, New York, 1951.

Furber, Holden,

"The Overland Route to India in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", Journal of Indian History, Vol. XXIX, Part II, August 1951, pp. 106-133.

John Company at Work, a study of European Expansion in India in the late eighteenth century, Cambridge, U.S.A. Harvard Univ. Press, 1948.

Griffiths, J.

Travels in Europe, Asia Minor and Arabia, London, 1805.

Hamza, Fuād,

Qalb Jazīrat al-'Arāb. Cairo, 1352/1933.

Ḥaydarī, Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ b. Saḥḥat Allāh b. Muḥammad As'ad al-,

'Unwān al-Majd fī Bayān Ahwāl Baghdād wa Baṣra wa Majd.

British Museum MS. Or. 7567.

Hoskins, H.L.

"The Overland Route to India," in History the Quarterly Journal
of the Historical Society, IX, April 1924 -
January 1925, pp. 302-318.

Ḥulwānī, Amīn b. Ḥasan al-,

Mukhtaṣar Ta'rīkh al-Shaikh 'Uthmān b. Saḥed al-Baṣrī al-Musammā

Bi Maṭālī' al-Su'ūd Bi Tayyib Akhbār al-ḥālī Dawūd, Bombay, 1304/1886.

Ibn Bishr, 'Uthmān b. 'Abd Allāh,

Kitāb 'Unwān al-Majd fī Ta'rīkh Majd, Makka, 1349/1930. The British
Museum MS is Or. 7718.

Ibn Durayd, Abū Bekr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan,

Kitāb al-Ishtiqāq, Cairo, 1378/1958.

Ibn Ghannām, Ḥusayn,

Kitāb Rawdat al-Afkār Wal-Afhām Li Murtād ḥāl al-Imām Wa Ta'dād

Ghazwat Dhawī al-Islām. Vol. I.

Kitāb al-Ghazwat al-Bayāniyya wal-Futūḥāt al-Rabbāniyya wa Dhikr

al-Sabab Alladhī ḥamal 'alā dhalik, Vol. II, Bombay, 1919.

The British Museum MSS are: Add 23,344-5 and
Add. 19,799; 19,800.

Ibn Manẓūr, Jamāl al-Dīn,

Lisān al-'Arab, Vol. I, Bayrūt, 1374/1955.

Ibn Razīq, Ḥamayd b. Muḥammad,

Al-Fath al-Mubīn al-Mubarrhin Sīrat al-Sādāt al-Bū-Sa'īdiyyīn,
Cambridge Univ. Library MS. Add. 2892.

Al-Sīra al-Jaliyya al-Musammāt Sa'd al-Su'ūs al-Bū-Sa'īdiyya,
Cambridge Univ. Library MS. Add. 2893.

Sahīfat al-Qaṭṭāniyya, Rhodes House, Oxford Univ. MS. Afr. 3.2.

Ibn Sanad, 'Uthmān,

Maṭālī' al-Su'ūd Bi-Tayyib Akhbār al-Wālī Dawūd. Ser. Qu. 1338.
This manuscript is now kept in the Library of
Tübingen University, Germany.

Saba'ik al-'Asjad fī Akhbār Ahmad Najī Riza al-'As'ad, Bombay,
1315/1897. British Museum MS. Or. 7565.

Irwin, Eyles,

A series of Adventures in the course of a Voyage up the Red Sea,
on the Coast of Arabia and Egypt; And of a Route through the
Desart of Thebais, in the Year 1777. With a Supplement of a
Voyage from Venice to Latichean; and of a Route through the De-
sarts of Arabia, by Aleppo, Bagdad, and the Tygris, to Busrah,
in the Years 1780 and 1781. Two Vols. London, 1787.

Ives, Edward,

A Voyage from England to India, in the Year 1753, and an Historical
Narrative of the Operations of the Squadron and Army in India, un-
der the Command of Vice-Admiral Watson, and Colonel Clive, in the
Years 1755, 1756, 1757; including a Correspondence between the Ad-
miral and the Nabob Serajah Dowlah. interspersed with some inter-
esting Passages relating to the Manners, Customs &c. of several
Nations in Indostan. Also, A Journey from Persia to England, by an
Unusual Route with an Appendix, containing an Account of Diseases
prevalent in Admiral Watson's Squadron. A Description of Most of
the Trees, Shrubs and Plants, of India, with their real, or supposed
medical Virtues: Also a copy of a Letter written by a late ingen-
ious Physician, on the Disorders incidental to Europeans at Gombroon
in the Gulph of Persia, London, 1773.

Jenour, Captain Matthew,

The Route to India through France, Germany, Hungary, Turkey, Natolia, Syria, and the Desart of Arabia, delineated in a clear concise Manner, with Distances, Time, Mode and Expence of Travelling. London, 1791.

Jones, Lieutenant J. Felix,

"Extracts from a Report on the Harbour of Grane (or Koweit), and the Island of Phœleechi, in the Persian Gulf." Prepared in November 1839." in Bombay Selections, XXIV, Bombay, 1856.

X Kahhāla, 'Umar Riḍā,

Mu'jam Qabā'il al-'Arab, Three Vols. Damascus, 1368/1949.

Karmalī, Anistās Marī al-,

"Al-Kuwait" in Al-Mashriq al-Bayrūtīyya, X, Bayrūt, 1904.

X Kelly, J. B.,

"The Persian Claim to Bahrain" in International Affairs, Vol. 33, No. I, London, 1957.

British Policy in the Persian Gulf (1813-1843) Thesis, London University Library, 1956.

Kemball, Lieutenant A. B.,

"Observations on the Past Policy of the British Government towards the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf." in Bombay Selections, XXIV. Bombay, 1856.

"Memoranda on the Resources, Localities, and Relations of the Tribes inhabiting the Arabian Shores of the Persian Gulf." in Bombay Selections, XXIV, Bombay, 1856.

Lam' al-Shihāb fī Sīrat Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, British Museum MS. add. 23, 346.

Lockhart, L.,

Nadir Shah, a critical Study Based Mainly upon Contemporary Sources,
London, 1938.

Longrigg, S. H.

Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, Oxford, 1925.

Lorimer, J. G.,

Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Oman and Central Arabia, Two Vols.
Calcutta, 1915.

Low, Charles Rathbone,

History of the Indian Navy (1613-1862) Vols. 1 & 2, London, 1877.

Malcolm, John,

The History of Persia from the most Early Period to the Present Time.
Two Vols. 1st edition, London, 1815.

Manṣūr, Shaikh,

History of Seyd Said, Sultan of Muscat together with an account
of the countries and People on the Shores of the Persian Gulf
particularly of the Wahabees. London, 1819.

Miles, Colonel S. B.,

The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, Two Vols. London, 1919.

Murray, H.,

Historical Account of Discoveries and Travels in Asia from the
Earliest Ages to the Present Time. Vol. III, Edinburgh, 1820.

Musil, Alois,

Northern Negd, A Topographical Itinerary, New York, 1928.

Nabḥānī, Muḥammad b. Khalīfa al-,

Al-Tuḥfa al-Nabḥāniyya fī Ta'rīkh al-Jazīra al-'Arabiyya, in twelve
Volumes.

Vol. I Ta'rīkh al-Bahrain, Cairo, 1342/1923.

Vol. IX Al-Baḡra, Cairo, 1342/1923.

Vol. X Al-Muntafiq, Cairo, 1344/1925.

Vol. XII. Al-Kuwait, Cairo, 1368/1949.

Niebuhr, E. G.,

The Life of Carsten Niebuhr, the Oriental traveller, with an appendix by J. D. Michaelis. Translated from the German by Professor Robinson. Edinburgh, 1836.

Niebuhr, Carsten,

Description de l'Arabie, faite sur des observations propres et des avis recueillis dans les Lieux memes, Amsterdam, 1774.

Voyage en Arabie en d'autres Pays circonvoisins, Amsterdam, Tome Premier 1776, Tome Deuxieme, 1780.

Olivier, G.A.,

Voyage dans l'Empire Ottoman et la Perse. 3 Vols., Paris, 1801.

Oppenheim, M. F. von,

Die Beduinen unter mitbearbeitung von Erich Bräunlich und Warner Gaskel, Band I, Leipzig 1939; Band II, Leipzig, 1943; Band III, Wiesbaden, 1952.

Vom Mittelmeer zum Persischen Golf, Durch den Hauran die

Syrische Wüste and Mesopotamien. Erster Band, Berlin, 1899; Zweiter Band, Berlin, 1900.

Parsons, Abraham,

Travels in Asia and Africa including a Journey from Scanderoon to Aleppo, and over the Desert to Bagdad and Bussora; A Voyage from Bussora to Bombay, and along the Western coast of India; A Voyage from Bombay to Mocha and Suez in the Red Sea; and a Journey from Suez to Cairo and Rosetta, in Egypt, London, 1808.

Philby, H. St. John,

Saudi Arabia, London, 1955.

Plaisted, Bartholomew,

"Narrative of a Journey from Basra to Aleppo in 1750", published in Carruthers' The Desert Route to India etc., Hakluyt Society, London, 1929.

Qinā'ī, Yūsuf b. 'Isā al-,

Ṣafahāt min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, Second edit., Damascus, 1374/1954.

Rashīd, 'Abd al-'Azīz al-,

Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, in Two Vols. Baghdād, 1344/1936.²

Rentz, G.S.,

Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (1703/4 -1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia. Dissertation submitted for the degree of Ph.D., in History, California University 1948 (microfilm copy).

Rīḥānī, Amīn al-,

Mulūk al-'Arab, Two Vols. Bayrūt, 1924-1925.

Ta'rīkh Najd al-Ḥadīth wa Mulḥaqātuhū, Bayrūt, 1928.

Sadlier, Captain G. Foster,

Diary of a Journey across Arabia from el Khatif in the Persian Gulf, to Yanbo in the Red Sea, during the year 1819., Bombay, 1866.

Saldanha, J. A.,

Selections from State Papers, Bombay regarding The East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a summary of Events, 1600-1800. Calcutta, 1908.

Salīmī, Nūr al-Dīn 'Abd Allāh b. Humayd al-,

Tuhfat al-A'yān Bisīrat Ahl 'Umān,
Vol. I, 2nd edition, Cairo, 1350/1931.
Vol. II, 1st edition, Cairo, 1347/1928.

Seetzen, Dr.

"Letters to Baron von Zach" in Monatliche Correspondenz, XI and XII, July-December, 1805, pp. 234-241.

Shamlān, Saif Marzūq al-,

Min Ta'rīkh al-Kuwait, Cairo 1378/1959.

Stocqueler, J.H.

Fifteen Months Pilgrimage through untrodden tracts of Khuzistan and Persia in a journey from India to England through parts of Turkish Arabia, Persia, Armenia, Russia, and Germany, performed in the years 1831 and 1832. Two Vols. London, 1832.

Sykes, P.,

A History of Persia, in two vols. London, 1921.

Taylor, John,

Considerations on the Practicability and Advantages of a more speedy Communication between Great Britain and her Possessions in India; with the Outline of a Plan for the more ready Conveyance of Intelligence over-land by the Way of Suez; and an Appendix, containing Instructions for Travellers to India, by different Routes, in Europe, as well as Asia. London, 1795.

Taylor, Captain Robert,

"Extracts from Brief Notes, containing historical and other Information connected with the Province of Oman; Muskat and the adjoining country; the Islands of Bahrein, Ormus, Kishm, and Karrack; and other Ports and Places in the Persian Gulf. Prepared in the year 1818" in Bombay Selections, XXIV, Bombay, 1856.

'Umari, Yasīn b. Khayr Allāh al-Khaṭīb al-,

Al-Durr al-Maknūn fī M^oathir al-Mādiya min al-Qurūn.
British Museum MSS. Add. 23312, 23313.

Wahba, Ḥafīz,

Jazīrat al-'Arab fī al-Qarn al-Ishrīn, Cairo, 1935.

Warden, Francis,

"Extracts from Brief Notes relative to the Rise and Progress of the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf - Prepared in August 1819." in Bombay Selections, XXIV, Bombay, 1856.

"Historical Sketch of the Rise and Progress of the Government of Muskat; commencing with the year 1694-95, and continued to the year 1819." in Bombay Selections, XXIV, Bombay, 1856.

"Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs (Bahrein) from the year 1716 to the year 1817." in Bombay Selections, XXIV, Bombay, 1856.

"Historical Sketch of the Wahabee Tribe of Arabs, from the year 1795 to the year 1818." in Bombay Selections, XXIV, Bombay, 1856.

"Sketch of the Proceedings (from 1809 to 1818) of Rahmah bin Jaubir, Chief of Khor Hassan". in Bombay Selections, XXIV, Bombay, 1856.

Wellsted, J. R.,

Travels in Arabia, 2 Vols. London, 1838.

Travels to the City of the Caliphs along the Shores of the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, including a Voyage to the Coast of Arabia, and a Tour on the Island of Socatra, 2 Vols. London, 1840.

Wilson, A.T.,

The Persian Gulf, Oxford, 1954.


Wilson, H.H.,

A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms and of Useful words occurring in Official Documents Relating to the Administration of the Government of the British India from Arabia, Persian.... and other Languages.
London, 1855.

Winder, R. B.,

A History of the Saudi State from 1233/1818 - 1303/1891. Ph.D.
1950 Thesis, Princeton University.

MAPS



KUWAIT BAY



SCALE 1" = 4,000,000 MILES.

